Yet another atheist, Greta Christina, misunderstands the grounding problem:
Anglican minister Rev. Gavin Dunbar made an interesting and even compelling argument that grief is necessary for love and humanity… and then went on to argue that, unless you believe in God, you have no reason to care whether the people you love live or die, or even to love them in the first place.
No. The argument is not, “Unless you believe in God, you have no reason.” The argument is, “Unless there is a God, there is no reason.”
But rarely have I encountered a critic of atheism who was so ready to deny even my basic humanity, who was so ready to tell me — and tell the world — that because I am an atheist, I see not only morality and virtue, but love and friendship and grief, as an illusion.
Well, that’s exactly the point. These are basic aspects of humanity, and we all experience them, whether or not we believe in God. We experience them because they’re real, and they’re real for everyone because God is real. The problem for atheists is not that they see these things as an illusion, but that they don’t see them as an illusion. They act as if they’re real, and this is inconsistent with their worldview.
Atheist philosopher Michael Ruse has said:
Morality is just a matter of emotions, like liking ice cream and sex and hating toothache and marking student papers. But it is, and has to be, a funny kind of emotion. It has to pretend that it is not that at all! If we thought that morality was no more than liking or not liking spinach, then pretty quickly it would break down…. So morality has to come across as something that is more than emotion. It has to appear to be objective, even though really it is subjective.
As Ruse explains, the atheist has to live as if his worldview were not true, as if morality and meaning were more than just “an illusion put in place by your genes to make you a social cooperator,” as if it were not the case that “God is dead. Morality has no foundation.”
Christina says we create meaning for ourselves—that “social experiences, such as morality, virtue, love, grief, are emotions and mental constructs, which evolved in us to help us survive and flourish as a social species.” She says:
The most crucial point: Saying that life and morality and reason and virtue and emotions such as grief are physical processes – this is not the same as saying they are illusions.
We’re not saying that in the atheist worldview these things are illusions in the sense that people aren’t really feeling them. The question is not about whether or not atheists experience what they interpret as grief and meaning. The question is whether or not what they’re experiencing is a reflection of reality. Ruse says no, and he’s right…if atheism is true.
There’s a difference between objective reality and a subjective feeling created by “physical processes.” Think of a person undergoing a brain operation. The surgeon initiates a physical process that makes the patient experience the smell of cheese. The experience is truly subjectively experienced by the patient, but that doesn’t mean he’s apprehending an objective truth about reality. There is no cheese there. It’s an illusion. Regardless of how he feels about it. The patient could attach any sort of invented meaning he likes to his experience of the smell of cheese, but is that true meaning?
In the same way, if we invent meaning and morality as a result of physical processes, that doesn’t mean there’s truly an objective scale of good and evil, or that an action is objectively morally desirable or undesirable. It merely means that our brain is manipulating us into feeling something for the purpose of our survival. We “smell” morality, but there is no morality there.
Or think of the schizophrenic woman involuntarily creating illusory scenarios in her own mind. Is the world she experiences through her invented perceptions as meaningful as that of a person who is interacting with objective reality? Don’t we have compassion and sorrow over her situation? Don’t we see the difference between objective and subjective meaning and rightly see hers as an illusion? And yet, if the atheists are correct, and meaning and morality do not reflect some objective standard, but are only subjectively experienced physical processes in our own minds (that could have been different, had we happened to evolve differently), then our invented “reality” of meaning and morality has no more true meaning than the world of the schizophrenic woman. Regardless of how we feel about it.
Ruse says that even when we finally face up to this, we will still continue to act in a moral way because “It doesn't matter how much philosophical reflection can show that your beliefs and behaviour have no rational foundation, your psychology will make sure you go on living in a normal, happy manner.” Isn’t that odd? No matter what, people continue to act as if morality and meaning were more than illusions…almost as if they really were more.
Christina continues:
It’s easier to ignore [the] voices [of atheists] if people can pretend that we don’t care about right and wrong, that we think everything is physical and therefore nothing matters, that we see love and compassion as illusions, that we have no reason for grief. It’s easier to ignore those voices if people can pretend that we’re not quite human.
This is just a misunderstanding of the theist argument. No Christian thinks an atheist is “not quite human.” On the contrary, what we call atheists to is a true recognition of their own humanity, because that humanity is greater than what we would find in a blind, uncaring, meaningless, Personless universe made up only of matter—where in the grand scheme of things, a giant tree falling to the left and crushing a busload of children is no different from it falling to the right and crushing some seedlings.
That kind of world doesn’t match our experience. We know that both atheists and theists care about right and wrong, love and compassion. So now we must decide: Are we merely being fooled by survival instincts, or are we apprehending objective reality?
Amy Hall
You wrote:
Needless to say, I disagree with Ruse. In fact I can't really make sense of Ruse's comments; he appears to be quite confused. If morality is an illusion, then what is it an illusion of? What do we think we're seeing, that we're not really seeing?
Apparently, your answer is that we think we're seeing objectivity. But what do you mean here by "objectivity"? There are various sorts of objectivity, some of which actually apply to morality, and some of which do not. So for instance morality is often "objective" in the sense of not priviledging one group of people over another. There is also a strong objective character to the semantic properties of moral language, e.g. words like "wrong" and "evil" and such have a more or less fixed meaning in everyday English usage which resist opposition by individuals. (In other words, nobody is going to understand me if I suddenly decide to use the word "wrong" to refer to a cheese sandwich.) On the other hand, some kinds of objectivity do not apply to morality. So for instance there is no external concrete exemplar for defining moral standards, such as folks once tried (unsuccessfully) to define the meter in terms of an iridium bar in Paris. Moreover, moral standards are varied from culture to culture. And although we can insist on evaluating every culture in terms of a particular moral standard, that won't change the cultural subjectivity which abounds.
I don't think most people have any illusions to the contrary, here. Nothing about my moral experience suggests the existence of a concrete exemplar, nor does it contradict the fact that people in other cultures experience morality differently than I do.
Personally, I get the impression that people often are tripped up by their moral vocabulary. They fail to consciously understand what it means, leading them to misuse it. But that is a confusion, not an illusion.
You continue:
See, I don't know what you mean when you talk about "an objective scale and good and evil." "Objective" in what sense? Given your discussion of truth and falsity in the previous paragraph, I might suspect you of being concerned about semantic objectivity. But it's easy to see that the semantic properties of language exist independent of God. Human beings are quite capable by themselves of developing and using language to express statements which are true or false. As long as our moral terms actually mean something, then we can evaluate sentences which employ them as expressing true or false statements. But clearly, God is not required to fix a meaning to some linguistic expression.
On the other hand, if you're not concerned about semantic objectivity, then what sort of objectivity does concern you? Do you think we apprehend the existence of an external concrete exemplar in our moral experience? If so, then I must ask, what about our moral experience leads you to make that inference? I certainly don't have any inclination to suspect the existence of an external concrete exemplar. Why would you?
Are you perhaps talking about a different sort of objectivity than I have surveyed here? If so, then what sort?
