Evolution & Morality

Dinesh D'Souza does a good job critiquing attempts to explain morality in Darwinist terms.  Morality, along with consciousness, remains one of the stubborn features of reality that we all know intuitively, which cannot be explained in purely naturalistic terms.  The lack of explanatory power in Darwinism is called "the grounding problem." 

One key point about the catalog of evolutionary arguments D'Souza cites is that evolutionary explanations always change the definition of what we're talking about in morality.  D'Souza notes one way this is done by pointing out that the morality we want explained is prescription; but any scientific explanation, by the very nature of science, will be descriptive.  Science can only observe and explain what occurs in nature.  It doesn't have the capacity to explain why morality has a prescriptive incumbency on us that the laws of nature don't have.  We have moral duties that are quite different in nature than the law of gravity, for example.  We follow the law of gravity, but we don't have a prescriptive moral duty with the subsequent moral guilt if we don't obey it.

Here's another way the terms are changed in evolutionary explanations.  Note in the article that each and every attempt to give an evolutionary account for morality has to change any self-sacrificial and altruistic act a selfish explanation because that's the only way evolution works.  Survival of the fittest produces "selfish genes," as Richard Dawkins coined it.  But if so-called self-sacrificial and altruistic acts actually have a selfish explanation for how they evolved, then they really aren't sacrificial or altruistic, are they?  The definition has been changed because evolution can't explain morality.

Comments

[AaronSTL]

I don't see how the theistic explanation is any different. If one performs a self-sacrificial and altrustic act in order to win a god's favor, then the act isn't sacrificial or altrustic, is it? If the act is done because a person is somewhat "programmed" by a god to do so in a given circumstance then that brings up a pretty big question for free will, doesn't it?

[Heath Griner]

One doesn't perform a self-sacrificial act to earn God's love, because love can't be earned. God loves us for who we are. We find His favor as His children, just as I love my child for who she is and not because of some act she might perform.

[WisdomLover]

Christianity, at least, denies that there is any moral act with which we can win God's favor. But that is neither here nor there, really.

The issue is this: how did it come to happen that human beings have altruistic and benevolent moral sentiments? Human beings manifestly do have such sentiments. They don't always act on them, even in cases where they know they should. And then they feel guilty.

Darwinists have attempted various explanations of this. But they've generally been unsatisfactory. They have generally lead either to insuperable problems regarding cheaters and free riders or to the denial of the phenomenon. The theistic explanation is that, since humans are designed (and not the products of random mutation plus time plus natural selection) those altruistic and benevolent sentiments are designed in.

[Mark S]

Aaron -- in a way, your question is a version of Euthryphro's dilema: is an act good because the gods proscribe it or do the gods proscribe an act because it is good? You may be interested in reading STR's treatment of the dilema as a challenge to Christianity and God: http://www.str.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5236

But to your question, I think you're missing a key point: imo D'Souza is not addressing your question of "why we act morally" -- in fact he acknowledges that man primarily does NOT act morally because we are fallen -- instead, again imo, he is addressing the question of "how we know what is moral?" in the first place.

[Sam]

I seems to me that Darwinian explanations of morality and theistic explanations of morality are attempting to answer separate questions. Theists are trying to answer the question, "Why is anything right or wrong?" Darwinists are trying to answer the question, "Where do our moral instincts come from?" So Darwinians explanations aren't even attempting to answer the grounding problem, because they're not concerned with whether there are any objective moral values in the first place. They're more interested in psychology--why we BELIEVE in morals.

[Joe]

"Cheaters and free riders" do not present an "insuperable" problem. Even vampire bats know how to solve this problem.

DD is a good example of someone who can't see the forest through the trees. And his comments also leave out a good number of important trees.

[WisdomLover]

""Cheaters and free riders" do not present an "insuperable" problem. Even vampire bats know how to solve this problem."

Humans know how to deal with the problem of cheaters and free riders. That's hardly the point. The point is to understand how an undesigned evolutionary system can deal with the problem at an explanatory level.

BTW-Insulting D'Souza does not count as a critique of his argument.

[Joe]

"Humans know how to deal with the problem of cheaters and free riders. That's hardly the point."

Yes, it is the point. If there are mechanisms and/or behaviors that allow will individuals within a given social species population to isolate and punish cheaters and free riders, then reciprocal altruism works. This is true for the human species, but it's also true for non-human species.

"The point is to understand how an undesigned evolutionary system can deal with the problem at an explanatory level."

Take a look at vampire bats. Ask the question "How do bats deal with cheaters?". The answer will show you how cheaters and free riders are not an insuperable problem with respect to the evolution of altruism. There's no reason why the vampire bat system can not be the product of an "undesigned evolutionary system". Bats have a "moral code". Do you think that they got it from God?

