Big news from London:
The philosopher and writer Alain de Botton is proposing to build a 46-metre (151ft) tower to celebrate a "new atheism" as an antidote to what he describes as Professor Richard Dawkins's "aggressive" and "destructive" approach to non-belief.
Rather than attack religion, De Botton said he wants to borrow the idea of awe-inspiring buildings that give people a better sense of perspective on life.
"Normally a temple is to Jesus, Mary or Buddha, but you can build a temple to anything that's positive and good," he said….
De Botton said he chose the country's financial centre because he believes it is where people have most seriously lost perspective on life's priorities….
Dawkins criticized the project on Thursday, indicating…that a temple of atheism was a contradiction in terms….
Notice what De Botton wants to restore to atheism: awe, a right perspective, proper priorities, and an honoring of something that's positive and good. All of these things require a standard and objective purpose outside of ourselves in order to exist. (Otherwise our own priorities and perspectives are always the "proper" ones, regardless of which ones we choose. Who, or what, could judge them?) And all of these things are subjective illusions in a materialist universe where only what is is objective. There is no ought. A piece of machinery acts, but what ought its "priorities" to be? What makes one piece of matter good and worthy of exalting over another? Can you make value judgments about rocks and trees?
Yes, a temple of atheism is a contradiction in terms, and this whole project ought to cause atheists to ask themselves two things: 1) In a world that began not with a living Person, but with dead atoms, where only randomly-developed matter is real, where there is no objective purpose and no objective standard, where everything in the unknowing, uncaring universe will eventually cease to exist, how do you explain our very real experience of these greater, powerful, non-material aspects of our lives? And 2) If they're not objectively real (as a materialist universe would prove), why is it that we can't live a fully human life without them?
Here's what the temple will look like:
De Botton revealed details of a temple to evoke more than 300m years of life on earth. Each centimetre of the tapering tower's interior has been designed to represent a million years and a narrow band of gold will illustrate the relatively tiny amount of time humans have walked the planet. The exterior would be inscribed with a binary code denoting the human genome sequence.
The temple features a single door for visitors who will enter as if it were an art installation. The roof will be open to the elements and there could be fossils and geologically interesting rocks in the concrete walls.
You'll see a picture of it to the right. (Well, okay, we added in the eye because, admit it, that design was begging for it.)
Humanists said it was misplaced for non-believers to build quasi-religious buildings, because atheists did not need temples to probe the meaning of life.
"The things religious people get from religion – awe, wonder, meaning and perspective – non-religious people get them from other places like art, nature, human relationships and the narratives we give our lives in other ways," said Andrew Copson, chief executive of the British Humanist Society….
Notice that Copson didn't say atheists don't need awe, wonder, meaning, and perspective; he merely said they don't need temples to explore these things. They still want to get them from places other than God. The question is, is that possible? Would those things ever be anything more than useful illusions in a materialist world?
De Botton has insisted atheists have as much right to enjoy inspiring architecture as religious believers.
"The dominant feeling you should get will be awe – the same feeling you get when you tip your head back in Ely cathedral," he said. "You should feel small but not in an intimidated way."
Human beings are built to desire that experience of awe in contemplating something greater and more beautiful than ourselves. This is because human beings are built to worship God. If a person denies God, he will seek to fulfill that need in some other way, even if doing so makes no rational sense within his own worldview.
All of this only goes to show that we can't live consistently in a materialistic worldview. We long for those parts of life that were declared subjective and/or unreal by empiricists and rationalists over the past couple centuries. And I wish De Botton and his fellow atheists all the best in truly finding what he knows they need.
In the meantime, Strange Herring has some suggestions for a more suitable atheist temple:
It would be made entirely of smoked glass, with no foundation or floor plan. Negotiating the space would be an act of sheer will and chance, and only the smartest and strongest will make it through the entire structure, although even they will be left with a nagging feeling that it was all ultimately futile and for no good purpose. A waste of money? I think not. Before something can be wasted, it must have some endogenous purpose, no?
Didn't the French try something like this after the revolution?
Posted by: Trent | February 01, 2012 at 03:34 AM
Hardly a temple to atheism with the masonic all seeing eye at the top.
Its a Religious pagan phallus symbol pure and simple which any high ranking mason will recognise.All pagan religions can be traced back to Bablylon including freemasonry, just shows how naive some atheists really or that they are secretly pagans.
Posted by: Andrew | February 01, 2012 at 05:35 AM
A tower with one door? That sounds like a death trap.
Posted by: Sam | February 01, 2012 at 06:28 AM
They buildin' the towa' a' babel! :P
Posted by: PB | February 01, 2012 at 06:41 AM
Notice what De Botton wants to restore to atheism: awe, a right perspective, proper priorities, and an honoring of something that's positive and good. All of these things require a standard and objective purpose outside of ourselves in order to exist. (Otherwise our own priorities and perspectives are always the "proper" ones, regardless of which ones we choose. Who, or what, could judge them?) And all of these things are subjective illusions in a materialist universe where only what is is objective. There is no ought. A piece of machinery acts, but what ought its "priorities" to be? What makes one piece of matter good and worthy of exalting over another? Can you make value judgments about rocks and trees?
The primary claim being made here is the following:
Value-Cum-Theism (VCT): Necessarily, (a) objective moral values must be “grounded” in something and (b) the only adequate “grounding” is God.
What reasons are given in this post to show that VCT is true? It’s not always easy to tell. Since the argument is not formalized, the reader is left with the work of formalizing it himself. Fleshing that out would make this comment even longer than it is, so I’ll just spend time thinking a bit about what VCT is actually claiming.
What is being said when it is said that objective moral values must be “grounded” in something? Presumably what is being said is that moral facts like It is good for humans to experience joy are facts the must be true in virtue of other facts. In other words, this moral fact about the goodness of human joy requires explanation in terms of more fundamental facts. What is it, one might wonder, that makes the human experience of joy good as opposed to bad or morally neutral? I take it that answering that question will involve appealing to other facts that are taken to explain the moral fact in question. Lets call these moral fundamental facts that explain the moral fact about human joy the “explanatory fact base.”
Ok, but now a question arises. Does the explanatory fact base itself contain moral facts, or does it consist entirely of non-moral facts? Suppose it consists entirely of non-moral facts. In that case, then it cannot really explain our original moral fact about the goodness of human joy, since from entirely non-moral premises one cannot validly and non-question beinggingly deduce a moral conclusion. For instance, from the non-moral fact that such and such occurs in the brain when humans experience joy, it does not follow that it is morally good for humans to experience joy. Actually, Koukl agrees with this. He writes,
So, we must say that our explanatory fact base consists partly of moral claims. Call one of these moral claims M. A question arises. Are going to say, as we did with the moral fact about joy, that M too must be explained in virtue of more basic facts? If we do, then we are back to our original problem. M’s explanatory fact base will either be entirely non-moral or partly moral. If the former, then we really don’t have an explanation of M, since it is a fallacy to deduce a moral claim from a non-moral claim. So, we must say that M’s explanatory fact base also contains moral facts. And so one can see that what must be done is one must admit that there are some moral truths that are to be taken as primitives. They are true, but their truth needn’t be accounted for in terms of more basic truths. On the contrary, some moral facts are constitutive of the foundational truths.
So now let us return to VCT. According to VCT, moral truths must be grounded in something. If this is taken to mean that moral truths cannot be among the most fundamental truths, but must be accounted for in terms of more fundamental truths, then we have seen that this cannot be true. If one does not in some way begin with moral truths, then one will never arrive at them through valid inferences.
All of us, therefore, must admit that some moral truths are just basic, primitive, non-derivative parts of reality. This gives the atheist a way of responding to the challenge contained in posts like these. Suppose Amy were to ask Mr. Atheist, “Ok, what do you think explains the fact that human joy is a good thing, as opposed to being bad or morally neutral?”. In light of the preceding, it would be entirely reasonable for Mr. Atheist to respond as follows:
That, it seems to me at the moment, may be a promising way of responding to claims like VCT.
