God's Will (Video)

What's the difference between God's decreed will and His commanded will? God's causal will and His permissive will?

Comments

[dave]

>Permissive Will; from R.C. Sproul

>>What is usually meant by divine permission is that God simply lets it happen. That is, He does not directly intervene to prevent its happening. Here is where grave dangers lurk. Some theologies view this drama as if God were impotent to do anything about human sin.

This view makes man sovereign, not God. God is reduced to the role of spectator or cheerleader, by which God’s exercise in providence is that of a helpless Father who, having done all He can do, must now sit back and simply hope for the best. He permits what He cannot help but permit because He has no sovereign power over it. This ghastly view is not merely a defective view of theism; it is unvarnished atheism.

http://www.ligonier.org/blog/exposing-permissive-will-god/

[RonH]

Sometimes there are doubts about whether any of it are true.

At other times, there is the most exquisite detail.

RonH

[RonH]

Sorry, that should have been "whether any of it is true".

[hb]

Interesting post and the contrast with the view, like Sproul's, posted above was exactly what I was hoping to see as a follow up on. Anyone?

[Daron]

Hi HB,
I don't see the contrast. I think Dave's post can lead one to think that Greg made a claim that is rebutted by the Sproul quote. I would say, rather, that they are in full agreement and that Sproul clarifies a danger in the language in this very short devotional of his.

Here's a Piper link I've offered a couple of times of late:

http://www.desiringgod.org/resource-library/articles/are-there-two-wills-in-god

[WisdomLover]

We've of course heard Jeff-Cog, Sebastian and LHRM go on quite a bit about hows God does not will that some people sin, in spite of the fact that that would imply that God does not have control of His creation. You end up having to reject God's Omnipotence, His Omniscience or His Rationality.

This post obviously has a great deal of relevance to their position.

I'm left to wonder whether the only reason they have for saying that God does not will that people sin is that He wills that they not sin. But these are different claims.

1) God does not will X.
2) God wills that not-X.

It is entirely possible that, for some X at least, the following claims both be true:

2) God wills that not-X.
3) God wills that X.

But then, isn't God's will in conflict? Isn't God irrational?

Hardly.

It just shows that God can make one thing that He wills obedient to another thing that He wills when both cannot be satisfied.

It was, after all, God speaking to Himself who said this:

My Father, if it is possible, let this cup pass from Me; yet not as I will, but as You will...My Father, if this cannot pass away unless I drink it, Your will be done. (Matt. 26: 39b, 42b)

God wills that He not drink the cup (otherwise, He would not have said "not as I will"), God also wills that He drink the cup (otherwise, He would not have said "but as You will"). And He explicitly makes one will obedient to the other ("Your will be done").

[dave]

Here's an excerpt from Gordon Clark. It shows there is no need to demote God to the realm of spectator by "permitting" people to sin.

>How can the existence of God be reconciled with the existence of evil?

If God is good and wants to eliminate sin, but cannot he is not omnipotent; but if God is omnipotent and can eliminate sin, but does not, he is not good. God cannot be both omnipotent and good.

God is neither responsible nor sinful, even though he is the only ultimate cause of everything. He is not sinful because in the first place whatever god does is just and right. It is just and right simply in virtue of the fact that he does it. Justice or righteousness is not a standard external to God to which God is obligated to submit.

There is no law, superior to God, which forbids him to decree sinful acts. Sin presupposes a law, for sin is lawlessness. Sin is any want of conformity unto or transgression of the law of God. But God is “Ex-lex.”

God And Evil: Problem Solved (Excerpts)
by Gordon Clark

http://www.monergism.com/evilproblem.html

[Bennett]

WisdomLover,

To clarify, would that be similar to saying that I might will to be free to do what I please, when I please it, but I also will that I be a good and faithful boyfriend, and thus there are times when I, as a moral agent, subordinate my will-to-please-myself with my will-to-be-faithful, even though both wills are in effect?

[WisdomLover]

Similar, except that there is no sin in either of God's wills. There is in your faithless-will, but possibly not in your faithful will.

[Bennett]

WL,

Very good point, on the clarification. Maybe a better one would be that I will to eat steak and potatoes, and I also will to save money on my grocery bill, so I substitute some less expensive item for the steak. Two sinless desires, one of which has to be subordinated to the other for economic reasons.

[WisdomLover]

Right.

Notice that in the words of Christ we even see Christ say "if it be possible". His will to avoid the cup is placed in obedience to His will to drink the cup. And it is based on the idea that fulfilling the one might not be possible in light of the plans that gave rise to the other.