Also, I wasn't insulting DD. I was describing his argument.

DD looked at each mechanism (kin selection, etc.) in isolation, decided that any one mechanism in isolation couldn't account for absolutely everything that we see in "moral" behavior, and so concluded that these mechanisms were of no explanatory value. Neat and tidy, but wrong. It also left many other parts of the explanations. Again, neat and tidy, but incomplete.

[AT]

Joe, thanks for your comments. I'm wondering why you seem to consider cheaters and free riders to be deserving of punishment?

[david.hawkins]

Hi Joe,

>> "Even vampire bats know how to solve this problem."

I was wondering if, with this assertion, you are equating "knowing" with "instinct?"

or

Do you mean bats "instinctively" solve this problem?

If this is true:
"natural selection has rewarded with survival the instincts for engaging in mutually beneficial exchanges..."

I am wondering then:

Could a human being instinctively perform or engage in a completely selfLESS act for the benefit of another?

(I mean apart from dying on a cross.)

Or does this run counter to the purpose of instinct? (suggesting that knowing what to do is superior to instinct)

[Joe]

I'm wondering why you seem to consider cheaters and free riders to be deserving of punishment?

Interesting question, but not really relevant to the question of whether or not "morality" or "reciprocal altruism" could be the product of evolution. But if you want an answer, I'd say ask the vampire bats.

[Joe]

David,

I'm not certain I understand what you mean by "instinctive". I'm not sure that behaviors can be neatly sorted into "instinctive" in one pile and "knowing what to do" in another. In fact, I'm not sure what you mean by "knowing what to do". I'm not trying to be difficult, I'm just not sure what you're saying.

[AT]

"Interesting question, but not really relevant to the question of whether or not "morality" or "reciprocal altruism" could be the product of evolution."

Thanks Joe. But I'd have to disagree with you here. As someone else posted earlier, this is most relevant. There's a distinct difference is how we know something, right or wrong in this case, and that that something exists. You seem to agree that right and wrong exists. So I'm just trying to understand here why you seem to agree that cheaters and free riders are a "problem."

[WisdomLover]

I do think the bats are as designed by God as humans are. That shouldn't be surprising should it? I don't know whether you could characterize what bats have as being quite so developed as to be characterized as a moral code.

What you have in your final paragraph is, indeed, a critique of D'Souza. So thanks for that. The simple characterization of D'Souza as not seeing the forest for the trees is not a critique but an insult.

I don't think that your critique against D'Souza works because he does give Darwinian-style explanations there due in the limited areas to which they can be applied. For example, he agrees, I believe, that kin selection can explain some forms of altruism. I think he also agrees that reciprocal altruism can explain some forms of altruism. But there are other forms of altruism which simply do not have an adequate Darwinian explanation.

I don't think D'Souza makes this point, but oddly enough, I think these are the forms of altruism we find most laudable. The case that Darwinism really has trouble with is where one helps an unrelated person in a situation where one can have no reasonable expectation of receiving some benefit.

[Joe]

So I'm just trying to understand here why you seem to agree that cheaters and free riders are a "problem."

Well, ok, as the bats will tell you, if there is no mechanism to control cheating and free riding, that's very bad news for the non-cheaters and exchange systems will break down. On the other hand, if cheating can be identified and controlled, then one may well be more likely to survive by participating in an reciprocal exchange system then by going it totally alone. That is, those who tend to act as wary, but occasionally generous, participants in a system of mutual exchange will be be favored over those who never share, are always selfish and always going it alone.

[AT]

Thanks Joe. Why should the non-cheaters be considered better, or even equal to, the cheaters and free riders? Why does it matter that it's "bad news" for them? Also, why is the individual's or the species' survival considered a good thing? Why not just watch for yourself and screw everyone else?

[Joe]

I'm sorry, but "not seeing the forest for the trees" is not an insult. DD looked at a few individual "trees" (mechanisms) in isolation from each other and demanded that a given isolated mechanism explain everything. He looked at mechanism A and said "but that doesn't explain X", etc.

He did not consider that kin selection, reciprocal altruism, and the ability of brains to reason and to learn can all come to together in a given social species. All of these factors interact with each other at any given time and place and in any given social animal. You can't tease them apart and expect any one mechanism will explain everything.

He failed to consider the possibility of an emergent property (a forest) that might be greater than the sum of its parts. It's not kin selection alone or reciprocal altruism alone or learned behviors alone or reasoning alone that explains the emergence of moral codes in Homo sapiens. It's all of it together.