Posted by: Malebranche | February 01, 2012 at 07:34 AM
I for one support the construction of the Tower of Mordor.
hahahhaaa
>> "1) In a world that began not with a living Person, but with dead atoms, where only randomly-developed matter is real, where there is no objective purpose and no objective standard, where everything in the unknowing, uncaring universe will eventually cease to exist, how do you explain our very real experience of these greater, powerful, non-material aspects of our lives?"
video
2) If they're not objectively real (as a materialist universe would prove), why is it that we can't live a fully human life without them?"
Fiction stories are not objectively real. Could we live a "fully human life" without stories? If there's anything to associate with "being human" - story telling is one of them. (Hence the trillion dollar movie, video game, and book industry - devoted to describing experiences that never existed)
Aside from that, you keep coming back to this argument that is something like:
"My brain is telling me I need X, hence, X exists, and is true and right for me."
I'm on a diet right now and my brain is SCREAMING for sugar. I look at pastries, I want want want. But candy and junkfood is the last thing I need, and in large quantities, will eventually kill me.
In actuality we are not really wired very well to know what is good for us at any given time. Hence alcoholism and obesity being of the top preventable causes of death.
So even if its true that we are spiritually "needful by nature" I don't see how that would put a God in the sky.
Posted by: ToNy | February 01, 2012 at 07:44 AM
Darn, I wrote,
And should have wrote,
Posted by: Malebranche | February 01, 2012 at 07:47 AM
What a great idea. Then maybe at bottom there could a be list of the 140,000,000 names of the people who were slaughtered under that ideology put into practice in the 20th century.
Posted by: Damian | February 01, 2012 at 07:49 AM
@Sam
Sounds more like a money trap to me... :P
Posted by: grh | February 01, 2012 at 07:54 AM
Every "a"theist you talk to reminds you that "atheism" is merely "without".
But de Botton wants to build a monument to something "positive". I think Dawkins is right about the contradiction of terms.
Posted by: Daron | February 01, 2012 at 08:02 AM
This whole thing is just stupid.
Posted by: Josh Stewart | February 01, 2012 at 09:47 AM
1. "he chose the country's financial centre because he believes it is where people have most seriously lost perspective on life's priorities"
It's beating a dead horse, but in a naturalistic system, life's only priority is survive long enough to reproduce as much as possible.
2. Yes, build a temple to atheism, so we can point to the "religion" of atheism that secularizers want to instill in our schools. Stick that in your establishment clause...
Posted by: ChrisB | February 01, 2012 at 09:58 AM
Tony-
I'm glad I'm not the only one who looked at it and saw the Barad-dûr complete with the Eye of Sauron on the top.
Nice Tower.
Posted by: WisdomLover | February 01, 2012 at 10:26 AM
Perhaps they'll build an Atheist chapel next door, with a hymnal full of NiN and Pearl Jam songs, and copies of Greyling's "The Good Book" in every pew.
I'd go see it, but I wouldn't be able to resist quoting the Very Secret Diaries of Middle Earth the whole time.
Posted by: Bennett | February 01, 2012 at 12:16 PM
I wonder if they will apply for tax exempt status or demand a seat in the House of Lords.
Posted by: Trent | February 01, 2012 at 12:28 PM
I'll write a prayer to the supreme lord Stephan Hawking and we will have a communion of wild turkey 101 and bacon.
Posted by: Josh Stewart | February 01, 2012 at 12:30 PM
Malebranche wrote "if some moral truths are absolutely primitive in this fashion, then they themselves will not be explained in virtue of anything else, God included."
If all that exists is contained within the universe, then your counter argument to VCT appears reasonable. However, as the God of the Bible is described as being transcendent, outside of the universe, then I don't believe your argument holds.
From a Biblical perspective the most "primitive" (foundational? fundamental?)truth is the existence of God. Therefore, as moral truths within the created realm reflect the character of the Creator, the existence of these primitive moral truths actually do point to a transcendent creator.
Posted by: Brian | February 01, 2012 at 12:54 PM
Well... notable, but pointless and expensive... which means the Brits will probably build it. Still its interesting that we all agree that we need morals... the core question is: are morals relative or not? Under materialism it seems indisputable that relativism rules the moral roost. Theism, not so much.
As for Mal's comment, I am perplexed because you seem to have outlined Euthyphro's dilemma for us in a rather conversational and compelling way; but you already know the rebuttal, so why bother.
And, while I like Herring's comment I secretly prefer the tower far more. But only if they include the all-knowing eye! The multi-faceted "eye"-rony would be hilarious and alone worth the price of admission. And every LOTR fanatic will be making a pilgrimage...think of the tourism potential.
Posted by: JustChatting | February 01, 2012 at 04:51 PM
This seems very reasonable
Let me flesh it out a bit:- Claims break down into two sets: factual claims and moral claims.
- Adding factual claims together will give just give you more factual claims.
- Denying a factual claim is just another factual claim (only one of them is true of course), it is not a moral claim.
- Remarks similar to 2 and 3 go for moral claims.
- The Humean Principle: It is impossible from a set of factual claims to logically deduce a moral conclusion. This is the famous "Is-Ought" gap.
As I said, 1-5 seem to be quite reasonable. Moral rabbits, non-moral hats, all that. Who could deny these claims?For all that, 1-5 are quite contradictory.
There's a wholly unsatisfying, but easily seen proof of this.
It is a little known and often disbelieved fact of logical deduction that contradictory premises logically imply any conclusion. From the premises "Grass is green" and "It is not the case that grass is green" one may validly deduce that God exists (One may also logically deduce from those same premises that He does not).
Well, if one may validly deduce anything from the premises "Grass is green" and "It is not the case that grass is green", then one may also deduce "It is wrong to kick a puppy just for fun" from those same premises. But the claim that grass is green is a factual/non-moral claim. So is it's denial. And so is the conjunction of those two claims. Morality has never entered into the discussion. Except that you can deduce a moral claim from those factual claims.
Once you wrap your head around that curious fact about deduction, it's a straightforward matter to see that the supposition of an "Is-Ought" gap is actually a logical hash.
Now, you might say
But even that won't work out. The problem will end up being mixed claims. Claims where you combine factual claims and moral claims. For example, "If Ed is feeling low, you ought to comfort him". The factual claim "Ed is feeling low" is combined with the moral claim "You ought to comfort Ed". What are you going to say about such claims?If you say that they are all moral claims, it is a simple matter to find purely factual claims from which some mixed (and hence moral) claims can be derived.
And if you say that they are all factual claims, then it is a simple matter to find purely factual claims and mixed (and hence factual) claims from which purely moral claims can be derived.
And if you say that mixed claims are neither factual nor moral, whence the celebrated Is-Ought gap? That gap seems to be all filled up with mixed claims.
Posted by: WisdomLover | February 01, 2012 at 05:28 PM
"My brain is telling me I need X, hence, X exists, and is true and right for me."
Just as a by the by, that is not the Argument from Desire as put forth by C.S. Lewis. It's not that your desire for sugar means that sugar is good for you. Obviously no Christian thinks that wanting something makes it good for you--just look at how much we go on about "sinful desires."
The argument is that your craving for sugar proves that sugar exists. You wouldn't have a bodily hunger if there was no such thing as food. It's discerning which good is 'good and right' that is the trick.
Similarly, all people do experience a spiritual hunger. Some fill it up with movies and TV, some with sex, or alcohol, some with temples to atheism, others with the Gospel, others with Islam or Buddhism or Eckhart Tolle. Which one is "right and good" is related, but not implicit in, the question of whether "spirituality" exists to be hungered for.
Posted by: Bennett | February 01, 2012 at 10:04 PM
>> "The argument is that your craving for sugar proves that sugar exists."
So if i can identify a desire for something that does not or could not exist, then this would render the argument void?
