Question for Greg: If the Molinist were to say that God elects individuals by virtue of electing "worlds" would this seem to you more accurate? It appears to me that this isnt an either or question...electing certain worlds will mean the election of certain individuals.
What bothers me is that it seems most Calvinists (or at least 90% that I've met) poison the well by creating strawmen of ANY other theological belief by saying they have "Armenian persuasion" or are some form of Armenianism.
The debate is not that simple and it closes ears to cast everyone but Calvinists as part of the Amermenianism heresy.
The Calvinist/Molinist debate is far too big to get into to discuss on a blog post. My contribution, then, is to recommend that people read the text or summaries of the Second Council of Orange (held on 3 July, 529) which were at the end of the height of the Armenianism/Pelagianism/Semipelagianism/Augustine debates.
My own question on Molinism is with respect to the idea that, under this view, God "evaluates" (for lack of a better term) how people will freely choose, given certain situations and circumstances and then "elects" to create the world we now know.
If this is the case, wouldn't this put us on a bit of a slippery-slope toward deism? Where God says, "Ok. I've created everything and set things in motion so that people will freely choose a certain way. Now I'll just let things unfold as I intended during my creation."
I get that this concept seems to wrap up the libertarian free-will problem in a nice little package, but I'm not sure that that's always a good thing. Some things seem more plausible when held in some tension.
Plus, there's the whole question of whether or not we actually have libertarian free-will, but that may be too much to get into, here.
Daniel,
Interesting question about deism, but Id say that God choosing a world to create doesn't at all preclude His involvement through out the history of that world.
I would also add that if Craigs formulation of this idea is even possible, it does seem like the best resolution to this whole debate...to me anyway.
Steve, I agree that Molinism does not slide into Deism. One primary reason for this is that one of the things God "evaluates" (to use Daniel's terminology) in choosing which world to create is His own involvement, as well as humans' free response to His involvement.
Molinism must be understood in the historical context that it was refined in by Luis de Molina. Molinism affirms free will but only in the implicit understanding that grace is absolutely necessary for any act towards salvation. Pelagianism denied Original Sin and said man could choose God (or actions towards salvation) without any grace at all whereas Molinism, or at least Molinism in the Catholic Church, has a long history of affirming the necessity of grace to God because of the consequences Original Sin.
I can't speak for Craig because I am only familiar with his writings on Molinism and haven't read them directly.
For more information on a better understanding I recommend reading New Advent's article on Molinism.
I agree with Greg's conclusion in the video. I don't think this POV solves any problems. I actually think it creates a problem: According to Molinism, if God elects a world, he is not just electing the world with the highest number of people who choose him, he is electing all of their choices for all of history. If that's the case, did he proclaim all of Scripture's prophecies only after seeing what was going happen? I think Molinism binds the will of God even more than classic Arminianism.
Also, @M.M.: I took Greg's comments regarding "Arminian persuasion" to mean only that Molinism is usually a view used by Arminian-leaning people searching for some middle ground.
I wonder how someone like Greg, who affirms libertarian freedom in certain instances (though not in coming to faith) goes about explaining God's providential control and/or foreknowledge of those kinds of free choices. After all, he neither accepts Molinism, nor the usual Calvinist explanation that uses the idea of God's being outside of time. Hmmm.
I would also like to note that middle knowledge was not originally primarily used in conjunction with explaining election to salvation, but rather to explain God's foreknowledge of free acts. Any application of the doctrine to election is purely optional on the part of the theologian. Interestingly, some Calvinists are employing the doctrine of middle knowledge in their explication of God's providence (e.g., Terrence Thiessen, Bruce Ware). Whether this is a good move is another question.
I still reflect upon Luther's words to Erasmus in the Bondage of the Will, where he lists the works of the flesh in Galatians, and then challenges Erasmus to find something in the list that will choose God.
If God elects worlds, as the Molinists say, then he elected a world where nobody chooses Christ apart from radical Divine intervention.
[I can only get the first 30 seconds (or so) of the video to play, so I apologize if my comments reflect my having not watched it in its entirety.]
Matt:
You wrote:
>> According to Molinism, if God elects a world, he is not just electing the world with the highest number of people who choose him, he is electing all of their choices for all of history.
I suspect that the Molinist would object to this particular usage of the term "elect," claiming that it's not strictly accurate in this context. She'd probably prefer, instead, to say that God (weakly) actualizes or brings about all of the states of affairs in which free agents act with (some version of) libertarian freedom.
>> If that's the case, did he proclaim all of Scripture's prophecies only after seeing what was going happen? I think Molinism binds the will of God even more than classic Arminianism.
Molinists don't believe that God, first, looked to see what was going to happen in the future and then, second, reported to us what He saw. If God possesses middle knowledge, He knew, prior to the world's existence, what action any given agent would freely perform if placed in any given circumstances. And since God exhaustively decides which contingent states of affairs obtain, which includes free human actions, the Molinist account actually appears to afford God more providential latitude.
Ryan:
You wrote:
>> I wonder how someone like Greg, who affirms libertarian freedom in certain instances (though not in coming to faith) goes about explaining God's providential control and/or foreknowledge of those kinds of free choices. After all, he neither accepts Molinism, nor the usual Calvinist explanation that uses the idea of God's being outside of time.