[eric]

WisdomLover,

"Christianity, at least, denies that there is any moral act with which we can win God's favor. But that is neither here nor there, really."

Can you explain the parable of the sheep and the goats, if it is not saying that 'selfless' moral acts can win God's favor?

[Joe]

"Why should the non-cheaters be considered better, or even equal to, the cheaters and free riders? Why does it matter that it's "bad news" for them? Also, why is the individual's or the species' survival considered a good thing?"

I think that we're looking at two different types of questions. The posting was about the possibility that moral codes could be the product of evolution. This is what I've been trying to address. If you're trying to explain how or why something can or did evolve, then the only question is whether or not something gets more genes into the next generation. DD says evolution can't explain the origin of morality. I'm trying to explain that it probably can, that is, I'm trying to point out that certain behaviors that we often describe as "moral" may be advantageous. And that's about all I'm trying to do.

"Why not just watch for yourself and screw everyone else?"

'Cuz, as I said, you might be much better off if you don't try to go it alone.

[eric]

WisdomLover,

"The case that Darwinism really has trouble with is where one helps an unrelated person in a situation where one can have no reasonable expectation of receiving some benefit."

The explanation may not be obvious, but there is an explanation. I think it's still a bit speculative, but there are plausible evolutionary explanations for these cases. I may not be very good at explaining it, but if you are truly interested in the explanation, I can try to write something and post it here.

[AT]

"I think that we're looking at two different types of questions. The posting was about the possibility that moral codes could be the product of evolution. This is what I've been trying to address."

Thanks again Joe. What I'm trying to address is that even if we can discover that morality evolved, that only possibly explains "how" we know something is right or wrong. It does nothing to justify or ground the rightness or wrongness of an action. Perhaps I can explain what I mean by quoting you further:

"DD says evolution can't explain the origin of morality. I'm trying to explain that it probably can, that is, I'm trying to point out that certain behaviors that we often describe as "moral" may be advantageous."

This goes back to my question as to why is my advantage a "good" thing as opposed to someone else's advantage? Working together often means I have to sacrifice my good for someone else. How is that advantageous? Furthermore, can we really describe behavior that we do to simply gain an advantage for ourselves as "moral"? Wouldn't that we called selfishness? I don't know of any societies that would consider that a moral virtue, do you?

[RonH]

Dinesh D'Souza! What fun!

D'Souza 'refers' to Adam Smith's "impartial spectator".
Why? Just name dropping. This is NRO after all.

The 'impartial spectator' is part of Smith's naturalistic theory of human psychology and ethics. Read it and weep, Dinesh.

Then D'Souza says that scoundrels in an altruistic society would have 'the best deal of all' and be 'more likely to survive than their more altruistic fellow tribesman'.

OK, suppose they would on both counts.

If the scoundrels get too numerous or too active their tribe as a whole loses the competitive advantage altruism gives it over other groups.

And if the scoundrels get too mumerous or too active the tribe hires more cops and accounting auditors exposing the scoundrels and cancelling their advantage.

So there are two silly things from D'Souza from the first page of my printed copy.

I look forward to reading the rest of the article.

RonH

[Joe]

"If we can discover that morality evolved, that only possibly explains "how" we know something is right or wrong."

I agree, but it's the origin question that is addressed by DD's commentary, and that's all I'm trying to address myself. That is, can evolution explain the origin of human moral codes? The "gounding problem" has been the focus of other STR posts, and I've submitted plenty of comments about the grounding problem on those many other posts.

"This goes back to my question as to why is my advantage a "good" thing as opposed to someone else's advantage?"

If we're talking about the origins question, it's not a question of "good" or "bad". The only question is whether or not certain behaviors are more successful than others at passing on genes. Of course, humans are a clever species with a capacity for language, and so we may chose to label successful behaviors, including reciprocal exchange behaviors, as "good".

"Working together often means I have to sacrifice my good for someone else. How is that advantageous?"

In the context of the origins question, any "advantage" depends on the nature of the sacrifice, the length of time one sacrifices, whether the sacrifice benefits kin, and in the end, whether the sacrifice is ultimately rewarded in some way that includes genes into the next generations. What I'm trying to say is that a given act "sacrifice" may not always as be as sacrificial as it first appears.

I would add I'm not trying to suggest that every single sacrifice ever made by any individual is ultimately going to be rewarded or that human brains have the capacity to calculate exactly whether or not a given sacrifice will ultimately pay off. Evolution doesn't produce perfect machines capable of calculating exacatly when to sacrifice and when not to sacrifice. Individual animals make mistakes.