Assumidly the following things don't count?
the ability to grow wings and fly
to time travel
to turn invisible
to run at the speed of light
to journey to Oz
to have sexual relations with creatures possessing anatomically-impossible features (this one is very common in Japan)
Posted by: ToNy | February 01, 2012 at 10:18 PM
Birds exist,
Time and travel both exist,
Invisible things exist,
Both light and running exist,
Journeys exist (as do cities and emeralds and yellow bricks and roads and lions and scarecrows and lions and tigers and bears oh my),
Pamela Anderson exists.
It isn't to say that you can't incorrectly conflate categories--like I said, plenty of people satisfy their spiritual hunger with all sorts of things that aren't God. I don't, personally, think that the Argument from Desire proves the Christian God per se, so much as provides evidence of "something more" or, in simpler terms, a defeater for atheism in favor of, at the least, agnosticism.
That people want things they can't really get isn't really germante to what the Argument from Desire states, though--it merely points to the reality of a realm of experience greater than the material. That I want to marry Scarlett Johannsen and she won't have me isn't proof of her nonexistence.
As it's said in Ecclesiastes, there's nothing new under the sun. You'd have a very hard time coming up with a desire--one that you genuinely *hunger* for, not just some randomly-invented thing that some hypothetical guy might kinda way--which isn't pointing to a real thing, or some recombination of real things.
Posted by: Bennett | February 02, 2012 at 12:28 AM
Time travel exists.
Time travel backwards doesn't look promising, but forward travel is quite uncontaversial.
I am currently travelling at the rate of 1 sec/sec. If I were to travel at any rate of speed, the rate would increase.
Posted by: Trent | February 02, 2012 at 03:34 AM
The objection I formulated is not the Euthyphro problem. That problem concerns a question of an asymmetrical dependence relation between moral truths and God’s will or commands. Is it wrong to murder because God commands us not to murder, or does he command us not to murder because it is wrong? Notice that this would be a rather silly question for an atheist to entertain in his own voice, as it were. But the problem I posed is not a silly one to pose for an atheist. The atheist, just as the theist, can recognize that if, as Koukl following Hume says, we cannot deduce moral truths from entirely non-moral facts, then any adequate justification or “grounding” for a moral truth will take for granted at least one other moral truth. This is so, moreover, whether or not God exists. In that sense, therefore, there is no way to ground morality without implicitly presupposing it, simply due to the logic of the situation. That’s what I meant when I said that if we do not in some way begin with morality, we will never get it through valid deductive inference. If it isn’t part of our axioms, then it will never show up as a theorem. If the challenge to the atheist is to ground morality without implicitly presupposing some moral truth, therefore, then I suspect the atheist cannot meet that challenge, but neither can the theist. With respect to that issue, therefore, the theist has no upper-hand.
So what is the advantage that the theist is supposed to have over the atheist concerning morality? Amy asserts that if materialism is true, then there is no objective morality, but I cannot detect any argument in her prose for that claim. She says in a materialist world, only what is is objective, which is another way of saying, I think, that in a materialist world there are only descriptive facts. But that is just another way of saying that in a materialist world, there are no prescriptive, moral facts, so this is hardly an argument for that conclusion. Of course, she can define materialism as the thesis that the only facts are descriptive, non-moral facts, but that would render her claims tautologous. It would also fail to explain why atheists are committed to materialism so defined.
Perhaps materialism is the thesis that the only substances are physical substances. Maybe Amy thinks that if that is the case, then it is not clear how objective morality is possible. Ok, but what advantage is gained by adding a non-physical substance to the picture? Perhaps the thought is that if we add God as the non-physical substance, and stipulate the God is by nature good, we will succeed in adding objective morality. But we can then ask about God, “What explains the fact that God is good?” Here the theist typically says, “That is just a basic, fundamental feature of God. God is just the sort of thing that is good, the sort of thing that could not fail to be good.” But of course appealing to something and saying it is the sort of thing that is necessarily good is a game that not only the theist can play. For the atheist can plausibly say, if asked what makes human joy good, “That is just a basic, fundamental feature of human joy. Human joy is just the sort of thing that is good, the sort of thing that could not fail to be good. It is because of the very nature and character of human joy that human joy is good, not because of some relation human joy stands in to some other thing.”
Yet again, therefore, I fail to see how appealing to the necessity of God’s nature being good has any clear advantage over appealing to the necessity of the nature of human joy being good. If the former can be offered as a fundamental feature of reality, why not the latter? In fact, between the two, I’d say the latter is more obvious than the former, since the existence of God is not obvious in the least (that, of course, is not to say that I don’t believe in God), whereas the goodness of human joy is profoundly obvious, and may very well be a primitive, basic fact about reality concerning which we can only say, “It is just so, and that is the end of the matter,” something we are always forced to say eventually.
Posted by: Malebranche | February 02, 2012 at 07:05 AM
Very nicely presented and nuanced argument Mal. And I would say that you are correct in that from the Christian position it is axiomatic that morality is grounded in the character of God. It does seem fair then to allow our atheist friends to maintain that it is axiomatic that morality is grounded in human flourishing (Harris) or human joy.
Yet, at the end of the day, for the theist morality remains securely grounded in the character of God and is not subject to the vagaries of human desires or vanities (despite the fact that as we often fail to meet the standard set before us). Here morality is not relative...
For the atheist morality remains effectively adrift, grounded on a floating island as it were. What is one persons joy may be cause of another persons greatest dismay... In fact, some people take joy in the pain of others. While both positions may start as unprovable axioms they move off in entirely different directions. The atheist has a hard time telling me why his or her joy should be as important to me as my own... especially if I am the one in power. Cheers Mal, and again well said.
Posted by: JustChatting | February 02, 2012 at 07:24 AM
>> "That people want things they can't really get isn't really germante to what the Argument from Desire states, "
no
i think people desire things that do not exist.
i think my list is pretty good.
This whole argument seems to always come down to some sort of 'no true scottsmen' conversation. Wherein, after presented with a alternate desire, the method of retort seems to be to just find an ancillary thing that DOES exist, and extrapolate to say that the item mentioned is merely a resultant or a subset of that.
For example if i desired to sugar and sugar didn't exist. Then the Christian would just say:
"Ah, but taste itself does exist. Your desire is for taste. Not for sugar."
Posted by: ToNy | February 02, 2012 at 07:30 AM
Again, I agree that the logic is flawless, in as far as it goes. However, it only goes back to the beginning. In other words, it seems to me that is rests on the presumption that there was nothing before the beginning. If at the beginning ALL things came into being, and morality just was, then your logic loop is complete. But what if there was something before the beginning? Something that created the beginning? If this is true, as orthodox Christian doctrine claims, then all that "just was" at the beginning, such as primitive morality, was a created thing. This does indeed lead us back to Euthyphro, and so the discussion expands beyond the constraints under which we began. The logic loop has been opened.
Posted by: Brian | February 02, 2012 at 07:31 AM
JustChatting
Very nicely presented and nuanced argument Mal.
Thank you for the kind remark.
It does seem fair then to allow our atheist friends to maintain that it is axiomatic that morality is grounded in human flourishing (Harris) or human joy.
Well I hope we can be more charitable to our atheist friends than to appoint Sam Harris as their representative!
I want to be careful that my claim is being understood properly. I was not supposing that the atheist would think that all of morality is grounded in human joy, though of course the atheist is welcome to that view is she wants it. I was simply saying that the atheist could believe that the fact that human joy is good is explained merely by the nature and character of human joy itself. One could think this without committing oneself to the view that all morality is reducible to facts about human flourishing. And of course it should be emphatically insisted upon that there is nothing at all “atheistic” about the view that human joy, from its very nature and intrinsic character, is necessarily and intrinsically good. That is something a Christian could believe, and in my opinion something a Christian ought to believe.