I think you raise an important issue. It seems to me that if one is a Calvinist about divine providence, then one can't (or, in any case, shouldn't) affirm libertarianism about human agency. From what I understand, the Calvinist traditionally holds that God's decrees are logically prior to His foreknowledge. In a sense, then, God acquires or derives His foreknowledge on the basis of what He decrees; His acquisition of foreknowledge is logically posterior to His decrees. I think this might create a problem for a view like Mr. Koukl's (or Thiessen's or Ware's, assuming they subscribe to the same view).
In the first logical moment (when God is decreeing), if He decrees that an agent be placed in some set of circumstances with libertarian freedom, it appears that God is necessarily ignorant about how that agent will exercise her freedom. He only "discovers" precisely what that agent will freely do once He "arrives" at the second logical moment, which is to say, once He has completed decreeing. But, by then, it's "too late" to exert any provident control over the event concerning the agent's action--for He has already finished His decreeing--so God's providence doesn't extend to libertarian actions. Yet God is supposed to enjoy comprehensive, providential control over all contingent events. Thus, it seems that the acceptance of a Calvinistic conception of divine providence precludes the acceptance of a libertarian conception of agency.
I based my comment about God electing "worlds" on a point made later in the video.
>>Molinists don't believe that God, first, looked to see what was going to happen in the future and then, second, reported to us what He saw. If God possesses middle knowledge, He knew, prior to the world's existence, what action any given agent would freely perform if placed in any given circumstances. And since God exhaustively decides which contingent states of affairs obtain, which includes free human actions, the Molinist account actually appears to afford God more providential latitude.
I'm not clear on your point here. Since God can choose the circumstances that would allow certain things to happen, he is more free than if he simply made those things happen? I feel like I'm probably missing your point.
I was only trying to make the point that any scheme which views God as being susceptible to our will, so that he has to choose what he does either based on or in spite of what we do (or would do), binds God's freedom. It necessarily implies that he is responding rather than initiating.
>> I'm not clear on your point here. Since God can choose the circumstances that would allow certain things to happen, he is more free than if he simply made those things happen?
Sorry about the lack of clarity. I'm hesitant to describe God's having "more providential latitude" in terms of His being "more free." On the view that God causally determines (proximately or remotely) every contingent event which obtains, He's certainly "more free" (compared to Molinism) in the sense that He exerts more--indeed, exhaustive--causal control over those events. If being "more free" means "causally determining every contingent event," then God is more free on this view.
I deny that such a view, however, is compatible with there being genuine human agency in the world. So although God is more free (in the above sense), His providence suffers because, it seems to me, causally determining every contingent event entails the destruction of human agency. This view, in my judgment, provides a robust account of divine sovereignty, but only at the expense of human freedom.
When I speak of Molinism's affording God "more providential latitude," I meant to suggest that Molinism provides a robust account of both divine sovereignty and human freedom. I, unfortunately, left "more providential latitude" unexplained.
>> I was only trying to make the point that any scheme which views God as being susceptible to our will, so that he has to choose what he does either based on or in spite of what we do (or would do), binds God's freedom. It necessarily implies that he is responding rather than initiating.
1. Would you mind elaborating on you mean by "God . . . being susceptible to our will" and by "binds God's freedom?" I'm not sure that Molinism entails these things, but I want to better understand your meaning before attempting to address your point.
2. If "initiating" is synonymous with "unilaterally causally determining," then I believe we should avoid any view which incorporates divine initiation if we want to preserve human agency.
Deistic creation presumes that created objects, once created, have the intrinsic capacity to self-sustain their existence. Too much in the Bible indicates God's necessary activity for the sustaining of all creation. Otherwise we're left with theistic existentialism and the Bible is simply wrong about God's sustaining activities. Since the Bible isn't wrong, then we must recognize that God's created order is as he created it and likewise glorifies him as it plays out through the passage of history.
I contend the concept of foreknowledge, prognosis, doesn't preclude God's sovereign influence as first cause. It's like a designer who conceives an item to be manufactured and makes drawings of it. He knows ahead of time that which he has designed although it doesn't materially exist yet. Once it is made it can be said that the designer knew what it would be ahead of time. God doesn't search the future to discover something there that he did not create. He is not constrained to the passage of time. He creates all things.
As such, we choose things as agents of second-cause, but we do not choose things based on any consideration that is outside of God's created order. That would make us first-cause agents, and therefore on par with God. Let it not be so.
Molinism attempts to solve a problem that doesn't exist because the primary premise for the problem, libertarian free will, is false.
Compatibilism, apparently Calvinism's parallel structure to Molinism, is not the answer to a problem, it is the statement of a harmonious relationship between God's sovereignty as the first-cause and man's limited free will as second-cause agents.
My problem with the Calvinist viewpoint is that they seem to hold two contradictory views:
God exhaustively controls all events. ("Sovereignty")
God is good.
A quick glance at current events would seem to show that one of these propositions is false.
>> When I speak of Molinism's affording God "more providential latitude," I meant to suggest that Molinism provides a robust account of both divine sovereignty and human freedom. I, unfortunately, left "more providential latitude" unexplained.
Thanks for clarifying.