One thing DD fails to appreciate is that evolution favors behaviors that are usually successful, but that doesn't mean that a given behavior is always successful. Sometimes a given behavior will be a "mistake", that is, it will lead to failure, in an evolutionary sense.

What matters is whether or not a given behavior is successful more often than a competing behavior. The same impulse can be very successful or fatal, depending on circumstances, and so to look for the advantage in every single act is too simplistic.

[Richard W. Symonds]

Does this help ?

http://gatwickcity.phpbb3now.com/viewtopic.php?f=12&t=535&start=140

The idea of a God-given, inborn "Moral Instinct"...

[Mike Westfall]

> Can you explain the parable of
> the sheep and the goats, if it is
> not saying that 'selfless' moral
> acts can win God's favor?

This is Jesus dispensing Law, not Gospel. It should drive us to desperation, once we understand that we all have fallen into the 'goat' category.

Fortunately, there's Good News for even goats.

[WisdomLover]

"Can you explain the parable of the sheep and the goats, if it is not saying that 'selfless' moral acts can win God's favor?"

The parable says that Christ "will separate the nations one from another, as a shepherd separates the sheep from the goats." I'm not an expert on shepherding, but I'm pretty sure that sheep are not separated from goats on the basis of good or altruistic works.

A more likely basis for the separation is that the sheep hear the shepherd's voice and answer his call.

After this separation there is a judgment. But the outcome is foreordained. The goats can't make themselves sheep and the sheep can't make themselves goats.

As for their good works, what happens here is that Christ imputes righteousness to the sheep and unrighteousness to the goats in a way that both flocks agree has nothing to do with their actual behavior. This is most evident when he responds to the objections of the goats. He says that the goats never did anything to help anyone. By common sense morality, that should earn a great big "Really??!!" There is probably not a soul on earth that's had any kind of normal life that has not helped someone.**

But what's important here is not what the goats or the sheep say, but what the shepherd says. The shepherd is saying, in effect, that the good works you do are not going to count in your favor if you are a goat, and even good works you don't do will count in your favor if you are a sheep.

The important thing doesn't seem to be good works, there's nothing we can do on that front to help ourselves. the important thing seems to be answering the shepherd's call.

-----------------------
** - Obviously, a child that dies very young or a severely mentally disabled person might never have the opportunity to help anyone.

[eric]

Matthew 25:34-40

Then the King will say to those on his right, 'Come, you who are blessed by my Father; take your inheritance, the kingdom prepared for you since the creation of the world. 35For I was hungry and you gave me something to eat, I was thirsty and you gave me something to drink, I was a stranger and you invited me in, 36I needed clothes and you clothed me, I was sick and you looked after me, I was in prison and you came to visit me.
37"Then the righteous will answer him, 'Lord, when did we see you hungry and feed you, or thirsty and give you something to drink? 38When did we see you a stranger and invite you in, or needing clothes and clothe you? 39When did we see you sick or in prison and go to visit you?'

40"The King will reply, 'I tell you the truth, whatever you did for one of the least of these brothers of mine, you did for me.' '

What I see is the 'sheep' being told to take their "inheritance, the kingdom prepared for you since the creation of the world". The reason given to them is their good works. They performed 'selfless' moral acts. They are rewarded.

"It should drive us to desperation, once we understand that we all have fallen into the 'goat' category."

The story seems to require that there really are sheep. It also seems to explain what one must do to qualify as a sheep rather than a goat.

"I'm not an expert on shepherding, but I'm pretty sure that sheep are not separated from goats on the basis of good or altruistic works."

In reality they are not, but in the parable, that seems to be the basis for separation.

"A more likely basis for the separation is that the sheep hear the shepherd's voice and answer his call."

Again, the story seems to give a clear explanation of the basis for separation. It is the deeds done by the person to help "the least of these".

"The important thing doesn't seem to be good works, there's nothing we can do on that front to help ourselves. the important thing seems to be answering the shepherd's call."

I see the story very differently. It seem to me to strongly indicate that the important thing is the good deeds. I don't see where answering the call comes into it.

Matthew 25:46

Then they will go away to eternal punishment, but the righteous to eternal life.

The 'righteous' get eternal life, while the others get eternal punishment. From the context immediately preceding, it seems that the righteous are those who have done good deeds for "the least of these".

I don't want to derail this thread into a discussion about the sheep and the goats, but I did want to respond to those kind enough to answer my earlier question.

[RonH]

D'Souza notes one way this is done by pointing out that the morality we want explained is prescription; ...

I think Melinda meant prescriptive. Anyway, this is question begging: A Prescription requires a Prescriber.