[Arnauld]

"We've of course heard Jeff-Cog, Sebastian and LHRM go on quite a bit about hows God does not will that some people sin, in spite of the fact that that would imply that God does not have control of His creation. You end up having to reject God's Omnipotence, His Omniscience or His Rationality"

I'm wondering if you can expand a little on this WL. Suppose, for instance that God creates being X, and leaves it under X's control whether or not he performs some action. God relinquishes control over the doing of that action to X. Your comment suggests that you think this scenario incompatible with God being omnipotent, omniscient and rational. I'm not seeing the connection

[hb]

Darrin - is there anyway to make a more general case that Greg and RC are in agreement without using the the dynamics salvation and election to prove the rule?

It still seems to me that Sproul is generally saying that placing things outside of the category of God's decreed will is to render him impotent.

What am I missing?

[Mark Henninger]

Perhaps God's will is better differentiated between sovereign and conditional.

God sovereignly planned for mankind to live in the paradise of Eden under the condition of obedience. The results of disobedience are illness, wars, earthquakes, etc.

It's God's sovereign will that all be saved. This is partially under the condition of our stewardship.

[WisdomLover]

Arnauld-

Suppose that X does act A on some occasion, or would have if not prevented.

God either did or did not prevent X from doing A.

If He did prevent it, God obviously was in control of whether X did A.

So God could only have relinquished control if God did not prevent X from doing A

Either God did or did not know that X would do A if not prevented. If God didn't know, then God is not omniscient.

So God knew.

Now, we've established that God knew that X would do A if not prevented. God either did or did not have the power to prevent X from doing A.

If He did not have the power, then He is not omnipotent.

So God did have the power.

Now, we've established that God knew that X would do A and had the power to prevent it, but did not do so.

By the same sort of argument, God also knew that he had this power, and knew all the consequences of exercising that power.

If an individual has the known power to prevent some act A and he knows that A will take place if not prevented, and then chooses not to prevent it, and knows all the consequences of that choice, he is in as much control over A as if he had prevented it.

So either way, God does not relinquish control. Since the term "God" implies omnipotence etc., it is logically impossible for God to relinquish control.

[cog]

Wisdomlover,

You posted your "ironclad proof" of determinism before. I knew that what we differed on was not that God is omniscient, but on how His foreknowledge works. So, of course, one can uphold God's omniscience and His omnipotence and still believe that He doesn't exercise meticulous control over every detail of creation.

Roger Olson explains it, in part, in this post:
http://www.patheos.com/blogs/rogereolson/2012/02/some-thoughts-about-my-conversation-with-michael-horton/

Unlike some links posted by Daron/Brad, no nude pictures on this one.

You have to read down a bit to the part that is relevant.

Now, I wouldn't be posting on this if you hadn't used my name. I am not interested in arguing about this or taking the abuse from Daron/Brad, who, in their various personas have continually called me a liar, among other things.

Now, Daron/Brad, you need to learn the difference between when someone is mistaken and when someone is a liar.

Oh, and lest you start on about how you only called me "dishonest".... well, that's calling someone a liar. And you started in on that dishonest bit long before I changed my posting alias.

You wouldn't call me that to my face, at least not more then once. But you are safe here on the internet.

So. That is the last you will hear from me. If I have been uncivil to any here, you have my sincere apologies. It was, no doubt, uncharitable of me to intrude with a dissenting opinion on this Calvinist/Determinist blog.

I do still really appreciate the work Greg is doing, although we disagree on a few things, and the comments of a few on this blog will do nothing to lessen my support of his work.

[Daron]

Hiya Jeff/Cog,

I am not interested in arguing about this or taking the abuse from Daron/Brad, who, in their various personas have continually called me a liar, among other things.
...
Oh, and lest you start on about how you only called me "dishonest".... well, that's calling someone a liar. And you started in on that dishonest bit long before I changed my posting alias.
Show me once.
Previously, you made all kinds of charges like this that you could not substantiate right before you changed your name from Jeff to Cog.

I see you've got your adrenalin flowing. That's not necessarily bad. But it didn't inspire you to finish your work on the last thread.
That's where BradB and I both commented repeatedly. If we were the same person, as per your ridiculous tu quoque we/I would be banned now.

Regarding that "nude" picture ...

Wow, Jeff/Cog, I am sorry that out of the hundreds of links I have used on this blog (I know you've only followed one or two, though), and in hastily reconstructing my last comment, I didn't think about the consequences of linking to a site that had a photo on a girl's naked back on the sidebar.
Honestly, I wasn't thinking very well when I used that.
I could have anticipated that it wasn't a great move and might have found the material elsewhere.