>> 1. Would you mind elaborating on you mean by "God . . . being susceptible to our will" and by "binds God's freedom?" I'm not sure that Molinism entails these things, but I want to better understand your meaning before attempting to address your point.
Based on what I see in Scripture, God's actions are not ultimately determined by man. To me, a viewpoint like classic Arminianism in which we choose God and he reacts to our choice by saving us, makes his will susceptible to ours. I can't believe in a system where I could potentially hinder God's plans, or where he needs me cooperation in order to achieve his purposes.
I do believe in free will in a certain sense. I think our freedom has boundaries. Ultimately, if we believe in a sin nature as Scripture teaches, we can't claim that we have a completely free will. Yes, we choose to commit certain sins, but we don't have a choice whether or not we will sin at all. Our wills are bound from birth. They will ultimately be bound either by sin or by God.
>> If "initiating" is synonymous with "unilaterally causally determining," then I believe we should avoid any view which incorporates divine initiation if we want to preserve human agency.
Peter, in Acts 4:27,28, says, "'[...]for truly in this city there were gathered together against your holy servant Jesus, whom you anointed, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, along with the Gentiles and the peoples of Israel, to do whatever your hand and your plan had predestined to take place.'"
For the people involved, the act of killing Jesus was a sin. It was also ordained by God to take place in that way. I think there are reasons for this, but for the sake of this conversation I'll pose the question: Did those people have a choice in what they did?
>> Based on what I see in Scripture, God's actions are not ultimately determined by man. To me, a viewpoint like classic Arminianism in which we choose God and he reacts to our choice by saving us, makes his will susceptible to ours. I can't believe in a system where I could potentially hinder God's plans, or where he needs me cooperation in order to achieve his purposes.
1. The Molinist doesn't (or, at least, shouldn't) hold that God's actions are ultimately determined by humans. Rather, with respect to human agency in particular, God determines and is in complete control of what occurs--more precisely, he weakly actualizes the relevant states of affairs--such that He ultimately decides what happens.
2. Although God allows our actions to be "up to us," and although He permits us to cooperate with Him (or not) in bringing about His various purposes, the Molinist will argue that it's impossible for humans to undermine God's plans. Since God actualizes just that world which is suitable to His achieving certain ends, which includes the free actions of human agents, it's not within our power to hinder the divine objectives. Indeed, God allows us to rebel against Him and commit sin, but neither constitutes a genuine impediment to providence.
3. With regard to your claim about God's will being susceptible to ours, there's a certain sense in which this is true and certain sense in which it's false. Regarding the sense in which it's true, the truth-values of counterfactuals of freedom do present a kind of constraint on God's providential options. (This consideration, for example, is of central importance to Molinistic formulations of the free will defense.) You may be familiar with the distinction between feasible and infeasible worlds. Regarding the sense in which your claim is false, the Molinist may maintain that it's valuable and good for humans to possess (libertarian) free will. This affords us the opportunity to act responsibly and participate in meaningful relationships with God and one another, the former of which being an incommensurate good. The Molinist might also maintain that despite the constraint which counterfactuals of freedom place on God's providential options, God's consults His own will in deciding which world to actualize and which purposes to bring about.
>> For the people involved, the act of killing Jesus was a sin. It was also ordained by God to take place in that way. I think there are reasons for this, but for the sake of this conversation I'll pose the question: Did those people have a choice in what they did?
Yes, I believe that the choice was theirs, that it was up to them, and that it was within their power to refrain from sinning. And it seems to me that Molinism provides the best account of how God could "predestine" free, sinful actions -- actions which, He knew beforehand, would but didn't have to take place.
Since this thread is now buried in the depths of STR, I'll make this my last comment.
I mostly agree with statement #2 made above. Your statements touched on my bottom-line issue with Molinism: it is based soley on assumptions--of "other worlds," other possibilities, counterfactuals, etc.
The fact is that what "may have been" is not. Regarding any given action, we have no way of knowing whether there were other options for how it turned out.
You said, "[...]it seems to me that Molinism provides the best account of how God could 'predestine' [not sure why this is in quotes] free, sinful actions -- actions which, He knew beforehand, would but didn't have to take place."
How do we know it didn't "have to" take place? It seems to me as if it certainly did "have to" take place in order for the Scriptures to be fulfilled. In John 17:12, Jesus speaks of Judas, saying, "I have guarded them, and not one of them has been lost except the son of destruction, that the Scripture might be fulfilled." That sounds to me as if it "had to" happen.
Molinism assumes that there are other options for what has taken place, and runs with this assumption, often having to stop and verbosely untangle the knots in its logic. I see it as little more than an attempt to avoid the plain truth that Scripture presents of a God who sees and controls all things to achieve his ends. As I said in an earlier comment, our wills are bound by something, either sin or God, and I think it's best for us as believers to simply rest in that truth and take comfort there.
>> Your statements touched on my bottom-line issue with Molinism: it is based soley on assumptions--of "other worlds," other possibilities, counterfactuals, etc.
1. The Molinist would dispute the claim that the doctrine of Molinism "is based solely on assumptions," pointing (for example) to what she takes to be scriptural support for the view.
2. Concerning Molinism's modal speculations or assumptions--those about possible worlds--she'll insist that even non-Molinists make and rely on such assumptions. Modal metaphysics and epistemology aren't exclusive to Molinism.