...but any scientific explanation, by the very nature of science, will be descriptive.

So? What's wrong with a description? How about accurate description?

-------------------

The post also brings up 'the grounding problem' (again). This is just more question begging. We don't need 'grounding' for morality so we don't need a Grounder.

We have good reasons to try to influence each other's behavior when no one is looking. (And that is what morality, as opposed to law, is about.) So we do try. And we are successful. Why are we successful? One reason: we've developed some strong methods (the threat of eternal damnation among them). Another reason: we have evolved susceptibility to such methods. Why would we become susceptible? Well, would you want a spouse who had such a susceptibility or one who didn't?

And, speaking of how we behave when when no one is looking: How could an omnipresent, omniscient being have anything to do with that anyway? He's always looking! That's law, not morality.

---------------------

Finally, that article on grounding...

if there’s a real problem of evil, there has to be real evil.

Fine then: there's no 'real' problem of evil and no 'real' evil. There are still things we have very good reason to discourage each other from doing even if no one is looking. There still are methods for us to use to do this. And, we are still susceptible to these methods.

And, there is still a real problem of suffering.

RonH

[WisdomLover]

"sheep are not separated from goats on the basis of good or altruistic works." -WL

In reality they are not, but in the parable, that seems to be the basis for separation. -Eric

No, according to the parable they they are separated in the way that a shepherd separates sheep from goats. Which is not according to good works. This is what I take the import of this phrase to be: "and He will separate them from one another, as the shepherd separates the sheep from the goats" (Matthew 25:32)"

I also think that Jesus tells us in John that the sheep know the voice of the Good Shepherd and answer His call (see John 10:27).

It is only after the separation has already taken place that any talk of good works begins.

[RonH]

WL,

It's clear that those who provided food, drink, clothing, shelter, and visits in prison to those who needed those things were separated from those who did not on that basis.

What made the righteous righteous in this story was works.

Nothing is said about even one sheep who didn't do these good things but got to stay with the other sheep anyway.

And, perhaps more importantly, nothing is said in the story about even one goat who did these good things but had to share the fate of the other goats anyway.

No. To a man, sheep did good works and goats did not. this isn't what you'd expect these things in the story if the story were saying 'by faith alone'.

Face it, this is a place in the NT where salvation is attributed to works. It may very well be contradicted in John. That's expected. No reason to thing the Bible would fail to contradict itself. It may very well even be contradicted somewhere by the writer of Matthew himself (whoever that may have been). That's fine too. That writer, being human, must be expected to contract himself.

It is only after the separation has already taken place that any talk of good works begins.

S o
w h a t ?

RonH

[WisdomLover]

Again, Ron, the story specifically said that the separation occurs in the same way that the shepherd separates sheep from goats. This is not by good works.

You are right to note that the sheep were all credited with good works and the goats were not credited with good works.

What you do not take into account is that the sheep are credited with good works that, by their own admission, they did not do. And the goats are not credited even with good works that, by their own insistence, they did do. There's obviously something else going on here other than the reckoning of a celestial naughty and nice list.

[RonH]

WL, you say...

the separation occurs in the same way that the shepherd separates sheep from goats.

But all the story says is...

he will separate them one from another, as a shepherd separates the sheep from the goats

Well, the as here could mean Jesus uses a method like that of the shepherd.

But it doesn't mean that.

All this as means is this: The shepherd separates the sheep from the goats and Jesus separates the righteous from the unrighteous.

That's it. That's all the as means. This as doesn't tell us how Jesus does the separating.

How can we tell this as does not tell us how Jesus does the separating? Because the rest of the story tells us exactly how Jesus does the separating.

And the story doesn't talk about the sound of Jesus's voice. It talks about good works, who did them, and who didn't.

=======================

Then you say:

sheep are credited with good works that, by their own admission, they did not do.

OK WL, are you having me on?

Seems like now you are misinterpreting the sheep when they say:

when did we see you hungry, and feed you?

This doesn't mean the sheep didn't feed the hungry; it means they don't understand that when Jesus says...

I was hungry, and you gave me food to eat,...

... He doesn't really mean he was hungry. He explains:

inasmuch as you did it to one of the least of these my brothers, you did it to me.

inasmuch as you did it = because you fed the hungry
inasmuch as you did it = because you fed the hungry
inasmuch as you did it = because you fed the hungry

In other words: Jesus reckons works done for the least of his brothers as works done for Him. That's what He meant in the first place when he said ...

I was hungry, and you gave me food to eat,...

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

And, similarly, the goats don't claim they did any good works. They simply fail to understand Jesus when he says

I was hungry, and you didn't give me food to eat.