Posted by: Ben | July 18, 2012 at 04:29 AM
I think there’s a lot of confusion going around concerning this issue of “grounding morality.” Consider for a moment what this “grounding” question really amounts to. The Christian apologist thinks that the atheist is in some serious “grounding” trouble with morality, while the apologist himself or herself is not. So what is the problem for the atheist supposed to be? The grounding problem is typically construed as the problem of accounting for moral values and duties. To account for moral values and duties is to give an account of that in virtue of which these things obtain, to provide a set of facts which explain why moral values and duties exist (and perhaps why these are the moral values instead of those). For instance, one might account for the duty to not torture as follows:
That is perfectly sensible insofar as it goes, and there’s no reason the atheist could not appeal to that. But the apologist will not be beaten so easily. He or she will no doubt point out that this attempt does not really ground moral values and duties in general, but instead accounts for one particular moral duty (the duty not to torture) by presupposing another moral duty (the duty not to inflict harm gratuitously). Instead of grounding morality, this attempt has presupposed morality. This misses the point of the true grounding problem, according to the apologist. The true grounding problem is to give a set of facts that adequately explains moral values and duties but that does not itself presuppose any moral values and duties. If we explain morality in terms of a set of facts that itself includes morality, then the attempt to ground moral values and duties will be circular, presupposing the very thing for which we are trying to account.
In order to satisfy the apologist's insistence that we not give such a circular account, therefore, we must make sure that the most basic set of facts that we think grounds morality does not itself contain some moral value or duty. The grounding project can therefore be stated as follows:
Clause (i) guarantees that the project succeeds in grounding moral values and duties, while clause (ii) guarantees that the project does so in a non-circular fashion.
We can now state the apologist’s criticism of the atheist succinctly: the atheist, according to the apologist, cannot complete the Grounding Project. Now this would not be too forceful of a criticism of atheism if the apologist also could not, even in principle, complete the project either. So the apologist is implicitly presupposing that somehow having God around makes completing the grounding project a viable task. But here the apologist (at least if taken by a view STR promotes) may be in serious trouble.
Recall that, according to apologists like Greg, you can’t get an “ought” from an “is.” In other words, if you start with a purely descriptive set of facts, you cannot validly infer any prescriptive facts (WisdomLover has refuted this, but unfortunately there seems to be no danger of the word getting out on this blog, so I doubt many will learn from his refutation). In this vein, Koukl writes,
According to Koukl, therefore, there is no set of purely descriptive facts such that one may infer merely from those facts some moral conclusion. Notice that the claim here is that no one, theist or non-theist alike, can succeed in correctly making such an inference. What this means is that, according to Koukl, any time one validly infers a moral conclusion, one must have relied on a moral premise. But that is just to say that one cannot get to any moral conclusions without already relying on some moral item. In other words, there is no set of facts that can get you morality without itself including as a member some moral item (or in other words still, there is no moral conclusion that validly follows from premises all of which are entirely non-moral in character).
So, if Koukl wishes to retain this doctrine, then he is forced to say that the Grounding Project is in principle not capable of being accomplished, even by the apologist! The reason it is not capable of being accomplished is because it attempts to get morality from a set of facts all of which are non-moral facts. But that is just to commit the is-ought fallacy.
So the apologist is really the one being unreasonable here. The apologist insists that the atheist ground morality. If the atheist grounds morality in a set of facts that includes some moral item, then the apologist says that atheist has merely presupposed morality and that the account is circular. If the atheist grounds morality in a set of facts that does not include some moral item, then the apologist accuses the atheist of the is-ought fallacy. So one can see that there is no way for the atheist (or the theist!) to win this game, and the atheist can play it against the theist with just as much youthful brio and vivacity. The atheist can challenge the theist to ground morality. If the theist grounds morality in a set of facts one member of which is itself some moral fact, then the atheist can say the theist has given a circular account. If the theist grounds morality in a set of facts that does not include any moral facts, then the atheist can say that the theist has committed the is-ought fallacy. So, there is no way for anyone to win this silly game, and it therefore ought not concern the atheist in the least that he or she also cannot win it.
Posted by: Malebranche | July 18, 2012 at 06:01 AM
Ben,
I think that you’re trying to cover yourself from the ‘Best Argument Agianst Theism’ post. Unfortunately, I think it’s just getting worse for you.
Even more…
I’d like to repost my post from the ‘Best Argument Agianst Theism' post as it still applies.
Repost
Ben,
Oh, Ben. Is this really true? It’s one thing to disagree with the existence of objective morality, but a totally different thing to claim to not know what one means when they speak of moral objectivity. I believe you’re being a bit disingenuous here. Can you at least acknowledge that?
Let’s take for example: Friend of Ben and fellow non-theist, John. John and Ben are having beer at a bar late one night. John says, “Can you believe the silliness of the Christian claim of objective morality?” Would you have nothing to say except, “What do Christians mean? I've always wondered."
Don’t we know the answer to this?
Posted by: KWM | July 18, 2012 at 07:57 AM
Malebranche,
This means absolutely nothing.
Posted by: KWM | July 18, 2012 at 08:00 AM
Malebranche,
Where? I'd like to see that.
Posted by: SteveK | July 18, 2012 at 08:25 AM
Malebranche,
I don't think you understand the argument. If God is the grounding, then the "is" of God also coincides with the "ought" that comes with this fact. They are inseparable, they one-in-the-same. So you are arguing against a straw man. Morality comes from a set of facts (God), which cannot exist as non-moral facts.
Posted by: SteveK | July 18, 2012 at 08:34 AM
Instead of wading through past posts, I’ll just reproduce WisdomLover’s argument (he or she can correct anything that is not accurate in the following presentation). Consider the following argument:
(1) Either the sky is green or we morally ought to not torture for fun.
(2) The sky is not green
(3) Therefore, we morally ought to not torture for fun.
This argument is sound. The conclusion follows deductively from the premises and both premises are true. Premise (2), moreover, is not a moral fact. The conclusion, furthermore, expresses a moral fact. Now, either premise (1) expresses a moral fact or it does not. If it does not, then we have just given a sound argument whose conclusion expresses a moral fact but none of whose premises express a moral fact. In this case, we have correctly derived a moral conclusion from wholly non-moral premises.
But suppose that premise (1) does express a moral fact. In that case, consider the following argument:
(4) The sky is blue.
(5) Therefore, either the sky is blue or we morally ought to not torture for fun.
If premise (1) expresses a moral fact, then by parity so does step (5). Step (5), moreover, follows deductively from step (4), which obviously does not express a moral fact. Therefore, if we suppose that premise (1) expresses a moral fact, then we must say that step (5) does as well, in which case we must say that at least one moral fact (the one expressed in step (5)) follows deductively from a non-moral fact (the one expressed in premise (4)).
Either way, we know that there are logically sound arguments whose premises express no moral facts but whose conclusion express moral facts.
Posted by: Malebranche | July 18, 2012 at 08:42 AM
KWM,
I've already responded to your comment here. It still applies.
Posted by: Ben | July 18, 2012 at 08:44 AM
I don't follow you, Malebranche. You said
If 5 follows from all the premises (including premise 1), then how is it that 5 follows deductively from a non-moral fact? Premise 1 is a moral fact. What am I missing?