>> The fact is that what "may have been" is not. Regarding any given action, we have no way of knowing whether there were other options for how it turned out.
While all philosophers agree that our modal epistemology is imperfect, I don't think there's any good reason for holding that, "[r]egarding any given action, we have no way of knowing whether there were other options for how it turned out." It seems to me that there are very strong motivations for thinking that (i) there's contingency in the world and that (ii) things could've been different on many occasions. At any rate, I believe it's far from obvious that your assertion constitutes a "fact."
>> How do we know it didn't "have to" take place? It seems to me as if it certainly did "have to" take place in order for the Scriptures to be fulfilled. In John 17:12, Jesus speaks of Judas, saying, "I have guarded them, and not one of them has been lost except the son of destruction, that the Scripture might be fulfilled." That sounds to me as if it "had to" happen.
1. There's a subtle but significant difference between what will in fact take place and what must take place. Suppose God knows that you'll see a movie this weekend. If so, we can be completely certain that you will in fact see a movie this weekend. But it would be fallacious to infer, on the basis of what God foreknows, that you must see a movie this weekend, that it couldn't possibly fail to happen. It could fail to happen, but, as it turns out, it won't. It's not the case that you'll see a movie because that's what God knows; rather, God knows this information because you'll see the movie. Your actions explains part of the content of God's knowledge.
2. Certain instances of prophecy in Scripture, I think, are similar to what I described above. Certain prophecies take place not because of the prophetic utterance; rather, the prophecy is uttered because of what will take place. In other words, the predicted explains the prediction, not the other way around.
>> Molinism assumes that there are other options for what has taken place, and runs with this assumption, often having to stop and verbosely untangle the knots in its logic.
1. Molinism does assume that there's genuine contingency in the world, but this assumption certainly isn't exclusive to Molinism. A considerable portion of philosophy and theology accepts this assumption and argues that it's warranted.
2. Regarding your assertion about Molinism's "often having to stop and verbosely untangle the knots in its logic," I'm not familiar with any Molinist for whom this description would be applicable.
-- Surrealium
P.S. Thank you also for the exchange. I enjoyed it. =)
I have a question about Molinism, just beginning to study the idea myself.
Suppose it is true that God's knowledge precedes His will, insofar as actual creation is concerned... how can He, therefore, truly know what a free agent would do? It seems to me if the agent is truly and autonomously free, God cannot know even speculatively what it would do, unless the creature was actually made and acted out the given circumstance. The difficulty seems to center around the idea of God making a free agent (i.e. God making a being which He has, in some respect, no certain knowledge of) and yet at the same time being able to conjecture what it would do in given circumstances.
Now, I have been thinking over this and have come up with a scenario. Suppose God willed to create beings which He willed not to fully know. He wanted to make contingent agents, whose action did not depend on His will alone. This would mean He could not have any true knowledge about them speculatively before He created them, since they must first be made to be known, since their actions are self-determined. But, knowing this, God made all these creatures in time, which, to Him, is simultaneous (i.e. the 'moment' He made them He saw them all at once). Once He knew them, THEN He causally prepared the circumstances of the universe in order to save certain ones and damn others. So His decree is logically after His creation, although not "temporally" after, since, from eternity, He sees all the free agents He has made.
The order, then, of God's actions would be:
a) will to create free agents, which He is necessarily ignorant of until creation
b) act of creating free agents
c) knowledge of agents
d) decree to save some and damn others (freely both ways)
To me, this satisfies both Thomists and Molinists strengths. God truly does save those whom He chooses to place in certain circumstances (who may have actually resisted grace were they put in others) and damn others who freely reject grace in certain circumstances (who may have assented were they put in others) based on His will. Yet, those who reject grace all do so freely.
Question for Greg: If the Molinist were to say that God elects individuals by virtue of electing "worlds" would this seem to you more accurate? It appears to me that this isnt an either or question...electing certain worlds will mean the election of certain individuals.
Posted by: SteveC | August 02, 2010 at 06:48 AM
What bothers me is that it seems most Calvinists (or at least 90% that I've met) poison the well by creating strawmen of ANY other theological belief by saying they have "Armenian persuasion" or are some form of Armenianism.
The debate is not that simple and it closes ears to cast everyone but Calvinists as part of the Amermenianism heresy.
The Calvinist/Molinist debate is far too big to get into to discuss on a blog post. My contribution, then, is to recommend that people read the text or summaries of the Second Council of Orange (held on 3 July, 529) which were at the end of the height of the Armenianism/Pelagianism/Semipelagianism/Augustine debates.
Posted by: M.M. | August 02, 2010 at 08:30 AM
P.S.
I apologize for poisoning the well of Calvinists :P
My intent was to say that I frequently hear the debate framed that way and I don't think it's helpful.
Posted by: M.M. | August 02, 2010 at 08:40 AM
My own question on Molinism is with respect to the idea that, under this view, God "evaluates" (for lack of a better term) how people will freely choose, given certain situations and circumstances and then "elects" to create the world we now know.
If this is the case, wouldn't this put us on a bit of a slippery-slope toward deism? Where God says, "Ok. I've created everything and set things in motion so that people will freely choose a certain way. Now I'll just let things unfold as I intended during my creation."