... just like the sheep failed to grok ...

I was hungry, and you gave me food to eat,...

RonH

[WisdomLover]

"All this as means is this: The shepherd separates the sheep from the goats and Jesus separates the righteous from the unrighteous."

So what you are saying is that the metaphor of sheep and goats in this parable is completely idle. He might as well have said that he separated the nations into a group on his right and a group on his left, and skipped all that distracting sheep and goat talk.

Sorry, not buying that.

As a side note, Strong's shows the meaning of hosper as "just as", though the translations often shorten this (as in this case) to "as".

"the rest of the story tells us exactly how Jesus does the separating."

No, the rest of the story tells us what the Son of Man will do after He's finished separating the sheep from the goats. This is a point you've repeatedly missed.

You're right that the story says nothing about how a shepherd separates sheep from goats. But if you want to know what Jesus thinks about how shepherds might accomplish this feat, it makes sense to take a look at his Good Shepherd teachings in the book of John.

Now let's turn to the good works.

Jesus attributes a particular set of good works to the sheep: Feeding Him, Jesus, when He, Jesus, was hungry, etc.

If works had anything to do with the benefit conferred upon the sheep, it was the presence of this set of good works. These are works that the sheep claim they did not do.

What is the basis of this attribution? The fact that they feed the least of Jesus brethren etc.

How many times? It looks like even once.

In other words, the 'saving' work is attributed to them on the basis of a body of works that they would seem (more on this qualifier below) to have in common with virtually every other human (except those whose lives end before they start).

Now turn to the goats.

Jesus denies that they did a particular set of good works: Feeding Him, Jesus, when He, Jesus, was hungry, etc.

If works had anything to do with the benefit denied to the goats, it was the absence of this set of good works. These are works that the goats claim they never failed to do.

What is the basis of the denial? The fact that they failed to feed the least of Jesus brethren etc.

How many times? Well, it looks like even once. **

In other words, the 'damning' omission is attributed to them on the basis of a body of omissions that they have in common with virtually every other human (except those whose lives end before they start).

We've all failed to feed our neighbor enough for Christ to look at it as a failure to feed Him. And that's enough to send us to Hell.

Notice that I do not say that we've all fed our neighbor enough for Christ to look at it as feeding Him. Our problem is this, more often than not, we are not feeding our neighbor, but our own guilt, or our own self-righteousness.

Even those who claim to be feeding Christ in their neighbor are not feeding their neighbor, are they? Indeed, this last group seems to bear the most resemblance to goats. If I'm feeding Christ in my neighbor on the basis of this passage, then I'm really trying to shore up my goatish bleat "When did I see you hungry and not feed you..."

Christ's commandment is to show love to our neighbor by helping him. This we might seem to do all the time, but in truth, we may never do. Probably the only way we'll ever do this is to take eternal reward and punishment off the table. Only the Gospel can do that.

Now, it seems to me that we've gotten into a bit of a re-hash at this point. We're also badly off-topic. So, Ron and Eric, I'm going to give you the last word (unless you really vex me ;-). I promise to read whatever you care to respond with.

---------------------

** - This contradicts a point I think I got wrong in an earlier posting: In the earlier post, I said that Christ, in effect, accuses the goats of never having helped anyone. The passage actually seems to be saying that if you failed even once to help others, you failed to help Christ.

[eric]

WisdomLover,

I agree that we are quite off topic, and I take the primary responsibility because I brought up the sheep and the goats. I still think a plain reading of this story on its own merits is saying that people should help those in need, and that there will be a reward for this which will be dispensed by the Son of Man. Any further discussion of this seems to fit better in the other thread where we are discussing issues with Biblical interpretations. I still haven't responded to your latest comments there, but if I do decide to say more on this, I will include it in the other thread.

[Kevin Winters]

Why must be posit a ground for morality? There is a story about a man who got shot, but before he would let the physicians treat his wounds he demanded to know who shot him, with what kind of weapon, the reasons for his being shot, etc. (in other words, he wanted to ground why the event happened, why it was like it was). Might not morality be a similar thing: I can see, just from natural observation, that some actions and motives simply cause suffering for myself and others and that others cultivate happiness and peace (e.g., see the work in positive psychology and Martin Seligman). I don't know why that is, but since I want to be happy, I'll follow this order that I'm given.

[WisdomLover]

KW -

I think that the issue is this. Darwinists often claim to have a comprehensive explanation. Morality, whether rightly or not, is seen by some as an insuperable explanatory hole in the theory. The fact of moral and even genuinely altruistic behavior is taken by the critics as a given. The fact that some strategies lead to happiness and others to misery is also taken as a given.

