"I Could Be Wrong"

Dan asks:  When an apologist/philosopher like Greg or JP Moreland or William Lane Craig presents a case for Christianity and says, “Here is why I think it is reasonable to believe Christianity,” but then says “now, I could be wrong about this isn’t it counterproductive in lending credibility to their case.  It seems an unnecessary thing to say which could cause some to stumble because it conveys uncertainty.

Comments

[Knowhat]

Sure, The person or audience would then just think "I could be right"

[Kendalf]

"Intellectual humility," I like that. I wish more people would hear Christian apologists say this and understand that belief in Christianity is not based on dogmatic assertion.

[zadok]

Certainly it is true that epistemic humility is a virtue. But it is also just as certain that epistemic humility involves more than just the admission of error in the past or error in some possible state of affairs. It involves at minimum a willingness to momentarily immerse oneself, so to speak, in the motivations and assumptions of the other. What is it that the other is reacting against? What has the other correctly identified as a problem? What counts as persuasive evidence from the perspective of the other? How do my own arguments appear from the other’s perspective? Willingness to engage in this sort of understanding is what I call “sympathetic understanding.” It is a part of intellectual humility that goes beyond asserting some proposition as utterly obvious with the trite follow-up that one has been wrong in the past.

--zadok

http://standtofolly.wordpress.com/

[David Hawkins]

>>"But it is also just as certain that epistemic humility involves more than just the admission of error in the past or error in some possible state of affairs. "

How did you conclude this to be a "certainty?" Are you basing this assertion on how you "feel" about the idea, or something more readily tangible for the masses?

>>"It involves at minimum a willingness to momentarily immerse oneself, so to speak, in the motivations and assumptions of the other."

Why is this a minimum criterion by your definition? It seems - at least to me - this level of engagement would be a bit more mature than, say, merely acknowledging a due correction or admission of error.

Why does humility need the further ingredients you suggest it requires as a "minimum?"

I think this particular "willingness of immersion" would more accurately be described as "epistemic empathy", which you allude to with what you call "sympathetic understanding". But I do not see that one is required of the other. Cannot the two exist as separate virtues?

An "epistemic humility" need not entail anything other than one receiving correction graciously and without retaliation. Granted the more one understands the reasons for the opposition's perspective, the better the engagement. But I do not see the latter action as a necessary ingredient for it to be deemed "epistemic humility."

[Sam]

The case will stand or fall on its own merits. The credibility of the speaker is not logically relevant.

But, as far as determining the character of the speaker and the credibility of the speaker in an emotional sense.... Uncertainty is not a bad thing if one is uncertain. It's a sign of intellectual honesty and humility - both of which are important Christian virtues.