I get that this concept seems to wrap up the libertarian free-will problem in a nice little package, but I'm not sure that that's always a good thing. Some things seem more plausible when held in some tension.
Plus, there's the whole question of whether or not we actually have libertarian free-will, but that may be too much to get into, here.
Posted by: Daniel | August 02, 2010 at 01:06 PM
Daniel,
Interesting question about deism, but Id say that God choosing a world to create doesn't at all preclude His involvement through out the history of that world.
I would also add that if Craigs formulation of this idea is even possible, it does seem like the best resolution to this whole debate...to me anyway.
Posted by: SteveC | August 02, 2010 at 01:42 PM
Steve, I agree that Molinism does not slide into Deism. One primary reason for this is that one of the things God "evaluates" (to use Daniel's terminology) in choosing which world to create is His own involvement, as well as humans' free response to His involvement.
Posted by: Ryan | August 02, 2010 at 02:11 PM
I've always thought Molinism is overthinking the question.
Posted by: Eric S. Mueller | August 02, 2010 at 03:40 PM
Molinism, aren't we merely re-arranging the deck chairs on something called Pelagianism that sank a long time ago? Like in 431AD at Ephasus?
Posted by: dave | August 03, 2010 at 04:06 AM
Hey Dave, good question.
Molinism must be understood in the historical context that it was refined in by Luis de Molina. Molinism affirms free will but only in the implicit understanding that grace is absolutely necessary for any act towards salvation. Pelagianism denied Original Sin and said man could choose God (or actions towards salvation) without any grace at all whereas Molinism, or at least Molinism in the Catholic Church, has a long history of affirming the necessity of grace to God because of the consequences Original Sin.
I can't speak for Craig because I am only familiar with his writings on Molinism and haven't read them directly.
For more information on a better understanding I recommend reading New Advent's article on Molinism.
Posted by: M.M. | August 03, 2010 at 07:48 AM
I agree with Greg's conclusion in the video. I don't think this POV solves any problems. I actually think it creates a problem: According to Molinism, if God elects a world, he is not just electing the world with the highest number of people who choose him, he is electing all of their choices for all of history. If that's the case, did he proclaim all of Scripture's prophecies only after seeing what was going happen? I think Molinism binds the will of God even more than classic Arminianism.
Also, @M.M.: I took Greg's comments regarding "Arminian persuasion" to mean only that Molinism is usually a view used by Arminian-leaning people searching for some middle ground.
Posted by: Matt | August 03, 2010 at 07:58 AM
I wonder how someone like Greg, who affirms libertarian freedom in certain instances (though not in coming to faith) goes about explaining God's providential control and/or foreknowledge of those kinds of free choices. After all, he neither accepts Molinism, nor the usual Calvinist explanation that uses the idea of God's being outside of time. Hmmm.
I would also like to note that middle knowledge was not originally primarily used in conjunction with explaining election to salvation, but rather to explain God's foreknowledge of free acts. Any application of the doctrine to election is purely optional on the part of the theologian. Interestingly, some Calvinists are employing the doctrine of middle knowledge in their explication of God's providence (e.g., Terrence Thiessen, Bruce Ware). Whether this is a good move is another question.
Posted by: Ryan | August 03, 2010 at 08:20 AM
I can't see myself losing any sleep over it, and even if I did, I'd simply start counting the angels I could see dancing on an imaginary pinhead...
Posted by: James Findlayson | August 03, 2010 at 01:55 PM
Remember this....
Thomas is to Molina as
Calvin is to Arminius
Posted by: Francis Beckwith | August 03, 2010 at 01:57 PM
I still reflect upon Luther's words to Erasmus in the Bondage of the Will, where he lists the works of the flesh in Galatians, and then challenges Erasmus to find something in the list that will choose God.
If God elects worlds, as the Molinists say, then he elected a world where nobody chooses Christ apart from radical Divine intervention.
Posted by: dave | August 03, 2010 at 04:03 PM
Thomas who, Dr B? On 'first name' terms now, eh? :)
Greg would get a lot more sleep ditching the aut-aut principle. :)
Posted by: James Findlayson | August 04, 2010 at 08:50 AM
Is there any other Thomas than Aquinas? :-)
Posted by: Francis Beckwith | August 04, 2010 at 12:30 PM
Jefferson, Kinkade, Fehlman . . to name a few ;)
Posted by: Complete Concierge | August 05, 2010 at 01:30 PM
[I can only get the first 30 seconds (or so) of the video to play, so I apologize if my comments reflect my having not watched it in its entirety.]
Matt:
You wrote:
>> According to Molinism, if God elects a world, he is not just electing the world with the highest number of people who choose him, he is electing all of their choices for all of history.
I suspect that the Molinist would object to this particular usage of the term "elect," claiming that it's not strictly accurate in this context. She'd probably prefer, instead, to say that God (weakly) actualizes or brings about all of the states of affairs in which free agents act with (some version of) libertarian freedom.
>> If that's the case, did he proclaim all of Scripture's prophecies only after seeing what was going happen? I think Molinism binds the will of God even more than classic Arminianism.
Molinists don't believe that God, first, looked to see what was going to happen in the future and then, second, reported to us what He saw. If God possesses middle knowledge, He knew, prior to the world's existence, what action any given agent would freely perform if placed in any given circumstances. And since God exhaustively decides which contingent states of affairs obtain, which includes free human actions, the Molinist account actually appears to afford God more providential latitude.