You indicate that within theistic ethics morality is not relative. But of course the atheist I am describing needn’t be a moral relativist either. After all, the atheist I am describing believes that the proposition Human joy is good is a basic, primitive, necessary truth about reality, and true in virtue of the very character and nature of human joy. But if it is necessarily true, then of course the atheist won’t think the fact is relative or up for vote any more than the fact that there are infinitely primes is relative or up for a vote. Despite the frequency with which it is claimed that atheists must be committed to moral relativism, I have never seen an intelligible connection between the two. Certainly nothing in the original post illuminates such a connection. Why couldn’t the atheist believe that among the primitive, fundamental truths about reality are moral truths, which are true necessarily and omnitemporally? What really is the difficulty with such a view?
Posted by: Malebranche | February 02, 2012 at 08:29 AM
HI Mal... I would suggest that although the notion that "human joy is good" may be basic under your argument, the issue is, more specifically, who's human joy - the individuals, the communities, the cultures or the social elites? So, it is the meaning and operationalization of the term "joy" that draws in the spectre of relativism... In so far as the notion that "human joy is good" is dependent on human valuations or desires of what is "joyful" I don't think one can escape the relativistic nature of the atheistic conceptualization of morality. In that sense, I would suggest that perhaps human morality as you proposed is not basic at all, or perhaps basic while allowing for a wide range of moral possibilities.
In theism, God's "joy" is the Standard... in atheism, the "joy" of any individual or group of individuals could be the standard, and that standard is subject to change at any time...so really its not much of a standard. Here morality is like the ox tethered to the plow of relativism... its pulls in a direction, but that direction can change at any moment because the ox has no one to guide it. Under atheism you need only the ox and the plow to furrow the field and get your moral crop. Its a difficulty, or at least to my thinking... Cheers,
PS - I do agree that Sam Harris is not an atheistic stalwart when it comes to this line of argument. But his recent book did address this issue so we have to give him that.
Posted by: JustChatting | February 02, 2012 at 09:14 AM
JustChatting,
I would suggest that although the notion that "human joy is good" may be basic under your argument, the issue is, more specifically, who's human joy - the individuals, the communities, the cultures or the social elites?
Here I don’t think there is anything that ought to disturb the atheist I have described. That atheist believes that among the fundamental truths about reality is that human joy is good. If asked what “grounds” this fact, the atheist may reply, “That is simply the nature of human joy. There is nothing more to it.” I see no reason why the atheist would not also want to say that the joy of communities, cultures, and social elites is also good (well, unless the atheist, like myself, thinks that the only thing that can experience joy is an individual). Of course it is good that communities have joy!
So, it is the meaning and operationalization of the term "joy" that draws in the spectre of relativism... In so far as the notion that "human joy is good" is dependent on human valuations or desires of what is "joyful" I don't think one can escape the relativistic nature of the atheistic conceptualization of morality.
But I have said nothing so far as to what the atheist in question thinks the proper analysis of joy is. More importantly, I have thus far ascribed no particular normative theory at all to the atheist in question. For all we know at this point, our atheist could turn out to be a preference utilitarian or a Kantian, neither of which are forms of moral relativism (at least as I understand moral relativism). All I have said about the atheist is that she recognizes that human joy is an intrinsic good. It does not even follow from this that the atheist is committed to the view that all acquisitions of joy are all-things-considered good. A person can certainly acquire an intrinsically good thing by morally illegitimate means (e.g., a person could acquire a beautiful piece of art by stealing it); in these instances the acquisition is not, all things considered, a good thing. By recognizing that human joy, considered intrinsically and in itself, is a good thing, therefore, the atheist is in no shape, form, or fashion committed to moral relativism. As I have said, the atheist could recognize joy as an intrinsic good and reject moral relativism in favor of some kind of utilitarianism.
Posted by: Malebranche | February 02, 2012 at 10:48 AM
ToNy,
If you see it that way, that's fine. But who do you know who actually *desires* time travel, or to date a Pokemon? There's a difference between fantasizing and vaguely wishing, and an actual natural appetite, which was Lewis' point. He did a better job articulating it than I do of defending it, but that's primarily because most people misconstrue it as you do, and throw obviously silly retorts out. Of course people can invent imaginary things, but in what way do they legitimately *desire* them? We don't seem to be using that word the same way.
I mean, I *wish* I had a lightsaber. I *wish* I could choke people with the Force. I *wish* my best friend was a Wookie. I *desire* to know God. It's qualitatively different, but there's no arguing with taste.
Posted by: Bennett | February 02, 2012 at 11:39 AM
http://www.peterkreeft.com/topics/desire.htm That's actually a rather better articulation of the premises and logic of the argument, including the defense against people's wanting things like a plate of Klingon gagh worms, or a Green Lantern power ring.
(PS - The buffermonster is eating posts again)
Posted by: Bennett | February 02, 2012 at 11:50 AM
Sorry Malebranche, but this
Is simply untrue. It is actually contradictory as I noted above. And since your argument is based entirely on the assumption that it is true, it falls to the ground in ruins.Here is a simple counterexample to the so called Is-Ought gap:
- God said "It is wrong to kick a puppy just for fun"
- Whatever God says is true. SO
- It is wrong to kick a puppy just for fun.
The premises of this argument are purely factual. It is a simple matter of fact whether God said something or not. It is a simple matter of fact whether God is truthful or not. The conclusion is moral. It follows from the premises in a rigidly logical fashion.Look at it this way. I hereby declare that it is wrong to kick a puppy just for fun. Now, the most thoroughgoing moral nihilist that has ever drawn breath would have to acknowledge that, as a matter of cold fact, I did say that it is wrong to kick a puppy just for fun.
So an individual's declarations of moral claims are facts, not values. Even though they are declarations of moral claims.
Furthermore, the fact that an individual always tells the truth is a fact, not a value. When we say that some individual is a truth-teller, we are not saying that that individual ought to tell the truth or anything of the sort. We are merely saying that he does tell the truth in fact.
And it does no good to argue that I'm smuggling in an ought by having God speak the truth about a moral claim. That objection begs the question. You are saying that there must be an ought in premises (that clearly contain no ought) simply because the imply an ought.
If the argument is that you can't deduce an ought from premises that do not imply an ought, then you win (what else?). But it is hardly germane to the issue at hand.
Or perhaps you want to say that the difficulty is that I'm assuming that moral claims have truth value by assuming that God can tell the truth about them. And, somehow, that smuggles an ought into the premise set.
Well, actually I'm assuming that moral claims have truth value by calling them claims. They are claims and so it is a fact that they are bearers of truth value. Is, is, is. Not ought.
Because they bear truth value it is possible for an individual to be truthful in affirming (or denying) them.
Posted by: WisdomLover | February 02, 2012 at 03:36 PM
You see, the problem is that the concept-containment theory of logical truth is defective in a whole host of ways. Not the least of these is that it is a claim that purports to be logically true but in which the concept of the subject does not contain the concept of the predicate.
Now, A logically implies B just in case "If A then B" is logically true. So the concept containment notion of logical implication (that the conclusion is already conceptually contained in the premises) is equally defective.
The only reason there really is to think that the ought in the conclusion must already be in the premises is the untrue conceptual containment theory of logical implication.
Posted by: WisdomLover | February 02, 2012 at 03:53 PM
WisdomLover,
Thanks for the reply. Those are high quality comments and show that a qualification needs to be introduced. Although I must confess that when you began discussing the concept containment theory of logical truth, I wondered if you had mistaken me for Leibniz, since I neither accept such an account nor yet see how anything I’ve said commits me to it.
I’ve read similar concerns in Walter Sinnott-Armstrong’s book on moral skepticism, so you’re definitely in good company. Another point that could be made against what I said is the following: suppose we say that P implies Q if and only if it is not possible for P to be true and Q false. With that conception of entailment in hand, it follows that all necessary truths follow from all other truths. So, if we think that propositions like We shouldn’t kill puppies for fun are necessarily true, then they will be entailed by any truth you please, even something like Some books are smaller than some blue things.
Anyway, for those reasons, and the ones you pointed out, I think a qualification is needed. So what do I have in mind? Well let us restrict ourselves to cases where we are trying to explain that in virtue of which a moral fact obtains. That is really what the whole “grounding” problem we hear apologists talk about so frequently concerns anyway. The testimony of an infallible being, though it can provide infallible evidence of moral truth, does not serve to explain that in virtue of which the moral fact obtains in the first place. Or at least so says I. Perhaps we will part ways here.