Posted by: SteveK | July 18, 2012 at 08:57 AM
The point is just this. Consider the following two arguments:
Argument One
(1) Either the sky is green or we morally ought not to torture for fun.
(2) The sky is not green.
(3) Therefore, we morally ought not to torture for fun.
Argument Two
(4) The sky is blue.
(5) Therefore, either the sky is blue or we morally ought not torture for fun.
We know that at least one of these arguments is such that it is logically sound, has a moral conclusion, and does not contain any premises expressing moral facts. If premise (1) is not a moral fact, then we know Argument One is an argument that is logically sound, has a moral conclusion, and does not contain any premises expressing moral facts (since obviously premise (2) does not express a moral fact). If premise (1) is a moral fact, then by parity step (5) of Argument Two is a moral fact, in which case we know that Argument Two is logically sound, has a moral conclusion, and does not contain any premises expressing moral facts. Either way, we know there is an argument that is logically sound, has a moral conclusion, and does not contain any premises expressing moral facts.
Posted by: Malebranche | July 18, 2012 at 09:05 AM
I think what was confusing is that you may have thought that I was giving one single argument. I was actually trying to give two arguments. Hope that is clearer in my previous remark.
Posted by: Malebranche | July 18, 2012 at 09:10 AM
I see a few problems...
a) If Premise 1 is not a moral fact then the moral aspect of Premise 1 is not true and (3) cannot logically follow from (1) and (2).
b) If Premise 1 is a moral fact then the moral conclusion in (5) is not coming from a non-moral fact.
Posted by: SteveK | July 18, 2012 at 09:21 AM
Step (3) obviously follows logically from (1) and (2), whether or not premise (1) is true, and whether or not premise (1) expresses a moral fact. The validity of the argument is not disputable. The argument is known to be logically valid by anyone familiar with the concept of validity and basic logic. And again, the validity of the argument depends not at all on whether premise (1) is or is not a moral fact; it doesn't even depend upon whether or not any of the premises are true.
Furthermore, step (5) follows logically from premise (4). Again, this is not up for discussion. It is known to be true by anyone familiar with validity and basic logic. From "p" one may always infer "either p or q."
This leaves us with two questions. First, are the arguments sound? Since it is morally wrong to torture for fun, we know that both arguments are sound. Second, does at least one argument contain a moral conclusion and only non-moral premises? The answer is yes. If step (5) is a moral conclusion, then it follows from premise (4), which expresses no moral facts. In this case, there is a logically sound argument with a moral conclusion and wholly non-moral premises. If step (5) is not a moral conclusion, then by parity neither is premise (1), and so step (3), which expresses a moral fact, follows from premises (1) and (2), neither of which express moral facts. In this case, there is a logically sound argument with a moral conclusion and wholly non-moral premises. Either way, there is a logically sound argument with a moral conclusion and wholly non-moral premises.
But my main point is contained in my first comment, and as you can see, the substance of that post does not depend on whether WisdomLover's refutation succeeds.
Posted by: Malebranche | July 18, 2012 at 09:41 AM
Malebranche,
Your arguement is false because it is not morally wrong to torture for fun.
You assume this. You foist this into the arena of logic as if it is a Self Testifying Fact. Eating our neighbors is not wrong, either. I just "foisted" that into the arena of logic and assigned it an arbitrary letter, as did you.
If you mean to simply foist assertions, and then arbitrarily assign them letters, well, that is fine, but it is not a Proof of any sort.
Your assertion is groundless, as is mine. Unless you mean to say that a public vote of 51% "defines" wrong.
Posted by: scbrownlhrm | July 18, 2012 at 09:56 AM
Ben,
It seems that This-Context alone cannot give us a Non-Arbitrary assertion that there are no such things as round squares in any context, or in All-Contexts. Or, if we do Know that there are no such things as round squares in All-Contexts, then we see to the end of ad infinitum, and we find ourselves speaking with the Semantics of a Language which is uniform in All-Contexts, and True in All-Contexts, and, we Know-In-All-Contexts. Logic is not Self-Testifying. It too is grounded on the Fact-hood of what Is, the Immutable, the Uncreated, the Eternal. With what language do we speak Is-Statements in All-Contexts? As Logic is not merely Contextual (there are no round squares anywhere) and just as our Consciousness can access it, and as it is not self-testifying, it rests upon simple Objective Fact-hood. Our Logic cannot escape this, just as Ought cannot. Unless, that is, we mean to argue that there just may be round squares "somewhere" as we can't know All-Context Knowledge nor speak the Immutable Semantics of its Eternal Language. It is the same problem with Knowing Ought as in Knowing Logic. Unless we mean to concede the possibility of round squares in some contexts somewhere (we cannot say otherwise unless we know All-Contexts). If there is such a thing as the Everywhere and Always, the Uncreated, the Immutable, the Eternal, that which "Is", in All-Contexts, and if that Thing happens to be Personhood within Whom Love is housed, then the End of Ad Infinitum is both Personhood and Love, and all appeals to "something else" will, ultimately, come to a hard stop "There". Logic and Love both speak the language of All-Contexts. Of course, some cannot account for how it is we find ourselves speaking with the Semantics of this Language.
Posted by: scbrownlhrm | July 18, 2012 at 10:00 AM
Malebranche,
You're simply wrong. You start with premises that are stated as fact to be FALSE premises. How can you reach a true conclusion using false premises? You can't. You're committing the false-true fallacy, not the is-ought fallacy.Here is your Argument 1.
(1) Either the sky is green or we morally ought not to torture for fun.
(1a) The moral premise in (1) is not a fact (it's false)
(2) The sky is not green (the other premise in (1) is also false).
(3) Therefore, ???
Try the example below. Before we get started, let's stipulate in the below example that "water is dry" is not a fact. Now let's work through the logic.
(1) Either water is wet or water is dry
(2) Water is not wet
(3) ??
What can you conclude in (3)? You certainly cannot conclude that "water is dry" when you stipulated that this is not a fact.
Posted by: SteveK | July 18, 2012 at 10:01 AM
Ben,
In that case let me “speculate about your psychology” further. I think you’re doubling down after being called on this. I’m not the only one who said so originally – but of course, I’m no psychologist.
Honesty is the best policy. If one can’t be honest about knowing what one means when they speak of objective morality, what’s the point of further discussion?
One final point – you seem to use a whole bunch of space and a whole bunch of time explaining how you don’t understand what anyone means by objective morality.
Posted by: KWM | July 18, 2012 at 11:13 AM
Really? I’m actually surprised. I was thinking you’d agree with him since you don’t think objective morality exists.
Our experience of what we call morality is an illusion of morality. We think we’re apprehending moral truths, when in reality they’re “an illusion put in place by your genes to make you a social cooperator.”
I think you’re making this more complicated than it needs to be. Here’s all I’m saying: If God exists, and His character is the perfect standard of goodness, then there is such a thing as “goodness” that’s preferable to “badness.” There is actually objective “good” and “not good.” Perhaps we will not always discern the difference well, but that doesn’t change the fact that the standard is outside of us, and it’s real.