Ryan:
You wrote:
>> I wonder how someone like Greg, who affirms libertarian freedom in certain instances (though not in coming to faith) goes about explaining God's providential control and/or foreknowledge of those kinds of free choices. After all, he neither accepts Molinism, nor the usual Calvinist explanation that uses the idea of God's being outside of time.
I think you raise an important issue. It seems to me that if one is a Calvinist about divine providence, then one can't (or, in any case, shouldn't) affirm libertarianism about human agency. From what I understand, the Calvinist traditionally holds that God's decrees are logically prior to His foreknowledge. In a sense, then, God acquires or derives His foreknowledge on the basis of what He decrees; His acquisition of foreknowledge is logically posterior to His decrees. I think this might create a problem for a view like Mr. Koukl's (or Thiessen's or Ware's, assuming they subscribe to the same view).
In the first logical moment (when God is decreeing), if He decrees that an agent be placed in some set of circumstances with libertarian freedom, it appears that God is necessarily ignorant about how that agent will exercise her freedom. He only "discovers" precisely what that agent will freely do once He "arrives" at the second logical moment, which is to say, once He has completed decreeing. But, by then, it's "too late" to exert any provident control over the event concerning the agent's action--for He has already finished His decreeing--so God's providence doesn't extend to libertarian actions. Yet God is supposed to enjoy comprehensive, providential control over all contingent events. Thus, it seems that the acceptance of a Calvinistic conception of divine providence precludes the acceptance of a libertarian conception of agency.
Peace,
-- Surrealium
Posted by: Surrealium | August 05, 2010 at 10:40 PM
@Surrealium
I based my comment about God electing "worlds" on a point made later in the video.
>>Molinists don't believe that God, first, looked to see what was going to happen in the future and then, second, reported to us what He saw. If God possesses middle knowledge, He knew, prior to the world's existence, what action any given agent would freely perform if placed in any given circumstances. And since God exhaustively decides which contingent states of affairs obtain, which includes free human actions, the Molinist account actually appears to afford God more providential latitude.
I'm not clear on your point here. Since God can choose the circumstances that would allow certain things to happen, he is more free than if he simply made those things happen? I feel like I'm probably missing your point.
I was only trying to make the point that any scheme which views God as being susceptible to our will, so that he has to choose what he does either based on or in spite of what we do (or would do), binds God's freedom. It necessarily implies that he is responding rather than initiating.
Posted by: Matt | August 06, 2010 at 06:10 AM
Matt:
>> I'm not clear on your point here. Since God can choose the circumstances that would allow certain things to happen, he is more free than if he simply made those things happen?
Sorry about the lack of clarity. I'm hesitant to describe God's having "more providential latitude" in terms of His being "more free." On the view that God causally determines (proximately or remotely) every contingent event which obtains, He's certainly "more free" (compared to Molinism) in the sense that He exerts more--indeed, exhaustive--causal control over those events. If being "more free" means "causally determining every contingent event," then God is more free on this view.
I deny that such a view, however, is compatible with there being genuine human agency in the world. So although God is more free (in the above sense), His providence suffers because, it seems to me, causally determining every contingent event entails the destruction of human agency. This view, in my judgment, provides a robust account of divine sovereignty, but only at the expense of human freedom.
When I speak of Molinism's affording God "more providential latitude," I meant to suggest that Molinism provides a robust account of both divine sovereignty and human freedom. I, unfortunately, left "more providential latitude" unexplained.
>> I was only trying to make the point that any scheme which views God as being susceptible to our will, so that he has to choose what he does either based on or in spite of what we do (or would do), binds God's freedom. It necessarily implies that he is responding rather than initiating.
1. Would you mind elaborating on you mean by "God . . . being susceptible to our will" and by "binds God's freedom?" I'm not sure that Molinism entails these things, but I want to better understand your meaning before attempting to address your point.
2. If "initiating" is synonymous with "unilaterally causally determining," then I believe we should avoid any view which incorporates divine initiation if we want to preserve human agency.
Posted by: Marc | August 06, 2010 at 03:04 PM
Although the above entry says "Posted by: Marc," it was authored by Surrealium. I neglected to be consistent with my name. Sorry about that, Matt. =)
Posted by: Surrealium/Marc | August 06, 2010 at 03:06 PM
Deistic creation presumes that created objects, once created, have the intrinsic capacity to self-sustain their existence. Too much in the Bible indicates God's necessary activity for the sustaining of all creation. Otherwise we're left with theistic existentialism and the Bible is simply wrong about God's sustaining activities. Since the Bible isn't wrong, then we must recognize that God's created order is as he created it and likewise glorifies him as it plays out through the passage of history.
I contend the concept of foreknowledge, prognosis, doesn't preclude God's sovereign influence as first cause. It's like a designer who conceives an item to be manufactured and makes drawings of it. He knows ahead of time that which he has designed although it doesn't materially exist yet. Once it is made it can be said that the designer knew what it would be ahead of time. God doesn't search the future to discover something there that he did not create. He is not constrained to the passage of time. He creates all things.