However, this is the height of dishonesty (for a dishonest commenter) for you to go into paroxysms and pretend that there was some nefarious purpose on my part, that you are somehow in danger, or that you need a better excuse to escape following evidence and doing your homework.
Not to excuse my carelessness, but you see worse on billboards everyday, and can't help but see worse if you search the internet at all for information.

But if you want to strike the pose of a fainting daisy to escape another mirey pit that you've dug yourself, well, I can't blame you.
It beats changing your name to try again, doesn't it?

[Daron]

Hi HB.
Looks like my comments are not sticking again.
I am going to repaste, but I did not save all the bolds. I guess I will cut this in half as well.

We note at the outset that the Bible speaks of the “will of God” in more than one way. This is the problem that complicates our quest and serves as a warning against simplistic solutions. ... Here the resolute decree of God is in view, which no human action can set aside. God’s plan is impregnable; his “will” is unalterable. ... The word thelema is rich in its diversity of meanings. It refers to what is agreeable, what is desired, what is intended, what is chosen, or what is commanded. Here we have the notions of consent, desire, purpose, resolution, and command. The force of the various meanings is determined by the context in which thelema appears. ... The Decretive Will of God Theologians describe that will by which God decrees things to come to pass according to his supreme sovereignty as the “decretive will of God.” This is also sometimes called “God’s sovereign efficacious will”; by it God brings to pass whatsoever he wills. When God sovereignly decrees something in this sense, nothing can thwart its coming to pass. ...

[Daron]

The Preceptive Will of God When the Bible speaks of the will of God, it does not always mean the decretive will of God. The decretive will of God cannot be broken, cannot be disobeyed. It will come to pass. On the other hand, there is a will that can be broken: “the preceptive will of God.” It can be disobeyed. Indeed, it is broken and disobeyed every day by each one of us. ... It is the will of God that we sin not. It is the will of God that we have no other gods before him; that we love our neighbor as we love ourselves; that we refrain from stealing, coveting, and committing adultery. Yet the world is filled with idolatry, hatred, thievery, covetousness, and adultery. Here the will of God is violated. His law is broken. ... While we understand that the decretive will and the preceptive will of God are part of his overall will, other aspects of the mystery of his sovereignty still remain. One such aspect is “the will of disposition.” It is tied up with the ability of man to disobey God’s preceptive will. ... God’s Will of Disposition This aspect of the will of God refers to what is pleasing and agreeable to God. ... He may allow (but not via moral permission) wicked things to transpire, but he is by no means pleased by them.

To illustrate how these differing aspects of the will of God come into play
...
We have already distinguished among the three types of the will of God: his decretive will, his preceptive will, and his will of disposition. Another distinction must be established between what is called God’s secret, or hidden, will and his revealed will.

http://www.ligonier.org/blog/the-meaning-of-gods-will-pt-4/

etc.

[WisdomLover]

CJ-

You posted your "ironclad proof" of determinism before.

I posted it for Arnauld who asked for clarification.

I'm so sorry that you had to see the argument presented twice.

I knew that what we differed on was not that God is omniscient, but on how His foreknowledge works.

My argument makes no assumptions on how God's foreknowledge works, or even that he has true foreknowledge (if God is independent of time, then His knowledge of our future is not foreknowledge). My argument assumes only that God is omniscient. Not how He is omniscient.

So, of course, one can uphold God's omniscience and His omnipotence and still believe that He doesn't exercise meticulous control over every detail of creation.

Of course one can. One is always free to accept all the premises of a valid argument and still reject its conclusion. One is not free to do so without contradiction.

Again, Omniscience requires that He have meticulous knowledge of all the details of His creations.

Omnipotence requires that He have meticulous power over all the details of His creations.

You may choose to then say that He does not have meticulous control over all the details of His creations.

I choose to use English words in their customary sense. It makes communication much easier.

[Arnauld]

Hi WL

Thanks a lot for that. I do think cog is right, however, in pointing out that you are helping yourself to a very contentious claim: that omniscience requires comprehensive foreknowledge (or comprehensive knowledge of everything that happens in the future-relative-to-us, if you prefer). A common but not entirely precise definition of omnipotence is 'the ability to do anything that can be done.' In the same vein we might define omniscience as 'knowing everything that can be known'. The question at issue is whether or not the distantly future actions of free beings can now be known. If not, then clearly God is not disqualified as 'omniscience' for failing to know them.