As Ruse says, if God doesn’t exist, there are things we call “good” and “bad,” but it’s mere social convention, arrived at by a trick of our biology. There is no objective standard outside of us. Good is not objectively “better” than bad, we just prefer it because it helps us survive. We think that morality is something concrete we have to follow (natural selection has made sure we would, since society would otherwise fall apart), but it really isn’t.
Why would I have an inclination to suspect the existence of an external concrete exemplar in this discussion? As I explained in the post, because I think it’s more reasonable to take the straightforward understanding of our experience of morality as being real rather than going with the explanation that it’s an illusory trick of biology.
Posted by: Amy | July 18, 2012 at 11:51 AM
Amy,
Thanks for the response.
I should point out, though, that there already is such a thing as "goodness" and "badness," even before invoking the existence of God. Only goodness and badness are abstract objects, not concrete objects; i.e, they exist as concepts in our minds, just like other concepts such as straightness, tallness, and so forth.
But nothing about my moral experience suggests the existence of an external, ideal concrete exemplar, and so I don't see why you would think that our moral experience is somehow tricking us into thinking that there is such an exemplar. I don't get that at all from my moral experience, any more than I am tricked into thinking that there is a meter bar in Paris when I apprehend truths about length measurements.
Now, we are apprehending moral truths. That much is clear. But they do not imply the existence of an ideal external exemplar any more than truths about length imply the existence of the Parisian meter bar. So for instance the height of the Empire State Building had one true value long before the Parisians constructed their bar. Similarly, it really is true that kindness is good, regardless of whether God exists to concretely exemplify an ideal moral standard. This kind of semantic objectivity is completely separate from the question of a concrete exemplar.
So when you say that you want to take "morality as being real," I have to add, so do I! But for morality to be real is quite a different thing than for a concrete object to exemplify an ideal standard of morality or goodness. If you point out that the former is true, that's fine as far as it goes, but it tells us nothing of the latter.
Posted by: Ben | July 18, 2012 at 03:14 PM
KWM,
I have been open, honest and very polite in my posts here. So I take it as quite an insult when you repeatedly accuse me of dishonesty.
In any case, I have zero interest in discussing the matter further. I can't make you drop it, but I very much hope that you do. And even if you don't, I will.
Posted by: Ben | July 18, 2012 at 03:21 PM
Ben,
There is no Objective Is-Ness to your "semantic objectivity" as you cannot build upon the Non- Arbitrary All-Context Knowledge as per the post above. If by "good" and if by "objective" you mean Arbitrary, and the possibility of round squares, then you are not guilty of hyperbole on your own previously argued terms.
Posted by: scbrownlhrm | July 18, 2012 at 04:09 PM
Ben,
Short of All-Context-Knowledge you perhaps may infer these as Semantically Objective as well:
The Truth about Equality is found in Nietzsche's direction as he comments, "Equality is a herd mentality developed by the weaker in their attempt to foist their will upon the stronger."
Or, perhaps here:
"You can't, except in the lowest animal sense, be in love with anyone if you know (and keep on remembering) that all the beauties both of the person and of the character are a momentary and accidental pattern produced by blind forces constraining aimless reverberations of photons, and that your own response to them is only a sort of psychic phosphorescence arising from a deterministic dance to blind, indifferent genes. You can't go on getting very serious pleasure from music, or displeasure from Injustice, if you know and remember that their air of significance are both pure illusion, that you like the one, or dislike the other, only because your nervous system is irrationally conditioned to like the one or dislike the other."
You must be careful not to invoke any Is-Statements of the All-Context sort, as per my post to you above, as you often argue that our Consciousness is unable to access this.
Posted by: scbrownlhrm | July 18, 2012 at 04:18 PM
Excellent argument, STR. It was a similar argument which made me realise the untenability of Sola Scriptura.
Posted by: PaulR | July 19, 2012 at 01:09 AM
Meaning at, and in, and by the Cross of Christ:
As for Objective Fact-Hood, that which Is, the Immutable, the Uncreated, the Eternal, upon Whom Logic sees, and therefore knows at the end of ad infinitum, yet does not know infinitely, and lays claim to the Objective Semantics of the All-Context Language capable of the Is-Statement that there are no such things as round squares, ever, in All-Contexts, and upon Whom Love also sees and therefore also knows at the end of ad infinitum, yet does not know infinitely, and lays claim to the All-Context Language capable of Is-Statements of the I in All-Contexts, and of the You in All-Contexts, and of the I-You or Singular-We in All-Contexts wherein Love’s Triune I-You-We finds Personhood Uncreated and finds Love Uncreated, and Immutable, and Eternal, and we find that both Logic and Love speak with the Immutable Semantics of this Eternal Language.
Ultimate Reality Himself, Who is simply Love Himself, or, rather, the Uncreated, the Real, the Immutable, the Eternal Personhood at the end of ad infinitum, wherein the I-You forever births the Singular-We, Love's Triune I-You-We reveals to us that Uncreated Movement Among and Between Real-Selves, wherein Real, Immutable, and Eternal Love is found Uncreated. If one cannot see, know, that outward reach eluded to earlier which shores up all Is-Statements, which lies farther out, behind all and beneath all, at that eventual Conclusion Who Is Himself the End of ad infinitum then I am afraid one will not look past their own Is-Less Is-Statements and we need not venture into the arena of Ultimate Reality for Immutable Love would initially embrace and finally swallow up whole such a finite and Is-Less state of affairs as we see that that state of affairs cannot withstand the weight of its own assertions without permitting a Subtext which permits the possibility of round squares in Some-Context somewhere, not to mention the weight of Ultimate Reality Himself.
As for what lies at the end of ad infinitum, we find the Uncreated, the Eternal, the Immutable and the Is-Statement of God-Is-Love fills our Consciousness with Perspective. Within Love Himself we find that beautiful Movement Among and Between Real Selves within the Triune I-You-We where the I-You forever births the Singular-We and Love's Selves forever abdicate One toward the Other, and "Thy and not My" is found in ceaseless utterance, and therein the Eternally-Sacrificed-Self forever opens His arms wide, gives Himself way, forever Dies for His beloved Other, and in loving return the Other there in like manner gives back the same, and by that return He who forever Dies is also forever Restored, Raised up again. Within the Triune's I/You/We lies Uncreated Personhood and within such Immutable and Eternal Personhood Love forever gives away the Self, and this for His beloved Other. When Man's Consciousness finds Love made Flesh, he finds Love-Manifest there up on a Hill in his Consciousness and he sees Love simply doing that which He forever does within Himself: He spreads His arms wide, and He gives Himself away and that for His Beloved-Other. Man's Consciousness sees Him, there on a Hill, His arms open wide, giving Himself away, and this for His Beloved Other, whom He claims is You and I, and the Eternally-Sacrificed-Self thereby reveals to us Uncreated Love, Immutable Love, Eternal Love, which is Himself.
Posted by: scbrownlhrm | July 19, 2012 at 01:17 AM
If the Is/Ought fallacy is the "mistake" of deriving an ought from an is, then I don't agree with it. I think one can derive an ought from an is easily.
1. If God say we ought to do something, then we ought to do it.
2. God says we ought to provide for our families.
3. Therefore, we ought to provide for our families.
But I take the Is/Ought fallacy to be something different. It's the mistake of thinking that because something IS the case that it therefore OUGHT to be the case for that reason alone.