So, let us restrict ourselves to contexts in which we are explicitly trying to “ground” moral truths in the sense of trying to show that in virtue of which they are true in the first place. Clearly not all premises entailing a moral conclusion also “ground” that moral fact. Consider, for instance, the following argument:
(1) Were there an omniscient rabbit, it would believe “Murder is morally wrong.”
(2) Therefore, murder is morally wrong.
Something like that argument might work. But clearly the wrongness of murder isn’t properly grounded in subjunctive conditionals about omniscient rabbits.
The following question, therefore, arises: are any wholly non-moral facts capable of both (a) entailing moral facts and (b) explaining why those moral facts are facts in the first place? Here it is not obvious, to me at least, that there are any such facts. And if it is not, then it follows that no one, theist or atheist alike, can adequately ground all of morality in a wholly non-moral explanatory base, quite regardless of what they can validly deduce from infallible testimony.
Perhaps you could give us an example of a set of wholly non-moral facts that both (a) entail a moral fact and (b) “ground” that moral fact in the sense of providing that in virtue of which the moral fact obtains in the first place. Anything come to mind?
Posted by: Malebranche | February 02, 2012 at 04:27 PM
bennett,
>> "Of course people can invent imaginary things, but in what way do they legitimately *desire* them"
indeed thats the point
no matter what counter example an atheist would bring up, the christian need only say it is illegitimate.
its classic 'no true scotsman'
e.g.
"No person truly desires X."
"Well, but my Aunt Tilly desired X till the day she died."
"Ah but I said no person TRULY desires X."
Posted by: ToNy | February 02, 2012 at 05:54 PM
ToNy,
Did you read the link? It goes into how the argument is about natural, innate appetites, not veridical wants. I, for example, want a chocolate cookie. That's a true desire, with a real referent. However, it isn't really innate--I wasn't born wanting chocolate cookies, although perhaps "sweetness" is innate.
Whether the argument works is still on the table, but you still seem to be misconstruing what you're disagreeing with.
I don't find it necessarily persuasive as an apologetic either, but mostly because it doesn't prove the Christian God, only a "spiritual realm beyond this world," and even then only if its premises are true. It's a nice little tool, though.
So it isn't whether you truly desire, but whether you innately desire. I know that sounds like I'm moving the goalposts, but that's because I really didn't have such a great grasp on the argument myself, and have to confess that (shock me shock me) I don't know everything. ;)
You may indeed be right that it's not a great proof, but I'm not sure that the "No True Scotsman" thing flies. The more compelling counter-argument is, to me, how on earth do we prove whether anyone *desires* anything? I mean, not only can't I prove that God exists, I can't even really prove to you that I believe in him, other than to tell you. You've only my word to go on as to the reality of my faith, much less its object.
We'd have to find some way of adequately determining what an innate desire is, and how to ascertain their universality, before it could really be said to be a confirmed proof. On the other hand, for someone who does experience that hunger, there's the whole phenomenological proof. Can't argue a man out of an experience with logic, and all that.
Posted by: Bennett | February 02, 2012 at 06:42 PM
I have claimed that morality cannot be adequately “grounded” in wholly non-moral facts. What I should have been more careful to clarify is that by this I should have had in mind the following (I have WisdomLover to thank for bringing this to my attention):
Naturalistic Non-Reduction Thesis: There is no set of wholly non-moral facts that both (a) entails some moral fact, and (b) gives the adequate grounding for the truth of that moral fact in the sense of telling us that in virtue of which the moral fact obtains in the first place.
Against this more qualified thesis, WisdomLover has provided no counterexamples, though perhaps he soon will. If the Naturalistic Non-Reduction Thesis is true, furthermore, then it follows that the only set of facts that moral truths can be grounded in are collections of facts at least one member of which is a moral fact. So, if the Naturalistic Non-Reduction Thesis is true, then neither the theist nor the atheist is able to adequately ground all of morality in a wholly non-moral base. If we recognize moral truths, therefore, and think that all truths are either among the most basic truths or reducible to them, then we must recognize basic, primitive moral truths. As primitives, those truths will not be “grounded” in more basic truths, and so a fortiori won’t be grounded in more basic truths about God.
But suppose the Naturalistic Non-Reduction Thesis is false. Does that show that no moral truth is basic in the way suggested immediately above? Not at all. It would still be available to the atheist to think that some moral truths are just basic, primitive givens concerning which we have no option but to say, “That is just the way things are, it is impossible that they be otherwise, and that is the end of the matter.”
Furthermore, if the Naturalistic Non-Reduction Thesis is false, then it will be less obvious that morality cannot exist given the truth of physicalism. One might think that given physicalism, the most basic facts are going to be non-moral, descriptive facts. I don’t know about that really, but lets just run with it for a second. Any other truths, therefore, must be grounded in these basic facts. But if moral truths can, contrary to the Naturalistic Non-Reduction Thesis, be adequately grounded in wholly non-moral facts, then it is not obvious that they cannot be grounded in the basic non-moral truths that physicalism would countenance. A person might want to use the Naturalistic Non-Reduction Thesis to argue that morality cannot exist in the physicalist world, since given the Naturalistic Non-Reduction Thesis it follows that morality cannot be adequately grounded in the wholly non-moral set of basic facts given by physicalism. But if we reject the Naturalistic Non-Reduction Thesis, then we can’t very well use that justification, since we have thereby conceded that moral truths can turn out to be adequately grounded in entirely non-moral truths.
In summary, the truth of the Naturalistic Non-Reduction Thesis seems to entail, when conjoined with the fact that there are moral facts, that there are basic, primitive moral facts. In that case, those facts won't be grounded in other truths, including other truths about God. If the Naturalistic Non-Reduction Thesis is false, however, then there still may be primitive moral truths, and furthermore its falsity will give us one less reason to think that morality cannot exist in the type of physicalist world where the only basic truths are non-moral truths.
Posted by: Malebranche | February 02, 2012 at 07:49 PM
ya i read it
and i read it last week when it was posted too
it all hinges on the notion of who gets to define innate desires in premise 1
>> "We'd have to find some way of adequately determining what an innate desire is"
right
i think i like my answer
he thinks he likes his own i'm sure.
one wonders, if we programmed a genome such that its resultant brain was innately hard-wired to desire unicorns, would this mean that unicorns existed. Afterall, it would be an innate desire at that point.
One also wonders his stance on evolution.
For if mutation and randomness played as big a role in neuronal architecture as evolutionists said it does, then innate misconstrued desires should be quite commonplace.
Honestly I think the mere presence of the multi billion dollar fantasy genre of books and products is enough to basket this argument.
But whatevssss
Posted by: ToNy | February 03, 2012 at 01:22 AM
Whenever this topic comes up, I always think back to
http://goo.gl/baLXt
Posted by: ToNy | February 03, 2012 at 01:25 AM
Malebranche-
More on the "Is"-"Ought" Gap
My counterexample to the "Is"-"Ought" gap based on God's authority is a bit more compelling than the omniscient rabbit. The reason for this is that, in addition to being a valid argument from an "is" to an "ought", it also might be sound.
Be that as it may, the problem for the supposed "Is"-"Ought" gap goes deeper than just the example of moral authority.
As I said before, mixed propositions are also its undoing. Consider this mixed claim
There is a very plausible argument from M plus a clearly factual claim to a clearly moral claimThereforeNow, item-2 is unquestionably claim of fact. Item-3 is unquestionably a moral claim.The question is, "Is M a factual statement, or a moral statement?" If it is a factual claim, then we're done, no gap separates our "ought" from our "is". So the only hope for the "Is"-"Ought" gap would seem to be the insistence that M is a moral claim.
So is M a moral claim?
Saying that it is turns out not to help either, because M can be deduced from a factual statement. So if M is a moral claim, there is still no gap separating our "ought" from our "is".