As such, we choose things as agents of second-cause, but we do not choose things based on any consideration that is outside of God's created order. That would make us first-cause agents, and therefore on par with God. Let it not be so.
Molinism attempts to solve a problem that doesn't exist because the primary premise for the problem, libertarian free will, is false.
Compatibilism, apparently Calvinism's parallel structure to Molinism, is not the answer to a problem, it is the statement of a harmonious relationship between God's sovereignty as the first-cause and man's limited free will as second-cause agents.
Posted by: Jim Pemberton | August 06, 2010 at 09:53 PM
My problem with the Calvinist viewpoint is that they seem to hold two contradictory views:
God exhaustively controls all events. ("Sovereignty")
God is good.
A quick glance at current events would seem to show that one of these propositions is false.
Posted by: Jeff | August 08, 2010 at 05:29 AM
@Surrealium:
>> When I speak of Molinism's affording God "more providential latitude," I meant to suggest that Molinism provides a robust account of both divine sovereignty and human freedom. I, unfortunately, left "more providential latitude" unexplained.
Thanks for clarifying.
>> 1. Would you mind elaborating on you mean by "God . . . being susceptible to our will" and by "binds God's freedom?" I'm not sure that Molinism entails these things, but I want to better understand your meaning before attempting to address your point.
Based on what I see in Scripture, God's actions are not ultimately determined by man. To me, a viewpoint like classic Arminianism in which we choose God and he reacts to our choice by saving us, makes his will susceptible to ours. I can't believe in a system where I could potentially hinder God's plans, or where he needs me cooperation in order to achieve his purposes.
I do believe in free will in a certain sense. I think our freedom has boundaries. Ultimately, if we believe in a sin nature as Scripture teaches, we can't claim that we have a completely free will. Yes, we choose to commit certain sins, but we don't have a choice whether or not we will sin at all. Our wills are bound from birth. They will ultimately be bound either by sin or by God.
>> If "initiating" is synonymous with "unilaterally causally determining," then I believe we should avoid any view which incorporates divine initiation if we want to preserve human agency.
Peter, in Acts 4:27,28, says, "'[...]for truly in this city there were gathered together against your holy servant Jesus, whom you anointed, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, along with the Gentiles and the peoples of Israel, to do whatever your hand and your plan had predestined to take place.'"
For the people involved, the act of killing Jesus was a sin. It was also ordained by God to take place in that way. I think there are reasons for this, but for the sake of this conversation I'll pose the question: Did those people have a choice in what they did?
Posted by: Matt | August 09, 2010 at 07:00 AM
Matt:
>> Based on what I see in Scripture, God's actions are not ultimately determined by man. To me, a viewpoint like classic Arminianism in which we choose God and he reacts to our choice by saving us, makes his will susceptible to ours. I can't believe in a system where I could potentially hinder God's plans, or where he needs me cooperation in order to achieve his purposes.
1. The Molinist doesn't (or, at least, shouldn't) hold that God's actions are ultimately determined by humans. Rather, with respect to human agency in particular, God determines and is in complete control of what occurs--more precisely, he weakly actualizes the relevant states of affairs--such that He ultimately decides what happens.
2. Although God allows our actions to be "up to us," and although He permits us to cooperate with Him (or not) in bringing about His various purposes, the Molinist will argue that it's impossible for humans to undermine God's plans. Since God actualizes just that world which is suitable to His achieving certain ends, which includes the free actions of human agents, it's not within our power to hinder the divine objectives. Indeed, God allows us to rebel against Him and commit sin, but neither constitutes a genuine impediment to providence.
3. With regard to your claim about God's will being susceptible to ours, there's a certain sense in which this is true and certain sense in which it's false. Regarding the sense in which it's true, the truth-values of counterfactuals of freedom do present a kind of constraint on God's providential options. (This consideration, for example, is of central importance to Molinistic formulations of the free will defense.) You may be familiar with the distinction between feasible and infeasible worlds. Regarding the sense in which your claim is false, the Molinist may maintain that it's valuable and good for humans to possess (libertarian) free will. This affords us the opportunity to act responsibly and participate in meaningful relationships with God and one another, the former of which being an incommensurate good. The Molinist might also maintain that despite the constraint which counterfactuals of freedom place on God's providential options, God's consults His own will in deciding which world to actualize and which purposes to bring about.
>> For the people involved, the act of killing Jesus was a sin. It was also ordained by God to take place in that way. I think there are reasons for this, but for the sake of this conversation I'll pose the question: Did those people have a choice in what they did?
Yes, I believe that the choice was theirs, that it was up to them, and that it was within their power to refrain from sinning. And it seems to me that Molinism provides the best account of how God could "predestine" free, sinful actions -- actions which, He knew beforehand, would but didn't have to take place.
Posted by: Surrealium | August 12, 2010 at 08:33 AM
Surrealium:
Since this thread is now buried in the depths of STR, I'll make this my last comment.
I mostly agree with statement #2 made above. Your statements touched on my bottom-line issue with Molinism: it is based soley on assumptions--of "other worlds," other possibilities, counterfactuals, etc.
The fact is that what "may have been" is not. Regarding any given action, we have no way of knowing whether there were other options for how it turned out.
You said, "[...]it seems to me that Molinism provides the best account of how God could 'predestine' [not sure why this is in quotes] free, sinful actions -- actions which, He knew beforehand, would but didn't have to take place."
