Naturalists Still View Science as Prescriptive

In an Unbelievable podcast discussing the question, "What was the primary cause of Nazi ideology—Darwinism or Christian anti-Semitism?" a listener asked, "Has Darwinism become prescriptive? When did this happen?"

Here is the argument I have heard many times against the Darwinism-created-eugenics claim: Darwinism is merely descriptive, not prescriptive. Therefore, those who made it prescriptive (i.e., who reasoned natural selection is true, therefore we can create better human beings through careful breeding, therefore we should) were misusing the scientific knowledge. This was not the fault of Darwinism, but merely a misunderstanding of the role of science.

The problem with these scientists of the past was that they didn't submit themselves to an ethic that values human life—an ethic that, in order to provide an "ought," would need to come from something outside of a naturalistic view of reality built only on non-prescriptive scientific observation and ideas about evolution. They failed to do so, with barbaric results.

Scientists today can clearly see what went wrong, and so they condemn those in the past. But if they now recognize that the mistake made by those past scientists was that of confusing the descriptive role of science with a prescriptive one, do they carefully guard themselves against this confusion today, or is their naturalistic scientism causing them to continue to make the same mistake? For if the scientific method determines what is considered to be real and therefore important, and science is only descriptive, then they can discover no moral prescriptives, and the descriptive becomes prescriptive by default.

Think of embryonic stem cell research. When scientists argue against people who oppose ESCR for ethical reasons, they don't usually counter with their own ethical arguments; rather, they charge their opponents with being anti-science. That is, they view the science of ESCR as prescriptive (what they ought to do), not merely descriptive (what can be done). Therefore, if you are against ESCR, they say you are against science itself.

But as scientists now admit was the case with eugenics, science has nothing to say about whether or not we ought to destroy human beings in their earliest state of development for the sake of scientific research. This is an ethic-of-intrinsic-human-value-vs.-ethic-of-instrumental-human-value question about how science ought to be used, not an ethics-vs.-science question. Just as they recognize was the case with eugenics, science is amoral. Yet they continue to make science their ethic, just as some did in the case of eugenics. Unsurprisingly, the results are less than ethical.

Scientists should learn from the past. It's better to stop giving science a prescriptive role and submit to non-naturalistic ethics now, rather than follow the amoral dictates of science and naturalism now and have to explain away atrocities later.

Comments

[John]

Are you surprised Amy? You said "follow the amoral" in the quote. And there it is. Amoral. I can't find any ought beneath my electron microscope. Today's atheist, though, will dance the dance of ten thousand back flips trying to somehow "imply" the presence of ought in their amoral framework. It's the same old game. You seem surprised by their dishonesty. I'm surprised that you are surprised. Really. Naturalism is amoral. The atheist, though, suffering the harsh reality of the moral experience, as we all do, forever attempts to smuggle in a high sounding explanation for that experience. Murder and scratching an itch are rarely, if ever, called parallel, or rather horizontal, realities. Instead, one is "somehow different" than the other, and so the vertical dimension, or the vertical "direction" is smuggled in. As if what is at bottom nothing more than a series of random collisions "aims".

I'm not surprised. Nor impressed.

[Amy]

I sounded surprised?

[John]

"Unsurprisingly, the results are less than ethical."

I guess not! :)

Amoral can ONLY be "less", or perhaps "lower" than ethical; the vertical dimension being a nonreality inside of naturalism.

[Bennett]

Bear in mind, by the by, that naturalism is a pretty solid base for natural science. When you "leave room for God" in your *equations* (not to be conflated or confused with your holistic paradigm, just your science) then you can wind up with Newton's "God of the Gaps". He muddled his math and fudged the difference by saying that God and the angels must occasionally rectify the motions of the heavenly bodies, because his math didn't match his observations. Now, someone else, using his same physics model and observations, found the missing math and voila, no need for God to intervene in the planetary motions--turns out He got them right in the first place. As Liebnitz chided, it's an insult to God to think we must leave room for His works.

It's the same issue with ID, unfortunately. Discerning that life has a purpose and a Maker is a philosophical inference about final causes, while evolutionary biology only talks about material and effective causes.

It's like, say, the laws of physics and the chemical properties of water explain adequately why water in a kettle will boil at a given temperature and air pressure. So you could say, in terms of those causes, "The water boils because of chemistry and physics and no other explanation is necessary."

That, however leaves out the other reason that the water boils--because I wanted a cup of tea, and I put the pot on to boil--final and agent causes. All of them are correct, but not all of them are related to natural science.

We're arguing for a false dichotomy when we try to say that Darwin was wrong about genes or natural selection, but the Bible is right about mankind being a creation of Almighty God. If God is a watchmaker, evolution is His workshop, genes are His materials, and his Providential Design is our purpose. All true, all harmonious--not all explainable in terms of natural "hard" science, nor explained *away* by same.

So yeah, naturalism is amoral. So is chemistry. That's why they go in the same little toolbox. It isn't an issue unless that box is all you've got to explain the whole of human existence, including The Big Questions.

[John]

Bennett,

That was very helpful. The issue I have is with the Naturalist who first claims to have "explained away" the Agent, and then still tries to hold on to the ought inside of the amoral. Chemistry is amoral. There is no, as you say, 'wanting' to boil the water. But the Naturalist still tries to smuggle in the want, or the, as I mentioned, "aim" of random collisions. There is no "aiming" whatsoever.

Thank you for your comment; it ties together nicely the compatability of science and theism.