The standard way of deducing an if-then statement such as M from a set of one or more premises is to deduce the then-clause from that set of statements plus the assumption that the if-clause is true.
I propose a slight variation on that theme. I'm going to deduce this if-then claim from a factual claim
Claim C is the contrapositive of M. As a matter of form "If A, then B" is the contrapositive of "If not-B, then not-A". Contrapositives are logically equivalent to one another. So by deducing the one from my factual claim, I thereby deduce the other.I'm going start from the purely factual claim that it is not the case that Ed is feeling low. Assuming the if-clause of C, we may construct this trivially valid argument:
ThereforeThis deduction is valid because it is always deductively valid to deduce a proposition, X, form any set of propositions that contains X. So I've deduced the then-clause of C from the purely factual first premise (which is also the then-clause of C) and the assumption of the if-clause of C. That is, I've shown that this argument is valid:ThereforeSome primary treatments of statement logic take inferences like 1"->2" as a basically valid inference pattern in its own right (called Weakening).In any event, the contraposition of item-2" gives us
So M can be deduced from purely factual claims.
So if M is a factual claim, then we can fill the "Is"-"Ought" gap right out of the gate by using it to deduce that Frieda ought to comfort Ed. But if M is a moral claim, then we can deduce that moral claim from a factual claim. And again, no "Is"-"Ought" gap.
Perhaps one might find it promising to think that M is neither moral nor factual. So there are three kinds of claims, moral, factual and non-factual-non-moral. But in all events, there are moral claims and non-moral claims (the set of non-moral claims consists of the union of the set of factual claims and the set of non-factual-non-moral claims). And the whole argument goes through again where we find that we can deduce the moral from the non-moral.
Another way you can look at this is to note that if there is an "Is"-"Ought" gap, there should also be an "Ought"-"Is" gap. It should be equally impossible to derive factual claims from moral claims. After all, if I make a moral claim I have not made any claim of fact. Right?
But this is clearly not so. If I have an obligation not to kick puppies just for fun, then it follows that there are all sorts of true factual claims about me. For example, it follows logically that I have at least one foot...which is a factual claim. If you stop to think about it, every contingent moral claim is shot through with facts.
Mightn't the reverse also be the case.
Well, I think it is. Any claim that is true, but not logically true, is true because God freely chose that it should be so. But God made that choice because God always chooses the best. So the fact that a particular contingency is the case is actually the result of an immense moral determination that the creator of the universe made.
Is There a Grounding Gap?
Let us consider for a moment the possibility raised by Malebranche that at least some moral claims are not contignent, but necessary truths.
I think this is plausible. And I'll go into a specific example in a moment.
However, I want to fist address an argument that I think Malebranche was hinting at or at least seems to be tempted by. To wit, that if a truth is a necessary truth, then, though it is implied by anything, it is grounded by none.
I don't think this is true. The proposition that Richard prevailed at Arsuf or Richard did not prevail at Arsuf is a logical truth of the most basic kind. And it is implied by anything and everything. But it also has a perfectly good foundation: Richard's victory over Saladin at Arsuf. The statement that "A or not-A" is made true by the truth of A, or it is made true by the truth of not-A. Whichever it is is the foundation for the truth of "A or not-A"
So necessary truths can be grounded.
Now, as I said above, I think that it is entirely possible that at least some moral claims are necessary truths, and grounded by factual claims that entail them.
For example, the Categorical Imperative, hereafter the CI, is surely a moral claim. Well, OK, the CI is actually an imperative, so not a claim at all. But it is easily translated into a moral claim: One ought only to act according to the policy which one can, in the selfsame act, coherently choose as a universal law..
It also seems that this claim, if true at all is a necessary truth of some sort. It is not a simple tautology like "A or not-A". It is more like the "I think, I am". It is necessarily true every time it is considered.
The way I think Kant is going is to say that the fact that an individual is even considering whether the CI is binding on him shows that he is, in fact rational and free. And the fact that an individual is rational and free, in turn, implies the moral claim that the CI is binding on him. The fact of the rationality and freedom of the agent implies and is the factual basis of the moral claim that binds him.
And BTW, however binding the CI may be on an individual, no limited agent can act according to the CI unless he also assumes the fact of his own immortality and the fact of God's existence. This is because all limited rational beings must, of necessity, choose their own happiness. But happiness and virtue manifestly do not coincide in this world. We must therefore, if we are to satisfy both the aim of happiness and the aim of duty, assume that there is a life after and that a free powerful being is in control of all ends and will bring these two aims together.
So there is no "Is"-"Ought" Grounding Gap either At least, not in a deontological system of morality.
But What if Morality is Consequentialist?
Well, in a consequentialist system something like the Greatest Happiness Principle, hereafter, the GHP, is operative. But isn't it clear, in that case, that the consequentialist is proposing the GHP as a definition of what "right" means?
As such, the GHP is an analytic truth. That is, it is true by definition. Anything that follows from a set of claims and an analytic truth follows from the set of claims alone. Thus, if "Frieda ought to comfort Ed" follows from "Ed is feeling low" plus some other facts, plus the GHP, it follows from "Ed is feeling low" plus those other facts alone.
OK. But the GHP is just a definition. It is an arbitrary choice of a group of language users on how they will interpret their various signs and gestures. Right?
Well, note first that if the GHP is a good definition it is grounded in mundane facts about how people use the symbol "right".
Still, I suppose that at some meta-level, we also want to know whether people ought to use that symbol in that way. If we define "right" so that it is both something we expect people to choose and so that it implies that it is right to engage in ruthless eugenics programs, then we've probably gone adrift somehow with our definitions.
What keeps us from going adrift? Well you can talk about survivability and competitiveness etc. But that's never really going to get to the bottom of it. In the end, it will come down to the Providence of God. And the reason God provided for us in just the way He did is going to boil down to the the determinations God made when He created the world.
Final Remarks
Please notice that I have not argued here or anywhere that there are two hermetically sealed sets of propositions: facts and values (or some such). And that there is nevertheless a way to logically get from one to the other.
What I have been arguing is that the whole notion of the hermetically sealed categories is an inconsistent illusion.
My point is that every claim is shot through with moral and factual implications. The reason that there is no problem with an "Is"-"Ought" gap is not the existence of some logical conveyance to get us from one side of the chasm to the other. The reason is that there is no gap in the first place. "Is" and "Ought" exist on one broad plain of reality.
Posted by: WisdomLover | February 03, 2012 at 04:38 AM
WisdomLover,
Thanks for the reply.
My counterexample to the "Is"-"Ought" gap based on God's authority is a bit more compelling than the omniscient rabbit. The reason for this is that, in addition to being a valid argument from an "is" to an "ought", it also might be sound.
Well, is not the argument from the omniscient rabbit also sound? Is it not true that were there an omniscient rabbit, it would believe that murder is wrong? And can we not infer from that that murder is wrong? I fail to see how considerations of soundness reveal any advantage that the argument from divine testimony has over the argument from omniscient rabbit testimony. And in any case, I think that neither of them ground the wrongness of murder. Certainly God saying “Human joy is good,” for instance, does nothing to explain what is good about human joy in the first place. So, I fail to see why your case of divine testimony is at all more compelling as an example of providing a wholly non-moral grounding for a moral fact than the example of an omniscient rabbit.
What about the inferences you lay out? What you take yourself to be doing is not always apparent to me, and I confess to having never come across “weakening” in logic. Another puzzle is that your premise (2) (i.e., Ed is feeling low) contradicts your premise (1’) (e.g., it’s not the case that Ed is feeling low). It seems that you need premise (2), moreover, in order to make this point: “If M is a non-moral claim, then we can get a moral claim from entirely non-moral premises.” And it seems that you need (1’) to get your (3’). Perhaps I’m just not following what you’re up to, but it looks like you need both a proposition to be true and false in order to make your point, which is problematic.