How do we know it didn't "have to" take place? It seems to me as if it certainly did "have to" take place in order for the Scriptures to be fulfilled. In John 17:12, Jesus speaks of Judas, saying, "I have guarded them, and not one of them has been lost except the son of destruction, that the Scripture might be fulfilled." That sounds to me as if it "had to" happen.
Molinism assumes that there are other options for what has taken place, and runs with this assumption, often having to stop and verbosely untangle the knots in its logic. I see it as little more than an attempt to avoid the plain truth that Scripture presents of a God who sees and controls all things to achieve his ends. As I said in an earlier comment, our wills are bound by something, either sin or God, and I think it's best for us as believers to simply rest in that truth and take comfort there.
Thanks for the exchange on this topic.
Posted by: Matt | August 16, 2010 at 06:41 AM
Matt:
>> Your statements touched on my bottom-line issue with Molinism: it is based soley on assumptions--of "other worlds," other possibilities, counterfactuals, etc.
1. The Molinist would dispute the claim that the doctrine of Molinism "is based solely on assumptions," pointing (for example) to what she takes to be scriptural support for the view.
2. Concerning Molinism's modal speculations or assumptions--those about possible worlds--she'll insist that even non-Molinists make and rely on such assumptions. Modal metaphysics and epistemology aren't exclusive to Molinism.
>> The fact is that what "may have been" is not. Regarding any given action, we have no way of knowing whether there were other options for how it turned out.
While all philosophers agree that our modal epistemology is imperfect, I don't think there's any good reason for holding that, "[r]egarding any given action, we have no way of knowing whether there were other options for how it turned out." It seems to me that there are very strong motivations for thinking that (i) there's contingency in the world and that (ii) things could've been different on many occasions. At any rate, I believe it's far from obvious that your assertion constitutes a "fact."
>> How do we know it didn't "have to" take place? It seems to me as if it certainly did "have to" take place in order for the Scriptures to be fulfilled. In John 17:12, Jesus speaks of Judas, saying, "I have guarded them, and not one of them has been lost except the son of destruction, that the Scripture might be fulfilled." That sounds to me as if it "had to" happen.
1. There's a subtle but significant difference between what will in fact take place and what must take place. Suppose God knows that you'll see a movie this weekend. If so, we can be completely certain that you will in fact see a movie this weekend. But it would be fallacious to infer, on the basis of what God foreknows, that you must see a movie this weekend, that it couldn't possibly fail to happen. It could fail to happen, but, as it turns out, it won't. It's not the case that you'll see a movie because that's what God knows; rather, God knows this information because you'll see the movie. Your actions explains part of the content of God's knowledge.
2. Certain instances of prophecy in Scripture, I think, are similar to what I described above. Certain prophecies take place not because of the prophetic utterance; rather, the prophecy is uttered because of what will take place. In other words, the predicted explains the prediction, not the other way around.
>> Molinism assumes that there are other options for what has taken place, and runs with this assumption, often having to stop and verbosely untangle the knots in its logic.
1. Molinism does assume that there's genuine contingency in the world, but this assumption certainly isn't exclusive to Molinism. A considerable portion of philosophy and theology accepts this assumption and argues that it's warranted.
2. Regarding your assertion about Molinism's "often having to stop and verbosely untangle the knots in its logic," I'm not familiar with any Molinist for whom this description would be applicable.
-- Surrealium
P.S. Thank you also for the exchange. I enjoyed it. =)
Posted by: Surrealium | August 24, 2010 at 09:36 AM
Surrealium,
I have a question about Molinism, just beginning to study the idea myself.
Suppose it is true that God's knowledge precedes His will, insofar as actual creation is concerned... how can He, therefore, truly know what a free agent would do? It seems to me if the agent is truly and autonomously free, God cannot know even speculatively what it would do, unless the creature was actually made and acted out the given circumstance. The difficulty seems to center around the idea of God making a free agent (i.e. God making a being which He has, in some respect, no certain knowledge of) and yet at the same time being able to conjecture what it would do in given circumstances.
Now, I have been thinking over this and have come up with a scenario. Suppose God willed to create beings which He willed not to fully know. He wanted to make contingent agents, whose action did not depend on His will alone. This would mean He could not have any true knowledge about them speculatively before He created them, since they must first be made to be known, since their actions are self-determined. But, knowing this, God made all these creatures in time, which, to Him, is simultaneous (i.e. the 'moment' He made them He saw them all at once). Once He knew them, THEN He causally prepared the circumstances of the universe in order to save certain ones and damn others. So His decree is logically after His creation, although not "temporally" after, since, from eternity, He sees all the free agents He has made.
The order, then, of God's actions would be:
a) will to create free agents, which He is necessarily ignorant of until creation
b) act of creating free agents
c) knowledge of agents
d) decree to save some and damn others (freely both ways)
To me, this satisfies both Thomists and Molinists strengths. God truly does save those whom He chooses to place in certain circumstances (who may have actually resisted grace were they put in others) and damn others who freely reject grace in certain circumstances (who may have assented were they put in others) based on His will. Yet, those who reject grace all do so freely.
Let me know what you think.
Posted by: Chris Mullen | September 03, 2010 at 10:31 PM