Looks like the blog is moving on and I jumped in on this once kind of late so if you aren't keeping up on this post perhaps we'll have a chance to revisit the issue another time.

[WisdomLover]

Arnauld-

Come now. The contentious view that I am 'helping myself to' about omniscience has been the standard view of omniscience throughout church history. It took the process theologians of the 20th century to suggest anything else.

And their suggesting something else does not render their suggestion coherent, orthodox or even serious. (I think it is none of them).

The only contentious view that anyone is helping themselves to here is the view from process theology. Let's not pretend it's anything else.

But let's for a moment, take it seriously and see whether it even helps CJ's case.

Omnipotence is 'limited' by what it is logically coherent to say can be done. This is no real limit at all, of course. Logical incoherency is another word for nonsense, and putting "God can" or "God cannot" in front of nonsense does not transform it into sense.

If you place a similar 'constraint' on God's knowledge, what is it exactly?

God can only know what it is logically possible to know?

OK.

What renders it logically possible for a particular proposition to be known?

Since knowledge is justified true belief, for a proposition to be knowable, it must be logically possible for it to be the object of a justified true belief.

Clearly, to be a possible object of a justified true belief that object has to be a proposition. Propositions about the future are propositions.

Check.

The object also has to be true. Otherwise it could not be the object of true belief (by "true belief", of course, we don't mean that the belief is sincere, but that its object is true). I'll readily grant that not even God can know that a false proposition is true.

OK.

For any proposition about the future, either it or its denial is true, and the other one is false. This is the law of excluded middle. AKA elementary logic.

So one is false the other true. For the reasons already given, God cannot know that the false one is true, but we've got no reason yet to think that He can't know the true one to be true.

The final question is whether God can have justification for His belief of a truth about the future.

Well, obviously He can have such justification. At the very least, He could cause it to be true. For any proposition that an individual directly causes to be true, he has the best possible justification for believing it to be true. There is no higher form of knowledge of contingent propositions than that which one has because one has made the object of knowledge true.

And even if He did not do that for truths about the future actions of free beings by causing those truths to be true (for then the actions wouldn't be free or something). He could still do 1001 things to come to be justified in His belief of those truths about those future actions.

He could, for example, create a time-travelling angel who observed the future actions and came back to report on them. For that matter, He could do the time travelling Himself. Or He could look through time without any travelling. Or if He is independent of time (as I think is really required logically by the fact that time is God's creature no less than I am) He could just look at any place in time He wants.

Note that I'm not saying that God does do any of these things. All I'm saying is that any of them would be enough to justify His belief in the truth about the future action. And He could do at least some of them. As such, it is logically possible for God's belief of a truth about the future to be justified.

Because God could be justified in His belief of any true proposition about the future, it follows that it is logically possible for any true proposition about the future for God to know that it is true. And for any false proposition about the future it is logically possible for Him to know that it is false.

That is to say that there is no logical limit on what God can know.

[Arnauld]

I'll concede that your position is the standard one throughout church history. The fact that many others have helped themselves to it, however, doesn't really get us anywhere. You know as well as I that the status of future contingents (with respect to truth value) has been contested at least since Aristotle.

Suppose God creates Jones, grants to Jones the power to flip a coin, and then abdicates control over the exercising that power to Jones himself. Suppose that in doing so God renders it the case that at time T, there is simply no fact of the matter about whether or not Jones will be flipping a coin at T+1. God, then, lacks knowledge about what Jones will be doing at T+1. My claim is that this in no way compromises God's omniscience. Had God desired to have comprehensive knowledge of the future, he could easily have creates being other than Jones, beings who act only when acted upon and only in a determinate manner. He could then have set those beings in motion and deduced the entire future of the world. God's nature is the same in both worlds, and it is in virtue of that nature that we call him omniscient, not in virtue of the set of propositions he knows.

I understand that my suggestion has all sorts of contentious implications about the nature of time and God's relation to it, so let's be careful about the use I am putting it to. The claim I want to defend is that it is not clearly impossible for a being to be both omnipotent and omniscient even when there occur events that are not under that being's control.

I should be even more careful. When I say there occur events not under the control of an omnipotent, omniscient being, I mean that they are neither caused nor intended by that being. Being omnipotent, he could, of course, stop the event from occurring, or cause the event himself. If God has left it up to Jones when he will flip a coin, He might still retain the power to block Jones' ability to flip a coin when he sees fit, or to cause Jones to flip a coin Himself. If on some occasion he does neither of these things, however, there is at least an intuitive sense in which Jones' flipping of the coin is not under God's control. If such were to happen, I see no reason at all to think that God would fail to be both omnipotent and omniscient.

