The Nature of Moral Obligations: Moral Incumbency

In discussions of morality, we often use phrases like “John ought to do X” or “John ought not to do Y.” But what is this oughtness we refer to? What can be said of it to help us better understand the nature of morality? The oughtness of a moral obligation is what philosophers call incumbency, and as we explore the nature of moral incumbency, four observations arise that seem to resist naturalistic explanations.

First, the incumbency of moral obligations demands something from us and binds us to something. Moral obligations have an external force that presses in on us and compels us to act or refrain from acting in certain ways. We may be more acutely aware of this invisible demand when we're alone. For example, imagine I'm at a convenience store to purchase a Snickers candy bar, and the lone cashier informs me he has to use the restroom in the back of the store and subsequently departs from the cash register. Prior experience informs me this convenience store has no security cameras, and a quick observation helps me to determine no one else is in the store and no cars are in the parking lot. At this point a temptation to take the Snickers without paying for it may come rushing into my mind. However, the temptation is accompanied by a second experience, an awareness of what I ought to do. My awareness of an obligation not to take what does not belong to me presses in on me with such force that it compels right action. Therefore, I stand at the counter with my Snickers, waiting for the cashier to return.

The objector may claim that not everyone experiences this incumbency. But what follows from this? Certainly my experiences or feelings are irrelevant to the actual state-of-affairs. My claim is not that the experience of moral incumbency is universally felt, but that one’s incumbency to moral obligations obtains in the actual world.

Second, moral obligations are unconditional imperatives. They're incumbent upon us whether we desire them or not, agree to them or not, or recognize them or not. There's no opting out of our moral obligations. We simply must obey. And no one thinks you are excused if you choose not to fulfill them. Indeed, we're justified in considering such a person to be morally reprehensible or deficient and deserving of punishment.[1] This is why fathers who don't desire and consequently refrain from paying child support are called “dead-beat dads” and sent to jail.

Third, this incumbency applies not only to one’s actions but to the underlying motives as well. I may have an obligation to help a little old lady across the street, but my obligation reaches deeper than just the action itself. I also have an obligation to be properly motivated in doing so. If I help the old lady across the street because I believe we ought to take care of weaker individuals in society or because I believe she has dignity and value in virtue of her being a human being, I am properly motivated. However, if I'm motivated by a desire to get some money from her in the end, I would be considered morally repugnant. Thus, moral obligations make demands not only on the observable action but on the unobservable motive as well.

Finally, moral obligations place demands on us prior to any action.[2] It is neither necessary nor sufficient for one to be in the midst of action to experience the incumbency of obligations. We may simply reflect on a given behavior and experience the demands of our moral obligation. I reflect for a brief moment on the act of child abuse, and I am immediately aware that I ought to refrain from such behavior.

So what is the naturalist to make of moral incumbency? It would seem such a feature of moral obligations do not fit a naturalistic view of reality. Moral obligations have an invisible external force that makes demands not only on our actions but on our motives as well, and those demands come into play prior to any action. At the same time, such obligations may be counterproductive to our good. If naturalism is true, it would be very difficult to account for the fact of moral incumbency.

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[1] I will expand on the notion of deserved punishment in tomorrow's post.

[2] Francis J. Beckwith and Gregory Koukl, Relativism: Feet Firmly Planted in Mid-Air (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1998), p. 166.

 

Comments

[scbrownlhrm]

Unless and until reality confronts reason with an immutable *grain* – with a fundamental *shape*, then reason stands justified in and by her own essence such that her searching out any particular grain, shape, or crevice which she deems worthy sums to morally reasonable motion. Indifference alone confronts reason inside of Naturalism’s immutable grain, inside its fundamental shape, and thus we find her – reason – as a voice unto herself with no voice to counter, no voice to confront her such that reality cannot find the morally un-reasonable. Feser alludes to such isolation, such ontological silence in the pains of such a chain of metaphysical IOU’s, “If a series of hypothetical imperatives is to have rationally binding force, it has to trace ultimately to some imperative at the head of the line that has categorical force.”