But here we go anyway. First, I should clarify that by “entailment” I do not merely have in mind the rules governing material implication. According to that, as you may know, the following is true: If there are unicorns, then there is no God. This is true because the antecedent is false and a material conditional is true in all cases in which the antecedent is false. But of course that does nothing whatsoever to reveal some deep logical relationship between the existence of unicorns and the non-existence of God, and it should not trouble in the least a person who says that God’s existence is compatible with the existence of unicorns. That is just a feature of the truth conditions of material implication that fails to capture what we, or at least I, mean by “entailment,” which is closer to (something like) “P entails Q if and only if any possible world in which P is true is also a possible world in which Q is true.” Now if some moral truths are necessary truths, then on this conception of entailment, they will be entailed by everything. So, I would like to restrict our inferences to contexts in which we are not already assuming the necessary truth of the moral proposition, since clearly in those instance we could infer it from anything you please.
You say you wish to assume that the antecedent of C is true. Ok, let us assume that.
(1) Suppose it’s not the case that Frieda ought to comfort Ed.
Consider that moral claim entirely supposed. You also help yourself to the following:
(2) It’s not the case that Ed is feeling low.
Ok, let us grant the truth of (2). But of course, (2) has in no way been deduced, in the sense of entailment outlined above, from our initial supposition. You could have just as well replaced (2) with “Some books are rather old,” but would not have thereby revealed some deep logical connection between (1) and (2). Now of course we can deduce, in the sense outlined above, (2) from the conjunction of (1) and (2). Sure. But that is merely because (2) is being deduced from itself; the presence of (1) is entirely non-essential to that, and this does nothing to show that from (1) it deductively follows that (2). So I fail to see any case of a purely moral claim entailing a purely non-moral claim, or vice versa. It may be that there are systems of logic that permit inferences that would enable a person to make the point you make. But that, by itself, does nothing to show that those rules are accurately capturing our notion of “entailment” which is intimately hooked up to a necessary connection between propositions. It would do nothing to show, for instance, that after having his attention called to a purely non-moral fact, the moral nihilist, if rational, should infer a moral fact and thereby relinquish his moral nihilism. As you probably know from the abundance of systems of modal logic, once the various systems are proposed, we are still left with questions like, “Is S5 more useful for modeling good modal inferences or is S4 or some other system still?” So, the mere presence of systems that permit inferences does not suffice to vindicate those inferences as accurate models of good reasoning.
As far as Kantian deontology and its justification for the CI, I hardly am convinced that Kantians can successfully deduce their CI from entirely non-moral premises. Kant himself, as is typical of his writing, is about clear as mud on how any deduction is supposed to go, and of course Kantianism does not exhaust all of deontological space.
So, despite the logical inferences (concerning which I may have missed your point at times), I fail to see any example offered of an entirely non-moral claim that both (a) entails a moral claim, and (b) provides the grounding for that moral claim in the sense of giving that in virtue of which the moral truth is true in the first place. In fact, it appears that your comment entirely ignores condition (b), which is the condition I added to my claim in response to your previous comments.
But suppose that you are right, and that we can deduce a moral truth from an entirely factual truth like “Ed is feeling low” or what have you. The fact, therefore, satisfies condition (a) above. Either it satisfies (b) as well or it does not. If it does not, then the deduction still is not relevant to the qualification I introduced in my previous comment. If it does, then apparently the physicalist can adequately ground at least one moral truth, since the physicalist can ground it in the factual claim that Ed is feeling low. In that case, one wonders what is left of the apologist's claim that physicalists have a "grounding" problem with morality.
Posted by: Malebranche | February 03, 2012 at 06:52 AM
Just noticed something that might be rather confusing. I wrote,
You say you wish to assume that the antecedent of C is true. Ok, let us assume that.
(1) Suppose it’s not the case that Frieda ought to comfort Ed.
Consider that moral claim entirely supposed. You also help yourself to the following:
(2) It’s not the case that Ed is feeling low.
Unfortunately, as you can see, I introduced my own numbering system here that does not follow WisdomLover’s original numbering system. I regret doing that. Sorry if that makes things more confusing than they already are.
Posted by: Malebranche | February 03, 2012 at 06:58 AM
ToNy,
I do think I see what you're getting at, and I concede the point that God could, as Freud said long ago, be a 'projection' or the like. The biological determinism factor would cut against you, though--it makes little sense that we would have a false "drive." False beliefs, sure, evolution doesn't select for thoughts. But I think that's where the argument hinges--is God a thought, or is God a drive?
Take Tom Brady. He's pretty much got it all. Gorgeous wife, healthy kids, more money and fame than he can handle, top of his profession, everything we're told to want in America. And yet, in an interview, someone asked him about it, and he admitted that he'd accomplished "pretty much everything" that he could in this world. "But isn't there something more?" he added. Something beyond all this. It's that "something more" hunger, *whatever it may be directed towards* that suggests a realm of experience outside this world.
I don't disagree with you that we could direct that hunger towards something totally different from God, and/or something totally false. It's that ennui, that sense of "I have everything, and yet I feel as if there should be something more fulfilling..." Humans are the only animal that, if we're kept warm, and fed, and safe, but don't have a purpose, will become desperately unhappy and ennervated. I nearly turned suicidal during a long period of unemployment. I wasn't financially bereft (yet) but I was completely unable to *do* anything meaningful, and it was the worst experience of my life, far worse than the most menial job or messed-up camping trip.
We're purposive critters, that much is for sure. The question is, why do we feel like we have a purpose that goes past anything and everything that we can do on earth, reading comic books and watching Avatar included?
Posted by: Bennett | February 03, 2012 at 11:51 AM
Just have time right now to focus in on the mixed proposition arguments.
I stand by everything I said, but if you find it confusing Malebranche, then I think that proves it could be (and ought to be :-) stated more simply. That is to say, I have a high view of your reading comprehension.
I'm going to try again and avoid the use of if-then statements. Instead, I will use inclusive either-or statements. That is either-or statements that are true if one or both of their terms are true, and false only if both terms are false.
Start with this argument:
ThereforeThis is, I hope you can clearly see, a perfectly valid argument. It follows by a simple process of elimination. The claim in 2 eliminates one of the two alternatives in 1.Premise 2 is a plainly non-moral claim, but the conclusion, 3, is a moral claim.
What about premise 1?
Well according to the Humean Principle, 1 must be a moral claim. If it were non-moral, then we've just derived a moral claim from non-moral claims (which the Humean Principle tells us is impossible).
OK. But then what are we saying? Is it just our little either-or about Ed and Frieda that we are saying is a moral claim?
No, that can't be it. I could obviously make some similar argument about Suzy and Roger that works the same:
ThereforeAnd we're going to have to make the same claim about 1' that we made about 1. It's got to be a moral claim.Indeed, it looks like I could make a similar argument for any either or of the form Either NON-MORAL-CLAIM, or MORAL-CLAIM (or both). Let's call such a claim a mixed either-or claim.
So it looks like all mixed either-or claims are going to have to be identified as themselves moral claims.
OK. Now stop for a moment to fix that into your mind. The Humean Principle plus the Process of Elimination implies that every mixed either-or statement must be a moral claim.
Selah.
********************************
Let's now consider a different argument:
ThereforeThis argument is again plainly valid.In general, if "A" is true, then it's obviously the case that "either A or B" is true. That is, you may deduce an either-or claim from either one of its terms. This inference pattern is sometimes called Disjunction Introduction
All that I've done in 1"-2" is to use disjunction introduction to deduce the either-or in 2" from its non-moral term (found in 1").
Now, 1" is, as noted, a non-moral claim, so by the Humean Principle, since 2" is deduced from 1", it cannot be a moral claim.
And again, our little concerns about Fred and Edna are just the tip of the iceberg.
We could clearly devise as many similar arguments as you'd like to illustrate the fact that no mixed either-or claim may be identified as itself a moral claim.
********************************
So all mixed either-or statements must be moral claims. This is based on the process of elimination and the Humean Principle.
At the same time no mixed either or statement can be a moral claim. This is based on disjunction elimination and the Humean Principle.