[RonH]

Why must [w]e posit a ground for morality?

Good question Kevin.

The metaphor must date from a time when people believed the ground below them stood still. We know now that neither absolute motion nor the lack of it exist. The ground 'below' us, is in constant motion. (Which direction is up?) "Foundations" don't do what they are credited with.

Those looking for a 'grounding' of morality should find a different analogy and STR should probably rename its newsletter.

An accurate theory of morality would be nice to have. Try this.

RonH

[eric]

It seems to me that evolutionary theory produces some plausible hypotheses about the origin of a 'moral sense' and the explanation for apparently altruistic behavior. I don't think its legitimate to take as a premise that there is some absolute and universal morality or moral code when critiquing evolutionary theory. Something like that needs to be established first. I also think the distinction between genuinely altruistic behavior and apparent altruistic behavior become very sticky the more closely we look at them. I find discussions of altruism to be a case where the semantics really are very important, and not just a distraction from the substantive point. We need to know the criteria that would qualify something as genuinely altruistic before we can begin to determine if such a thing exists.

Also, despite hearing several several speakers, and reading several authors, going on for a long time about it, I don't see why a Christian worldview is capable of grounding absolute morality better than a non-Christian worldview. For example, Greg Koukl likes to use the following example when questioning non-Christian views of morality.

"Why is it wrong to torture babies for fun?"

He doesn't seem content with responses along the lines of, "it causes unnecessary suffering"; he presses for something more basic. So, what is the Christian solution to this? Why is it wrong (absolutely and universally), from the Christian perspective, to torture babies for fun?

[RonH]

The Parable of WL

A Master asked two from the students gathered before him to approach. The Master stood face to face with the first and slapped him upside the head. Then he explained to all the students gathered there that these two students had ignored the plain sense of the words in the previous day's lesson finding in it, instead, their own preferred meanings. Then he went to the second student, stood face to face with him, and slapped him upside the head.

What is the difference between the treatment the Master gave one student and the treatment he gave the other?

RonH

[Kevin Winters]

Why isn't genuine altruism possible on (some version of) evolutionary theory? At least all sentient beings are essentially social such that the good of the other can be a matter of concern. I just don't see the essential relation between evolution and selfishness, despite the hypothetical "selfish gene" (which is more of a thought experiment than anything actually discovered or demonstrated).

[WisdomLover]

Eric-

I certainly don't want to put words in Greg's mouth, but I can tell you what I find unsatisfactory with "it causes unnecessary suffering". The response seems to give rise to a rather evil sounding denial:

What do you mean "unnecessary"? The torture wouldn't have been half so much fun without the suffering. Who wants to torture a baby that just sits there?

Now, obviously, you didn't mean "unnecessary" in a way that could be used as in the above response. What you meant was that the suffering was not needed for some overarching good. But that shows that the notion of "unnecessary suffering" seems to smuggle in an antecedent notion of morality.

On the other hand, if you say that the problem is simply that it causes suffering, then all sorts of things, like chemotherapy for cancer victims, are going to come out as morally wrong.

And there is a very important problem with any kind of preference-based or hedonistic utilitarian answer such as RonH was suggesting (I think) with his link. Utilitarians want to say that the overarching good is the sum total of happiness (where happiness is understood as desire-satisfaction or pleasure or something like that).

The problem is that they have then to include happiness from all sources.

Presumably, the utilitarian will say that pain that the baby suffers goes in the minus column for the act and completely outweighs any fun that the torturer got from the act. That's why, according to the utilitarian, the suffering is unnecessary.

But if you think about it, this is a really weird response. It amounts to saying that the act was really bad, but, hey, at least the torturer had fun doing it. The fun of the torturer goes in the plus column.

Even if the baby's pain is greater than the torturer's pleasure (and, really, what guarantees that that will always be so), it seems more accurate to say that the fact that the torturer actually took pleasure in the act makes it worse.

But why does that seem more accurate?

One answer (though not the only answer) you might give on this is that that question is like asking why the side panel on the STR blog seems yellowish. You don't argue that the side panel is yellowish, you just look. By the same token, you don't argue that the torturer's pleasure makes the act work, you just see that it does. We have a built-in moral sense that tells us that the torturer's pleasure makes the act worse (and, btw, that tells us that the act is wrong in the first place).

But where did that sense come from?

The Darwinist will have to say that it evolved somehow. This is probably what Christians like Greg or D'Souza (or myself) despair of ever seeing adequately worked out. On the other hand, it might make sense to see it as designed in.