Posted by: Sam | July 19, 2012 at 06:29 AM
Sam,
Perhaps this: First, Ought is not Have-To. Secondly, the Ought does not come from what Love Himself "says". It simply "is" because of what He Himself "is". He need not say one word. The Immutable, the Everywhere And Always is that particular Is we know as the Triune, wherein the I-You forever gives forth a Singular-We, and within that Community it is Thine and not Mine, Other and not Self, as Love's Eternally Sacrificed Self gives Himself away, and this in the Pure Delight of His Beloved-Other, and so on forever.
The notion of a Hard-Stop at the End of Ad Infinitum brings all Is-Statements, all Statements whatsoever, to the Final End of that Hard Stop in the lap of Love, if, that is, Ultimate Reality "Is-Love". We think of this as an ought, but really it is simply that which cannot be otherwise, which never has been otherwise, which never will be otherwise. We need not run to the End of that Hard Stop. But Need and Ought are not the quite the same. It is simply a matter of Purpose. If the Purpose of the Derived is Love within Un-Derived Love Himself, then "ought" comes in. I "ought" to drink water, and Know-Life, as that is the Purpose of Water and of my Mouth. But I need not. I do not "have to". "Need" is the same as "Have To" and we mistake "Have To" for "Ought" but "ought" is something else, further along, farther out, and is built upon a Prior-Purpose. It is not God-Ought-Love, but it is God-Is-Love, for He is the Uncreated and has no Prior, whereas, Man-Ought-Love, and this is built on Love-Is. If there is no water, no mouth, no purpose, then there is only Need, only Have-To, but there is no Ought-To. Photons "need to reverberate downhill" or "have to reverberate down hill". There is not Ought-To therein for there is no Personhood, no Love therein as there is in the Uncreated Triune, Who is Love Himself.
Posted by: scbrownlhrm | July 19, 2012 at 06:56 AM
Sam,
Perhaps this also: Outside of Immutable Personhood, Immutable Love, we have only Need, only Have-To. Photons Have-To. Persons-Ought-To. It is a different Substrate and demands its own Language, the Semantics of which are as Immutable and as Eternal as is Love Himself, as per Logic and Love in my posts to Ben here. This is why "DNA neither knows nor cares, DNA just is, and we dance to its music" very well has its own "is" yet provides no "ought". You are right that "is" by itself brings no ought.
Posted by: scbrownlhrm | July 19, 2012 at 07:30 AM
Sam,
Although it is clear from my comments that I think that there are sound arguments with moral conclusions and non-moral premises, I do not think your example is an instance of this. As far as I can tell, your example can be accurately reformulated as follows:
(1) We are morally obligated to do whatever God commands.
(2) God commands that we ought to provide for our families.
(3) Therefore, we are morally obligated to provide for our families.
It seems to me that premise (1) expresses a moral claim, a claim about what moral duties we have, and so is not an example of a purely descriptive claim. So I do not think this is going to serve us well as an example of an argument that is logically sound, that has a conclusion expressing a moral fact, and that contains no premises which express moral facts.
But again, my main point concerns not the alleged is-ought fallacy, but rather that the grounding challenge that some at STR pose is really a challenge that no one at all is even in principle able to meet, and so should be of no concern to anyone.
Posted by: Malebranche | July 19, 2012 at 07:47 AM
To say that the grounding challenge cannot be met even in principle is to say that it's an impossible task. If morality cannot be grounded at all then how can it exist in any real way? I don't see that it can - even in a relativistic way.
Perhaps you can explain how that works, Malebranche.
And if you are saying morality cannot exist because it cannot, in principle, be grounded in anything, then please explain what it is you are experiencing and how it got there.
Posted by: SteveK | July 19, 2012 at 08:00 AM
I am not saying morality cannot be grounded. What I am saying is that the grounding challenge that STR poses cannot even in principle be answered, given their commitments.
They want morality to be grounded. But if the thing you ground morality in itself contains a moral item, they will complain that the account presupposes the very thing that we are trying to ground and so is circular. They will, therefore, remain unsatisfied. On the other hand, if the thing you ground it in does not contain any moral item, they can complain that the account fails because you can’t correctly infer a moral fact from wholly non-moral premises. They will, therefore, remain unsatisfied. So, no matter what one does or what one believes about God, they will say that you are either giving a circular account or else you are mistakenly inferring a moral fact from wholly non-moral premises.
My point is that this is what is actually going on, and that STR is right that the atheist cannot meet this challenge in a way that satisfies the folks at STR. But of course no one can, so it is hardly something about which anyone should be concerned.
Posted by: Malebranche | July 19, 2012 at 08:24 AM
Malebranche,
See my posts to Sam and Ben. There is Ground after all, it seems.
Perhaps something like this:
You have not provided an Eternal, Immutable, Everywhere And Always Moral-Item, for you seem to have based “moral item” either in mere assertion or in society (I think). You are only asserting a moral statement and then conceding you have no Ground to rest it on other than your own assertion, perhaps stemming from your own whim, or society’s whim. This leaves all Moral-Statements in the land of the Mutable. If Mutable-Morals are what you are aiming for, then I think STR will be dissatisfied, or at least I am, for MLK calls Slavery wrong Everywhere and Always while Nietzsche tells us that Equality is a herd mentality developed by the weaker in their attempt to foist their will upon the stronger. Society, Whim, Brainstems, Contextual-Semantics, and Photon-Fluxes all morph over time and place. DNA “is” yet provides no “ought” as per my two replies to Sam about his correct statement that a mere "is" does not give us an "ought". There is another Substrate which Immutable Ought must be made out of, again, as per my two replies to Sam.
Logic and Love see to the end of ad infinitum where the Immutable lives, while not knowing infinitely. Immutable Is-Statements of Worth come in here about the “I” in All-Contexts and about the “You” in All-Contexts and about the “We” in All-Contexts. Objective Fact-Hood, that which Is, the Immutable, the Uncreated, the Eternal, upon Whom Logic sees and therefore knows at the end of ad infinitum, yet does not know infinitely, and lays claim to the Objective Semantics of the All-Context Language capable of the Is-Statement that there are no such things as round squares, ever, in All-Contexts, and upon Whom Love also sees and therefore also knows at the end of ad infinitum, yet does not know infinitely, and lays claim to the All-Context Language capable of Is-Statements of the I in All-Contexts, and of the You in All-Contexts, and of the I-You or Singular-We in All-Contexts wherein Love’s Triune I-You-We finds Personhood Uncreated and finds Love Uncreated, and Immutable, and Eternal, and we find that both Logic and Love speak with the Immutable Semantics of this Eternal Language.
The simple way there (there are others) is simply when we say there are no round squares anywhere, ever, in any context, our Logic tells us something about Nonsense being Nonsense which we cannot touch and which is at the end of ad infinitum. If Logic cannot see to the end of ad infinitum, we cannot say that in all of reality, ever, in All-Contexts, everywhere and always, there are no round squares. The "Ground" on which we rest "there are no round squares anywhere, in any context, ever" is the same sort of Ground Ought sits upon: Objective Fact-Hood of that which Is, or the Immutable, or the Uncreated, the Eternal.