Unless and until the relentless contours of immutable love confront reason as the unavoidable fact, as the immutable grain, as the fundamental shape of the categorical paradigm there at the end of all things, unless and until that, it is the case that reason hears only herself, as reality finds only the voicelessness of Indifference confronting Reason. Therein, it is factually the case that Reason hears only herself, such that the definition of the morally un-reasonable becomes un-intelligible.

We find, then, our focus not on substance per se, but, rather, on paradigmatic start/stop points per se. Should (natural) Reason find love’s categorical paradigm at the end of the line, then indeed God fashions one paradigm (Dust, Contingent, Mutable) such that (natural) Reason perceives quite another paradigm in the Immutable Love of the Necessary Being. Whereas, if (natural) Reason hears only the sound of her own voice (on the one hand) and the voicelessness of Indifference (on the other hand), then Hume is correct:

“Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger. ‘Tis not contrary to reason for me to chuse my total ruin, to prevent the least uneasiness of an Indian or person wholly unknown to me. ‘Tis as little contrary to reason to prefer even my own acknowledg'd lesser good to my greater, and have a more ardent affection for the former than for the latter.” (Treatise of Human Nature 2.3.3.6).

The fundamental shape of reality finds nothing which confronts Reason, leaving Reason justified of her own Self, her own essence. Hume's intellectual honesty on that interface of (natural) Reason "in-here" with the factual shape of reality "out-there" is refreshing.

However, once love confronts Reason as that fateful paradigm – the fundamental shape of reality – the unavoidable fact, then, and only then, reason is (factually) found free to chase after some other shape elsewhere though she shall be, then, the factual contradiction of Reality.

[Goat Head 5]

The "moral argument", mainly as put forth by C.S. Lewis in Mere Christianity, is why I reason that God exists. I'm a Christian because of Lewis and Dallas Willard.

[Jason T V]

Upon having a better understanding of man's duty, concerning his moral obligation, or incumbency, using these four points, it would seem that one could also apply these in reverse? So, whether man does this in the order you have suggested, (when one puts "man's moral obligation" under greater investigation) or in the reverse, as I have, we see its origin is from God, but that the reverse order can be seen as a witness that returns to God, so to speak. And it further emphasizes man's obligation, as binding? Having no ability to escape his God-given, moral obligation. There being no excuses, loopholes, and zero room for error.

[First], "...moral obligations place demands on us prior to any action. I reflect for a brief moment on the act of child abuse, and I am immediately aware that I ought to refrain from such behavior."

[Second], "...this incumbency applies not only to one’s actions but to the underlying motives as well. ...I also have an obligation to be properly motivated."

[Third], "...moral obligations are unconditional imperatives. They're incumbent upon us whether we desire them or not, agree to them or not, or recognize them or not."

[Finally], "...the incumbency of moral obligations demands something from us and binds us to something. Moral obligations have an external force that presses in on us and compels us to act or refrain from acting in certain ways."

[John Moore]

I must be missing something, because I just don't see why moral obligations are unconditional imperatives. Do you have any supporting arguments for this point, or do you just assume it?

See, if you don't mind the punishment, then you're free to break the moral law. What could be simpler than that?

If you don't mind dying, go ahead and jump off the cliff. If you don't mind going to hell, go ahead and curse God. If you don't mind people calling you reprehensible or deficient and deserving of punishment, then you can do anything you want.

In every case, it seems clear that moral obligations are conditional on the results and your desires. The reason for following moral rules is because you desire the good results, or you desire to avoid the bad results.

What could it even mean for a moral obligation to be unconditional?

[scbrownlhrm]

John,

You're correct. In Naturalism's paradigm all morality begins and ends, is contingent on, the interior goals of contingent and mutable animals. "Morally Un-Reasonable" is ontologically, factually, as Hume and logic affirm, unintelligible.

[John Moore]

It's not just naturalism - any kind of morality would have to be conditional on results and desires. If theism says moral rules are unconditional, that just sounds incoherent. I don't see how any other position can be logical.

[scbrownlhrm]

John,

You’re stuck inside of Naturalism's means and ends.