[eric]

Interesting comments, WIsdomLover. I am not here defending a purely utilitarian ethic, and in your comments you touch on some of the problems with doing so. Unfortunately, you didn't respond to the main point in my post, which was a question.

Why is it wrong (absolutely and universally), from the Christian perspective, to torture babies for fun?

[Joe]

"We have a built-in moral sense that tells us that the torturer's pleasure makes the act worse (and, btw, that tells us that the act is wrong in the first place). But where did that sense come from? This is probably what Christians like Greg or D'Souza (or myself) despair of ever seeing adequately worked out."

"Despair"? Somehow, I doubt if "despair" is the right word here to describe the emotion in question.

I think that this might be a more accurate description of the emotions involved....

"This is probably what Christians like Greg or D'Souza (or myself) pray desperately hasn't already been adequately worked out."

After all the comments, you really can't see how how empathy might be an evolved trait in many big brained social animals (and not just in humans)? You can't understand how brains might evolve in such a way as to produce feelings of distress at the sight of offspring being tortured? You are aware that a desire to protect offspring is a highly favored emotion, yes?

[WisdomLover]

"...you didn't respond to the main point in my post"

Eric-

I think I did touch on it, though admittedly it was a light touch. This occurred in the final sentence of my last post.

Allow me to expand it out a bit.

Let's suppose that you go the route of Moral Intuitionism, i.e. we have an in-built faculty of moral sense.

It's going to be difficult to see how such a sense evolved to the degree that we recognize acts where one helps an unrelated person in a situation where one can have no reasonable expectation of receiving some benefit as among the most morally praiseworthy acts. Kin Selection and Reciprocal Altruism, in particular would appear to be ill-suited to making any explanatory headway in this area.

But it is not as difficult to see how such a sense might be designed-in by an intelligent designer, i.e. God. So the Moral Intuitionist Christian's answer to your question is that our in-built moral sense, designed into us by our Creator, tells us that it is morally wrong to torture the baby just for fun.

If you assume some theory other than moral intuitionism, e.g. Kantianism, you will probably arrive somewhere in the same neighborhood. Time plus chance plus natural selection is going to have difficulty explaining the moral reality. But intelligent design (whether implemented by fiat or by guided evolutionary processes) will not have a similar problem. This is not to say, of course, that it will have no problems.

Joe-

I didn't have the time to collect up all the attempted explanations on your side that have been put forward in this long and rather fragmented thread (as you invited me to in your last post). Perhaps a little later today I will have the time. Until then, or perhaps in lieu of that, these remarks aimed specifically at Eric's remark will also give you some additional targets to shoot at.

[eric]

WisdomLover,

"So the Moral Intuitionist Christian's answer to your question is that our in-built moral sense, designed into us by our Creator, tells us that it is morally wrong to torture the baby just for fun."

I'm not asking what tells us that it's wrong. I am asking "why is it wrong?" The claim is made that Christians can ground their morality in some way that is substantially different from non-Christians. I am trying to get down to that, because I am not convinced that it is true.

Of course, the question isn't only limited to WisdomLover. I would be happy for any Christian to answer the question, with a rationale that cannot be legitimately asserted by a non-Christian.
Why is it wrong (absolutely and universally), from the Christian perspective, to torture babies for fun?

[Newbietu]

eric,
Babies are unique human beings created by God. An action that causes a human being pain must have an extremely good reason. Pleasure is not a sufficiently good reason for causing pain.
Let me know if you want more detail.

[eric]

Newbietu,

"Babies are unique human beings created by God. An action that causes a human being pain must have an extremely good reason. Pleasure is not a sufficiently good reason for causing pain."

Is it still valid now?

Why is pleasure not a sufficiently good reason for causing pain? What is the reason for this that is valid in a Christian worldview, but not valid in a non-Christian worldview?

[Joe]

I'm curious. Is it ever ok to torture babies, whether for fun or not?

[Newbietu]

As Christians we believe that God is good. Not by some external measurement, but by definition.

God wants us to also do good, so he placed within us a knowledge of good and evil (there's really more to the story than that, try reading the first few chapters of Genesis). We can use this knowledge to determine whether our own actions or those of others are in line with God's character.

This internal moral compass tells us that hurting others for one's own pleasure is not consistent with God's nature, and is thus evil.

How is that?

[Newbietu]

Joe,
I can imagine a situation where causing a baby pain might ultimately be for his benefit.
I don't really like to spend much time thinking along those lines, but off the top of my head I can think of chemotherapy and reconstructive surgery (say after a car accident) as two events that could cause a baby pain and ultimately be good.

So I guess it depends on whether you consider every instance of pain torture.