[Bennett]

John,

Glad you think so! In a roundabout way, I merely meant to agree that Naturalism is amoral, but that doesn't make it 'lower' than ethical things, when you're talking about stuff like pots and water and genes, that don't really have a moral quality to them. Of course, while that is what makes it appropriate to talk about stuff like biochem, that's also what makes it inappropriate to talk about the human will, or God's design, or the supernatural generally.

In fact, a naturalist's argument against the supernatural would be very circular. "God does not exist because there is no evidence, and there is no evidence because God does not exist." Any sort of claims of revelation, miracle, experience, whatever, get thrown out a priori as delusional or impossible.

Of course, individuals and groups who work in the sciences and say 'sciencey'-sounding stuff (never confuse a scientist with good "science" any more so than you'd confuse a clergyman with good theology) can make these overreaching claims with a straight face because scientists enjoys a position of privelege in our society. This is because natural produces power of a very palpable sort, that even skeptics can't deny.

We can debate whether studying linguistics, or literature, or art, or music, or sociology, or so on really 'benefits' us in a tangible way (I believe the humanities and 'soft' sciences certainly do, but I'd have to prove it in ways that won't show up on a meter--the issue of 'quantitative social science' is a whole other kettle of kittens, but suffice to say I'm not heavily in favor), but there's no arguing with antibiotics, or atomic weapons. They work. Often a bit too well. Then we run into, as MLK Jr. said, "Guided missiles fired by unguided men."

And there is, as you say, the hitch of naturalism. Chemistry is amoral, but chemists should not be. Ergo, I would argue, while chemistry is natural, chemists should not be naturalists, save when doing chemistry.

[Galileo Unchained]

I’m not seeing the problem. A scientist can say that we ought to do something—as any person can—but this is no longer the voice of science. Recommending social change is policy, not science.

Science doesn’t give us oughts—I think we agree here—but it does explain where how moral instinct (our oughts) developed through evolution.

I’ve written more in Nazi Soldiers Indoctrinated with Darwin? How Convenient..

[Bennett]

"Galileo"

Not to get too deep into philosophy here, but... no, it doesn't.

Oh, very well, I'll elaborate a little.

Evolutionary biologists can make guesses about how moral codes developed, or how morally upright players can affect the genotype (or the genotype affects them--depends whether you like Gould or Dawkins' theory better, although frankly both are oversimplifying it--there's a much richer interplay of geno- and phenotype, and social influences) but biology and ethics are highly distinct fields of inquiry. If indeed our 'moral instinct' is some sort of biological imperative, then it's no longer an ought in any but a very loose semantic sense. You can't be blamed or praised for following biological drives.

It's rather a tautology to say "We ought to do what our genes tell us, because our genes tell us what we ought to do."

[John]

Bennett,

Don't waste your time. As I mentioned, the Naturalist will deny objective oughts, and then smuggle in their oughts anyway. He won't admit your "If indeed our 'moral instinct' is some sort of biological imperative, then it's no longer an ought in any but a very loose semantic sense. You can't be blamed or praised for following biological drives." He will say to everyone that he will settle for the "very loose semantic sense" you mean, which is of course not what we really mean by ought, but, deep inside, he won't believe it. But he'll never tell you that such is the case.

[Galileo Unchained]

Bennett:

If you want to rename "moral instinct," that's fine. But you seem to imagine that that somehow diminishes it. I don't know about you, but my moral sense (conscience) is pretty compelling. "Oh--that's just my programming talking" doesn't change the fact that my programming is talking.

[Bennett]

"Galileo"

I don't imagine that renaming moral instinct anything diminishes it--at least I should hope not. What I mean is that there is no such animal. There's no basis for making inferences about morality or ethics within the framework of biology. The two don't relate. It's about as useful as using chemistry to explain music theory, or astrophysics to talk about literature. You might, at a stretch, be able to make some sort of pseudo-scientific word salad that seemed to describe the subject, in a Lacanian sort of way, but your conclusions wouldn't be right. They wouldn't even be wrong.

[Bennett]

Now, to amend the above, certainly there is an interplay between morality & ethics, and other subjects of interest. I could, for example, ask about the intersection of aesthetics and morality. Pose questions like "What is the moral duty of an artist in society?" or "What moral obligations does an individual have with regards to artistic expression?" or "Can art be immoral?" or "Can immoral things be art?" I could ask about the intersection of biology and ethics, as well, "What role should natural drives play in determining our oughts?" "Is it possible for our appetites to be immoral?" "Why do moral actions promote the good of certain groups/features/genes/whatever?" Or even get into politics and ethics. "Does the law determine the good, or does the good determine our laws? When can one be outside the law and within morality, or vice versa?"

It's as much an error to say that "I'm a good person because I follow the laws of the United States (or Russia, or the PRC, or Iran, or whatever)" as it is to say "I'm a good person because I follow the urgings of my geno- and phenotype." That leads to some hardcore question-begging.

[John Seoh]

Scientists MUST be involved in public policy. They are the ones that obviously know the science behind what’s actually going on, best. They are the ones who will be able to measure the urgency of situations and convey the urgency, or lack thereof, to those actually involved in the deliberating. However, scientists cannot, by any means, be excluded from this process. Brief summaries of summaries of extensive scientific reports handed to policymakers will not be enough. Also, a broad consensus among scientists is more likely to prod and urge politicians and governments to be more heedful of their warnings and predictions.