As mentioned, One-Context alone cannot give us a Non-Arbitrary assertion that there are no such things as round squares in any context, or in All-Contexts. Arbitrary Contextual-Knowledge is Mutable, and all Is-Statements therein are also Mutable, Arbitrary, and Slavery becomes Arbitrarily Right and Arbitrarily Wrong. Mutable and not Always-In-All-Contexts-Wrong. If we do Know that there are no such things as round squares in All-Contexts, then we see to the end of ad infinitum, and we find ourselves speaking with the Semantics of a Language which is uniform in All-Contexts, and True in All-Contexts, and, we Know-In-All-Contexts. Logic is not Self-Testifying. It too is grounded on the Fact-hood of what Is, the Immutable, the Uncreated, the Eternal. With what language do we speak Is-Statements in All-Contexts? As Logic is not merely Contextual (there are no round squares anywhere) and just as our Consciousness really does access it, and as it is not self-testifying, it rests upon simple Objective Fact-hood. Our Logic cannot escape this, just as Ought cannot. Unless, that is, we mean to argue that there just may be round squares "somewhere" as we can't know All-Context Knowledge nor speak the Immutable Semantics of its Eternal Language. It is the same problem with Knowing Ought as in Knowing Logic. Unless we mean to argue the real possibility of round squares in some contexts somewhere (we cannot say otherwise unless we know All-Contexts). If one will not see, know, that outward reach eluded to here which shores up all Is-Statements, which lies farther out, behind all and beneath all, at that eventual Conclusion Who Is Himself the End of ad infinitum then I am afraid one will not look past their own Is-Less (arbitrary) Is-Statements and we need not venture into the arena of Ultimate Reality for Immutable Love would initially embrace and finally swallow up whole such a finite and Is-Less state of affairs as we see that that state of affairs cannot withstand the weight of its own assertions without permitting a Subtext which permits the possibility of round squares in Some-Context somewhere, not to mention the weight of Ultimate Reality Himself, which is Love Himself. In Personhood, unlike in Matter, we find Ought. DNA just "is" and sadly that "is" gives us no "oughts". Photons-Have-To. Persons-Ought-To. DNA Has-To, "I" Ought To, as per my two replies to Sam.
A Subtext beneath our feet which unwittingly permits the faintest possibility of round squares in Some-Context somewhere on the Grounds that we cannot access and speak the Language of All-Context-Knowledge is a Subtext which cannot support the weight of any Context up above our heads, for Nonsense-Is-Nonsense in All-Contexts, and the Context over our heads cannot rescue the Subtext beneath our feet, and the Subtext beneath our feet cannot support the weight of the Context above our heads, for there are no such things as round squares. If we mean to throw away Logic for Nonsense, then there is no hope.
"Ultimate Reality Is-Love" gets us out of Mere-Matter and into Immutable and Eternal Personhood within the Triune God Who is Himself I-You-We inside of which Love lives Uncreated.
Posted by: scbrownlhrm | July 19, 2012 at 09:11 AM
Sam,
I should also add that the is-ought fallacy, at least as articulated by Hume, is not exactly the fallacy of inferring from the fact that X is the case that X ought to be the case. Instead, the fallacy as articulated by Hume (at least on one standard reading) occurs whenever someone infers a moral fact from a set of purely non-moral facts. Here’s a relevant passage from Hume himself:
Here it seems that Hume is saying that from purely non-moral facts (be they facts about God (e.g., God exists and is all-powerful) or human affairs (e.g., hitting people hurts them), or whatever you please, one cannot validly infer a moral conclusion (e.g., God ought to be obeyed; we ought not hit people). According to Hume, therefore, any adequate justification of a moral fact must presuppose some other moral or evaluative fact. Since Koukl has referenced both Hume and the is-ought fallacy in his writings, I take it that he thinks this is true.
Here's an excerpt from the "Hume's Moral Philosophy" entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy concerning this fallacy:
C.S. Lewis also seems to have agreed with Hume that no purely non-moral premises will ever deliver a moral conclusion. Lewis writes,
Posted by: Malebranche | July 19, 2012 at 09:22 AM
Malebranche,
It is correct to say that a simple "is" does not give an "ought".
Ought requires quite another substrate.
Posted by: scbrownlhrm | July 19, 2012 at 09:30 AM
And what I'm saying is you've misunderstood their argument.
Posted by: SteveK | July 19, 2012 at 09:51 AM
Malebranche, it’s not that you have to come up with a grounding that doesn’t include a moral fact, it’s that a moral fact has to be grounded in a person. There are no moral facts between non-persons or between a person (or persons as a group) and a non-person. It makes no sense to say that a meadow existing by itself in the universe is good or evil. Nor does it make sense to say that if I’m the only person in a material universe that I have any sort of obligation or duty. Whatever I do is just “what I do.”
As a human race, we have no duties or obligations if outside of ourselves there exists only a non-personal, material universe. There must be someone to whom we are obligated. But human beings are persons—can one human being ground a moral fact that obligates another human being? I don’t see how this can be the case. Every human being would have equal authority to do so, which means the words “good” and “bad” would basically be meaningless—reflecting only personal, subjective preferences, and as many standards as there are human beings, with nothing to mediate between them. If I am my own standard, I have no obligation to follow your standard. Anything I’d call a “duty” would be either something I made up, or be something brought about by the superior force of another human being. But something I make up myself can hardly be called a “duty.” The only reason I have an obligation towards another human being is because I’m obligated to the Person above me, Whose character requires me to treat others in a particular way.
Yes, the words “good” and “bad” only make sense if we’re talking about interactions between persons, and those interactions happen among human persons, but in order for the words to have any objective meaning, they must be defined by a standard above the human race.
In order for there to be a true standard outside of our competing human opinions, to which we have an obligation to conform, there must be a universe that is ordered by a person (or rather, three persons eternally in community in one being), for whom morality is meaningful, who is the representative of goodness (the standard for the universe and the purpose for which we were designed), and to whom we are obligated.
No purely non-moral premises about the state of reality can lead to a moral conclusion because morality doesn’t spring forth from amorality. But this concept is exactly the point—an amoral universe does not beget morality (and moral beings do not spring forth from amoral material). It could only lead to many different competing “is-es.” Only a moral person, can be the source of objective morality. And that person must be someone we’re obligated to as an entire race.
Since the most straightforward understanding of our experience is that morality does exist, that we do have duties and an obligation to conform ourselves to a standard, this points to the existence of a Person above us, to whom we’re obligated.
Posted by: Amy | July 19, 2012 at 11:03 AM
Amy,
I certainly think that the route you have suggested is more promising than demanding that the atheist ground morality but then arguing that morality can be adequately grounded neither in wholly non-moral facts nor partly moral facts. I've taken the time to consider your comment and thought I'd share some thoughts about it below, to achieve clarity if not agreement. Here are my thoughts.
There are no moral facts between non-persons or between a person (or persons as a group) and a non-person.
