In Timothy Keller's new book The Reason for God, he evaluates the objection to Christianity: "Religious belief is too culturally and historically conditioned to be 'truth.'" He explains that the objection itself is self-refuting, since that view of religion would also be culturally and historically conditioned to be "truth."
He quotes a clever rebuttal from Notre Dame philosopher Alvin Plantinga:
Suppose we concede that if I had been born of Muslim parents in Morocco rather than Christian parents in Michigan, my beliefs would have been quite different. [But] the same goes for the pluralist....If the pluralist had been born in [Morocco] he probably wouldn't be a pluralist. Does it follow that...his pluralist beliefs are produced in him by an unreliable belief-producing process?
The objection turns out to be a dismissal instead of a conclusion following careful consideration. It's a way to end the conversation, rather than engage it. It can't survive it's own terms. It's surprising how often this happens.
Keller concludes:
The reality is that we all make truth-claims of some sort and it is very hard to weigh them responsibly, but we have no alternative but to try to do so.
Melinda, I'm a little confused by your third paragraph. Are you saying that the pluralists's objection to Christian theism is a dismissal, or that Plantinga's objection to pluralism is a dismissal?
Posted by: Jeffrey J. Stables | March 05, 2008 at 08:41 AM
Jeffrey,
Melinda doesn't come around these parts (the comments) much, so I'll take a stab. The objection she called a "dismissal" was the one she noted in the first paragraph - "Religious belief is too culturally and historically conditioned to be 'truth.'" In this conext, Plantinga wasn't giving an objection to pluralism but rather a rebuttal to to the original objection. Hope that helps!
Posted by: Aaron Snell | March 05, 2008 at 01:51 PM
Thanks, Aaron, that makes sense.
Posted by: Jeffrey J. Stables | March 05, 2008 at 07:10 PM