The process of elimination and the disjunction introduction principles are not in doubt. There are very few logical inference rules more obvious that those two.
It was the Humean Principle that got us into this contradictory pickle. It is the Humean Principle that must be rejected as contradictory.
Posted by: WisdomLover | February 03, 2012 at 01:30 PM
There are lots of ways to tell a grand biology story and describe said "feelings of purpose"
I mean personally, i don't have them.
But human motivation is horrendously complex and very poorly understood. It may just be a byproduct of the great evolutionary benefit in striving for exceptionalism.
id guess such thoughts of "That's it? Isnt there something else to do?" are probably just related to the same Coolidge Effect we observe in most mammals after they have sex.
i.e. "That's it? Isnt there someone else to screw?"
it wouldn't surprise me if the networks are related. and it would make a for a great phd fMRI research project.
aside from all that, we've lost focus on my assertion of the weakness of his premise 1... he's just going to invoke his prerogative to sidestep any counter example.
Anyway, its simply a horrendously weak argument. And, for all we know, might simply imply that we are meant for another world in a different Galaxy (not heaven) - a la Odo's pressing need to return to his own planet where he could merge into the great metallic soup that comprised his own race -- on Deep Space Nine.
watevsssssss
Posted by: ToNy | February 03, 2012 at 02:48 PM
ToNy,
It could very well be any of those things, I do agree on that much at least. And it's definitely not an argument I'd try to get any mileage out of. That said, I think he's within his rights to insist that we have to settle on a common definition of "desire" before we can even assess the argument, otherwise we get into this kind of semantic debate. That you and he don't agree on such a definition means that you're just at complete loggerheads from the get-go, and ends in, as you put it "watevssssss."
Posted by: Bennett | February 03, 2012 at 03:00 PM
WisdomLover,
Ok, that is much clearer to me, so thanks.
There’s something else I want to clarify. Suppose we articulate the Humean Principle as follows:
HP1: No non-moral fact entails a moral fact.
So articulated, I think that is false. Some moral truths are necessary truths, and so are entailed by everything. So, we are both in full agreement that HP1 is false. That’s why I introduced the qualification in clause (b) of the Naturalistic Non-Reduction Thesis. What I now want to know is whether you think any collection of wholly non-moral facts could both (a) entail a moral truth, and (b) provide the grounds for that moral truth in the sense of giving us that in virtue of which the moral truth is a truth in the first place. As far as I can tell, no example of such a collection of facts has been given. But presumably this is what would be required to properly ground morality in a wholly non-moral base.
Before moving any further, however, I’d like to say a word about what I think is a more promising Humean Principle. Perhaps the thought behind the “Can’t derive an ought from an is” slogan is the following:
HP2: Known authoritative moral testimony aside, we humans cannot come to know moral truths on the basis of deducing them from entirely non-moral truths.
I think HP2 is more promising than HP1, although it may need qualification too. To see why I think it’s more promising, I’ll begin with the argument you present concerning Ed and Frieda.
You write,
Your hopes are gratified. Perhaps you’ll permit me to replace your (1) with the following logically equivalent proposition (I’m glad you wrote it as a disjunction, but permit me to rewrite it, if you will):
(a) If Ed is feeling low, then Frieda should comfort him.
Ok. I’m still not sure if you’re treating this as a material conditional or a statement of logical entailment. Suppose we are treating it as a statement of logical entailment, i.e., that every possible world in which the antecedent holds is also a world in which the consequent holds. Here’s a worry. If we interpret it in this fashion, then I wonder if there is any non-question begging way for us to know that it is true. One way to know that it is true is to already know that the consequent is necessarily true. In that case, it will be entailed by the antecedent, as well as anything else you please. But surely the spirit behind the Humean slogan isn’t meaning to deny that we can infer a truth already known to be necessary from anything we please. That’s not what HP2 says, at least. What the Humean is interested in is how a person who doesn’t already know the consequent of (a) could come to learn that (a)’s consequent is true merely on the basis of deducing it from the antecedent. The Humean says there is no way, which sounds very plausible to me. Does that particular Humean claim sound plausible to you?
What if we treat (a) merely as a material conditional? In that case I doubt we are even playing the game the Humeans wanted to play. Since a material conditional is false if and only if its antecedent is true and its consequent false, we know that moral truths are materially implied by any falsehood you like. That’s not what the Humean wants to deny. The Humean, as articulated in HP2, wants to know how, known authoritative moral testimony aside, we can come to learn that the consequent of (a) is materially implied by its antecedent when the antecedent is known to be true. And here again, it seems that the only way is to already know that the consequent of (a) is true as well. But if that’s right, then clearly we aren’t going to lean (a)’s consequent on the basis of seeing that it is materially implied by the antecedent.
So, although the argument may be sound, the Humean will insist that it is no good for us coming to learn that Frieda morally ought to help Ed, since unless we already know this moral fact we will not be in the position to know that both of its premises are true. It is for these reasons that these arguments will certainly cause no moral nihilist the least bit of worry. That is what I think the Humeans should say, even if their sloppy slogan suggests something different.
Anyway, enough defense of the Humeans. That is what I have to say on their behalf, but I’m hoping to get back to the Naturalistic Non-Reduction Thesis, which I introduced precisely because of the merit in your objection. It says the following:
Naturalistic Non-Reduction Thesis: There is no set of wholly non-moral facts that both (a) entails some moral fact, and (b) gives the adequate grounding for the truth of that moral fact in the sense of telling us that in virtue of which the moral fact obtains in the first place.
I wonder if you think this is true. Suppose it is. Then it would seem (assuming there are moral truths and that any derivative truth is reducible to a collection of primitive truths) that among the primitive truths about reality are moral truths. As primitives, they aren’t grounded in more fundamental facts, including more fundamental facts about God. In that case, the atheist can simply respond to the apologist’s demand for further grounding by saying, “What you seem to not understand is that I take some moral facts as primitive, and if I am right in that respect, then ex hypothesi they cannot be further grounded at all. Perhaps I am mistaken, but that is at least my view, and your insistence that I give further grounding for facts I have told you I take as absolutely basic makes me think you don’t even understand the content of my position.”
Suppose the Naturalistic Non-Reduction Thesis is false. Then there is some set of wholly non-moral facts that both entails a moral truth and adequately grounds that truth in the sense of telling us that in virtue of which the moral fact obtains in the first place. If that is the case, however, then whence the confidence from the apologist that atheists cannot adequately ground morality? I thought the basic argument here was that no moral truths can be adequately grounded in physical facts, which (it is asserted) are the only facts around for an atheist (I don’t believe that the atheist is stuck only with moral facts, but let that pass). But if we are going to reject the Naturalistic Non-Reduction Thesis, then how can we keep saying that? To reject that Naturalistic Non-Reduction Thesis is just to admit that moral facts can be adequately grounded in a wholly non-moral basis.
Finally, I hope this point does not get lost in the discussion, since I think it is very important. Quite apart from disputes about Humean principles and about the Naturalistic Non-Reduction Thesis, it is entirely available to the atheist to simply take some moral truths as basic, primitive truths in need of no more fundamental grounding. The atheist, therefore, can in those cases simply reject the demand from the apologist to give a grounding of that moral truth. So my question is this. Suppose we are speaking with Mr. Atheist, and Mr. Atheist thinks that a truth like Joy is good is a primitive, fundamental, basic, entirely non-derivative, objective value fact about the world. What problem or blunder does the apologist think he can catch Mr. Atheist in? Presumably folks like Amy think they have caught all atheists who believe in objective moral values in a blunder. Since that includes Mr. Atheist, I wonder what blunder the apologist’s have caught him in.
Posted by: Malebranche | February 03, 2012 at 03:19 PM
Oops, I wrote,
And should have written,
Posted by: Malebranche | February 03, 2012 at 03:49 PM
Mal and WL,
If you guys decide to co-write a book, put me down for an advance copy. I wish there had been more like y'all in my college philosophy classes.
Posted by: Bennett | February 03, 2012 at 04:53 PM