That’s quite a controversial claim which requires support. If you’re merely reporting your own view, then fine (although the fact that you hold to this view is not what is under dispute). But if this is a premise in an argument which is supposed to worry the non-theist, then the premise certainly ought not to simply be granted; it must be supported by reasons. Why think this is true? Why not think that moral relations can obtain directly between persons and non-persons? For instance, some believe that humans have duties to non-human animals (and to them directly) to not inflict harm on them gratuitously. What non-question begging reason is there to think they are mistaken?
It makes no sense to say that a meadow existing by itself in the universe is good or evil.
I’m at a loss as to why this seems true to you. Many regard living substances like whales and trees as having some measure of intrinsic goodness. In fact, a popular Medieval position was that a thing has intrinsic goodness insofar as it has being. As Scott MacDonald has noted,
On this view, then, anything with being can truly be said to be good, at least insofar as it has being. Now I find this talk of being coming in degrees very turbid. But I find nothing nonsensical about the view that a plant or a whale has some measure of intrinsic worth that ought to be respected, a worth that it would possess even in the absence of all persons. Certainly nothing said thus far shows that this view is nonsensical or false. So again, there’s little here to worry the atheist who believes in objective morality.
Nor does it make sense to say that if I’m the only person in a material universe that I have any sort of obligation or duty. Whatever I do is just “what I do.”
This is a view with which I have sympathy, viz. that obligations are inherently social. But again it is very controversial. Some people have thought we have duties to ourselves (i.e., Kantians). These people might think that one reason being a prostitute is immoral is because it is an instance of using a human being (yourself) as a mere means to an end. The prostitute, on this view, violates a duty to herself. So, the view you are expressing is far from obviously true, and so requires support.
But it is also important to sharply distinguish questions of moral goodness from questions of moral duty. There are many things that are good that I am not obligated to do. Conceptually, therefore the notions of goodness and duty ought to be kept distinct. Just because moral duty may make sense only in the context of a plurality of persons, it does not follow that moral goodness makes sense only in this context.
As a human race, we have no duties or obligations if outside of ourselves there exists only a non-personal, material universe.
This is merely a restatement of the very thing at issue (whether morality requires there to be non-human persons), and so provides no independent support for it.
There must be someone to whom we are obligated.
Many who do not endorse a theistic account of ethics agree. Contractarians, for instance, think that questions of moral duty concern what human persons owe to each other.
But human beings are persons—can one human being ground a moral fact that obligates another human being? I don’t see how this can be the case. Every human being would have equal authority to do so, which means the words “good” and “bad” would basically be meaningless—reflecting only personal, subjective preferences, and as many standards as there are human beings, with nothing to mediate between them.
I don’t think these reasons are cogent, or at least I’m not sure I understand them. As far as I can tell, the reasoning is as follows:
Premises (3) and (5) seem plausible to me. But if this is your argument, I do not know why you think premise (1) is true. Why think that only facts about what standards humans have actually decided to adopt could ground moral facts about duties between humans? Why not think, with the Aristotelians or Kantians, that facts about the kind of things humans are ground facts about our moral duties? Or why not think, with some Rawlsian contractarians, that what grounds moral duties are not what principles of behavior humans actually adopt, but which principles humans would agree to were they fully rational, and seeking to agree to principles governing behavior behind a veil of ignorance (i.e., they don’t know their gender, sexual orientation, religion, race, social status, etc.)? I see no reason for the non-theist to be uncomfortable with the argument you’ve given, since it rests on a highly controversial and thus-far unsupported premise.
The only reason I have an obligation towards another human being is because I’m obligated to the Person above me, Whose character requires me to treat others in a particular way.
Again, this merely restates the very thing at issue, which is whether there are other possible bases upon which to ground morality. As a mere restatement of your position, it provides no independent support for it.
Yes, the words “good” and “bad” only make sense if we’re talking about interactions between persons, and those interactions happen among human persons, but in order for the words to have any objective meaning, they must be defined by a standard above the human race.
This again merely restates the position that moral duties require some superhuman foundation, which is the very point at issue. Maybe you think this because you think the only viable candidates for grounding genuine, objective morality are either God or else the standards of behavior individual humans have actually adopted, and that the latter would lead to relativism. But again, I don’t know why you think this. Many, after all, have thought there are other possibilities. Aristotelians and Kantians appeal to facts about our rational nature; Rawlsians appeal to facts about the principles that humans would adopt for the general governance of behavior were those humans fully rational and choosing from behind a veil of ignorance; utilitarians appeal to facts about our capacity for sentience; Hobbesians appeal to facts about the principles it would be rational for humans to adopt in order to escape from the state of nature. Surely we cannot begin our conversation with our atheistic interlocutor by just hauling off and asserting without argument that all of these traditions are mistaken. The atheist, after all, might be among one of these traditions.
In order for there to be a true standard outside of our competing human opinions, to which we have an obligation to conform, there must be a universe that is ordered by a person (or rather, three persons eternally in community in one being), for whom morality is meaningful, who is the representative of goodness (the standard for the universe and the purpose for which we were designed), and to whom we are obligated.
You can probably predict what I’m going to say. This yet again merely restates your position that objective morality requires a superhuman person, and so provides no independent support for it. Furthermore, if taken literally, your position is not only that morality entails theism, but that it entails the doctrine of the Trinity. I think that is going to be very difficult to defend. Finally, in light of the other possible bases for grounding morality, I’m still puzzled as to why you believe that objective morality requires a superhuman person to ground it.
No purely non-moral premises about the state of reality can lead to a moral conclusion because morality doesn’t spring forth from amorality.
Then if you’re going to ground morality in facts about God, these cannot be purely non-moral facts. They will have to be partly moral facts. But in that case you are just starting by helping yourself to one bit of morality (the bit relevant to God, e.g. “we morally ought to obey God”) in order to explain other bits. That’s a game that the atheist can play too. The atheist can just start by taking it as axiomatic and utterly basic that there is a moral duty to not inflict harm gratuitously. He can say that on his view, this is a basic, non-derivative, fundamental moral fact in need of no grounding at all. If asked, “What grounds that fact?” the reply is, “As a basic moral fact, obviously nothing further grounds it. It is part of the most basic set of facts about the world that is in need of no further grounding. Asking what grounds a basic moral fact is as silly as asking who created the uncreated creator.” In this case, you and the atheist both begin with moral facts. Your moral facts just happen to include stuff about God in them, while the atheist’s do not. I see no great advantage for you over the atheist here.
But this concept is exactly the point—an amoral universe does not beget morality (and moral beings do not spring forth from amoral material).
If this means, “If the universe ever once contained no moral agents, then it would always contain no moral agents,” I have no idea why you believe that. I certainly see no arguments in favor of this view.
Only a moral person, can be the source of objective morality. And that person must be someone we’re obligated to as an entire race.
If this is just to say that morality can only be grounded in facts about a single moral individual, then it merely restates your view.
Posted by: Malebranche | July 19, 2012 at 01:15 PM
Malebranche,
Those are great thoughts and they do come close. I think the thing you are missing is that, first, you are still starting with a moral item that is a "fact" rather than a Person (which is a Rule at best and thus void of Personhood) and, also, you still are not giving an Immutable, Eternal moral item.