[WisdomLover]

I'll concede that your position is the standard one throughout church history. The fact that many others have helped themselves to it, however, doesn't really get us anywhere.

Actually it kinda settles the matter. We're talking about the Christian God here right? We're not having a strictly philosophical conversation where it might turn out that Allah or Ahura Mazda is God. The contentious claim I'm 'helping myself to' here is nothing less that the orthodox Christian view of Divine Omniscience.

You know as well as I that the status of future contingents (with respect to truth value) has been contested at least since Aristotle.

And you know as well as I that, historically, Aristotle's famous sea-fight discussion has been used, more or less, to show how even the great ones can flub things. The fact that Heyting, Brouwer and Łukasiewicz got caught up in Aristotle's error only reinforces the lesson.

Oddly enough, it was Aristotle himself who first gave a pretty compelling argument against the idea of there being any proposition that's neither true nor false. Suppose that there's some third possibility, say undetermined. For any given proposition is it true that it is undetermined, or false that it is undetermined (i.e. it is either true or false)?

No.

There must be another possibility. It might be undetermined whether it is undetermined. Let's say that it might be doubly undetermined.

Well is it at least true for any statement that it is doubly undetermined or false that it is doubly undetermined (i.e. true, false or singly undetermined)?

No.

There must be another possibility. It might be undetermined whether it is doubly undetermined. Let us say that it might be triply undetermined.

And on to infinity.

Suppose that in doing so God renders it the case that at time T, there is simply no fact of the matter about whether or not Jones will be flipping a coin at T+1. God, then, lacks knowledge about what Jones will be doing at T+1.Whoa!

There simply is no fact of the matter at T about whether Jones flips a coin at T+1 no matter what. You don't need to horse around with God abdicating this or that. The coin-flipping fact exists at T+1. Period.

But it also does not follow from this that God cannot know whether the proposition "Jones flips the coin at T+1" is true. There is no fact of the matter at T about whether Jones flips the coin at T-1 either. Any facts about Jones' coin-flipping activities at T-1 existed back at T-1. But, surely, God has, at T, knowledge of what happened at T-1.

Being omnipotent, he could, of course, stop the event from occurring, or cause the event himself. If God has left it up to Jones when he will flip a coin, He might still retain the power to block Jones' ability to flip a coin when he sees fit, or to cause Jones to flip a coin Himself. If on some occasion he does neither of these things, however, there is at least an intuitive sense in which Jones' flipping of the coin is not under God's control.

Actually, what you've described is a God that is in complete control of the coin-flip.

For starters, notice that at every moment up to T, God knows what Jones' intentions about the coin-flip are (and whether there are any).

Now let's suppose that after some time, T-dt, prior to T, and at all later moments right up to T Jones intends to flip the coin. God knows about all these intentions.

At T, God can decide whether to make Jones flip, let Jones flip, or make Jones not-flip. So the flip being out of God's control is off the table. God is also in control whether Jones is compelled to flip or allowed to flip. He does not, granting all the assumptions made so far (which is a huge grant, since one of them is the denial of excluded middle), control whether Jones is compelled to not flip.

Notice that God could have decided how the coin-flip at T would go before the foundations of the earth. Even if, contrary to logic, the process theologians were right, God could have comprehensive knowledge of when the coin-flips or any overt events will happen. This is because He could simply decide how things will go and use His omnipotence to insure that that's how they do go. Even granting process theology, the only thing that God could not know ahead of time, in any particular instance where God has decided ahead of time that a coin flip is coming, is whether He would be making Jones flip, or letting Jones flip.

What if that is the only way we ever act freely? What if God has decided ahead of time how all the overt facts of the world will go and the only freedom we ever really have is to go along with God's plan or have God's plan move us along?

Everything that CJ and company say that freedom requires has been satisfied, yet God is still in control of all events. In particular, Adam ate the apple by God's plan, Judas betrayed Christ by God's plan. Saul converted by God's plan. And so on. Some of these events might have been permitted acts rather than forced events in that God let the agent fulfill His plan rather than forcing the agent to fulfill His plan. But they all came about by God's plan.

And notice that this shows what it is logically possible for God to know in advance, even if the process theologians are, again contrary to logic, right. The answer turns out to be "Almost Everything. Every overt event for sure."

So really, process theology isn't much help.

But of course, we've assumed that the law of excluded middle is false in even expressing our process theology. So it really can be no help.

[Daron]

Jonathan Edwards via John Piper