Personhood/Love, and, Immutable, and, Eternal, and, Uncreated. If you can account for an Uncreated, Immutable, Eternal “Rule” which pre-exists Matter, then you still really do not give the necessary Substrate, as Personhood/Love is therein void.
When we speak of Ought, we first speak of Substrate. The Trinity has an odd way of giving all of the above even more so than a Monolithic-I sort of God, for in the Pure-I there is no Uncreated You, no Uncreated Us/We and thus such a Monolithic-I is dependent on Creation in order to “Love” for Love is not looking in the mirror and adoring yourself. "Let Us make man in Our Image" speaks volumes here. Uncreated Distincts, as in I, You, and, inside the I-You the We/Community of the I-You is forever found Uncreated, which is where Immutable Love is grounded.
We start with “Person” or “Persons” and with “Love”. And, we see the Mutable issue as another real problem to any Moral Is-Statement, for Mutable-Morals morph over time. Thus Immutable becomes Necessary.
I think you are missing “Person” and more specifically “Community/Love” and also Person-Hood, and also Immutable, and also Eternal and also Uncreated/Un-Derived. The only set of descriptive statements which houses all of the above is a Triune God wherein the I-You-We live inside of Love’s Community Among and Between Real Persons, and this From Forever and unto Forever. Love can speak to us here in that I do not know of any other “Relation” or “Interaction” which I have ever tasted in Love which does not have “I” and “You” and “Us”. And, I do not know of any other “Relation” or “Interaction” which I have ever tasted in Love which has some “other entity” as in “they” or “them” or “those”, as Love has within it “I” and thus “We” out-paces “Them” in accuracy. And on and on it goes in that sort of talk about this.
The Necessary Substrate which “fits” is these sorts of Necessary Is-Statements. Honestly, anything less than this simply cannot ground (never mind Ought) but just plain “Love” itself. But, the Ought I guess is the issue at hand.
I think your statement of, “a basic non-derivative fundamental moral fact” is utterly void of Love and of Personhood and of Community. It may be Immutable and Un-Derived and pre-existing matter itself (though you do not show us how) but, even if that is granted as "Just There", it is a thing which is impersonal, and thus heartless, cold, and by that we mean void of Necessary Personhood as in void of I, void of You, void of Us, and, therefore, void of Love for Love is that Movement Among and Between Real Selves and that in the simple delight of the Beloved-Other.
Others may be satisifed with less, but, all that is less is either Mutable over time, or, Impersonal, and thus heartless, loveless.
"God Is Love" and the Triune has all sorts of things to help us here.
Posted by: scbrownlhrm | July 19, 2012 at 02:42 PM
Malebranche,
I suppose if I am heartless, loveless, cold, impersonal, and void of any sense of "Other" or of "Self" then I may be the child of the “basic non-derivative fundamental moral fact” that you describe. But, I am not, you are not, we are not, the Children of such a thing. We are Persons, Real Selves who know Other, and therein Love, and in Love we, you and I, and us, move upon one another in that thing we taste as Good, and Beautiful, and Ought, and Lovely, even if broken, fractured in The-Now. We are a blurred and broken reflection of He from Whom we come. And that is far, far different than “a basic non-derivative fundamental moral fact”. Our Real-Experience as Persons can help us here too, along with "Ultimate Reality Is Love" and along with "The Triune" and all of the Is-Statements which come out of all of those.
Posted by: scbrownlhrm | July 19, 2012 at 03:07 PM
STR,
Thank you for second chances. I am a composite of those.
Posted by: scbrownlhrm | July 19, 2012 at 03:11 PM
Morality and ethics are an abstraction of the innate desire of all empathic and compassionate people to end needless suffering. They do not really have anything to do with theology, religion or even philosophy.
The problem with Hall's argument is that he is assuming "blind indifference" cannot make anything real. Problem is, where does she get this premise? I do not see any way things could be "less real" or "just brains fooling you" even if things were not specifically created. What is the standard of "real" Hall uses? One might just as easily turn this argument around, if God exists morality is not "real", it is just arbitrary guilt that God has programmed you to feel.
Posted by: Erkki S. | July 19, 2012 at 04:07 PM
Personhood does come in it seems. All of our questions about Good and Evil and Ought-To and Should-Have and It-Would-Have-Better-If are, oddly, "raised by Persons about Persons". The entire body of Semantics within the Language with which we speak about the Non-Arbitrary Everywhere and Always is Nonsense outside of Person, or Personhood, or Persons. The All-Context capacity of Man's Consciousness allows his Logic to make the Non-Arbitrary, Non-Contextual Is-Statement of Nonsense Is Nonsense In All Contexts. There are no round squares, anywhere, ever, always, in any context. Our Consciousness here sees, and therefore knows, to and at the End of Ad Infinitum, while not knowing infinitely. In the same way, the other half of Man’s Consciousness, the twin of Logic, which is Love, also sees, and therefore knows, to and at the End of Ad Infinitum, yet does not know infinitely. The Non-Arbitrary here lives. The Everywhere and Always. Man here has his first Taste of the Infinite, and, once the Immutable, the Uncreated, that which “Is” becomes Taste-Able by Consciousness, all becomes possible. There are no such things as round squares. Nonsense is Nonsense in All-Contexts, and, therein the Non-Arbitrary Semantics of the wholly Objective Language swallows up whole the Purely Arbitrary Language of Contextual-Semantics. The All contains within it the Each. Photons “have to”. You and I “ought to”. There is nothing a Person “has to do”. He can choose to live, to die, to starve, to feast, to run, to remain still. Inside of Person and Personhood the “ought to” Language lives forever, while no such Semantics exist inside of the purely Impersonal. The Personhood or the Personal houses the Ought-To for “I” ought to, and this is the door by which Agency lives. But, the Impersonal houses the Have-To, for “Photons” Have-To, and there is no Agency. Personhood houses Agency and Agency houses Ought-To, there in the Personal and this Bedrock has its Own-Language, a Language which cannot be applied within the Impersonal. The Impersonal, void of Personhood, is thereby void of Agency, and is thereby void of Ought-To and lives only in the Have-To of Blind-Photon-Reverberations. Love’s Non-Arbitrary Ought lives only if and when and where Personhood lives. And, inside of Love’s Triune we find just that. The I, the You, and therein the Singular-We of the I-You is forever birthed, forever begotten inside of the Triune I-You-We. “God Is Love” breaks down to God Is Triune, which gives Love the valid claim at the End of Ad Infinitum where the Immutable, the Non-Arbitrary, the Everywhere and Always lives in which Personhood lives Uncreated.
God Is Love. Or, Ultimate Reality Is Love.
Posted by: scbrownlhrm | July 21, 2012 at 05:16 AM
When we see Ultimate Reality Is-Love we see that the Highest Ethic Is-Love. The Immutable Bedrock of All-Contexts, of All, Is-Love. There is a Hard-Stop "there" in Un-Derived Love beyond which a Derived-It or a Derived-Person will never be able to get "past". There is no "past" this Immutable and Eternal and Uncreated Hard-Stop, which is the Uncreated, the Un-Derived, the Primary.
Posted by: scbrownlhrm | July 21, 2012 at 05:43 AM