Your Necessary/Sufficient which sums to The Good - The Moral, is constituted of the following

1) The interior, contingent, and mutable goals of the Self

2) The freedom to align the Self, the Self’s goal, with some feature of the world external to the Self

3) The freedom to align the Self, the Self’s goal, against some feature of the world external to the Self

Therefore, you conclude: “Any kind of morality would have to be conditional on results and desires.”

Given the constitution of your means and your ends, you’re correct. Hume agrees with you:

““Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger. ‘Tis not contrary to reason for me to chuse my total ruin, to prevent the least uneasiness of an Indian or person wholly unknown to me. ‘Tis as little contrary to reason to prefer even my own acknowledg'd lesser good to my greater, and have a more ardent affection for the former than for the latter.” (Treatise of Human Nature 2.3.3.6).”

The fundamental shape of Naturalism’s paradigmatic Indifference leaves Reality categorically voiceless, unable to confront said Reason of said contingent and mutable Self, leaving said Reason justified of her own Self, her own essence. Your own and Hume's intellectual honesty on that interface of (natural) Reason "in-here" with the factual shape of reality "out-there" is refreshing.

The Theist does not argue with you that morality is, if you insist, entirely material as such leaves you fundamentally unable to finance the very expensive metaphysical real estate of immutable love. That is to say, love does not precede and out-distance the indifferent, but, rather, the indifferent precedes and out-distances love.

Hence, all your definitions, all your means, all your ends, affirm your conclusion that, factually speaking, The Good, The Moral, is based entirely on the Self, the Self’s goals, the Self’s desires. Hard Stop.

[scbrownlhrm]

John,

In the Christian paradigm, Love and Being and The Good and Reason are contours of an ontological singularity, not separate blind spots within your own paradigm's ontological Start-Stop of Indifference.

Reason thus finds herself factually amid Final Causes, such that the phrase "I ought" finds Reason factually spying her true, or final, felicity. Final Causes carry us to The Good, to Immutable Love there amid the three unavoidable vertices of being. Such finds Reality constituted of that which we cannot deny, on pain of incoherence, there in all the affairs of "Self / Other / Us" in our own undeniable experience of being. The immutable love of the Triune God, of The Necessary, extricates Final Causes wherein all such contours precede and out-distance me, precede and out-distance the contingent and mutable Self. They do not begin and end in me, in the contingent and mutable Self .

The desires and the goals and the volition you speak of fail to sum to the Necessary and Sufficient, though, as we've seen, you have them as your Necessary and Sufficient. But you have to Stat and Stop or Begin and End your paradigm's "I Ought" there in your own paradigm's unavoidably arbitrary and ultimately indifferent "necessary and sufficient", and so you do. Hence your own, and Hume's, Hard Stop, as described in earlier comments.

[John Moore]

I don't think the self's goal is mutable. Maybe that's where you misunderstood me. All people always want the same thing for all eternity. The problem, of course, is that people don't clearly know their true desires. Our conception of the goal may change, but the one goal is immutable.

This way my self-oriented morality is indeed connected to reality. The one goal of all humanity is an aspect of objective reality.

[scbrownlhrm]

John,

Your [I-Want] has been connected to reality (naturalism's paradigm) the whole time.

There's no news there.

Nor is there any news in naturalists asserting that contingent and mutable constitutions are in turn then constituted of immutable [I-Want's].

Philosophical Naturalism never seems content with itself.

[scbrownlhrm]

"....remember, our primary concern is not with guilt feelings but an objective state of guilt resulting from a failure to fulfill moral obligations..."

Guilt feelings is a feature of morality that does not on necessity resist naturalistic explanations.

Objective moral obligations/guilt not only resist naturalistic explanations, but such are simply unintelligible within a blind cul-de-sac which Naturalism’s Ocean of Indifference factually precedes, subsumes, and out-distances.

Naturalists keep looking at, not the whole of reality, not even the blind cul-de-sac of plant, animal, rabbit, sky, earth, and insect, but, inexplicably, at one narrow slice within that blind cul-de-sac. They call that slice "kindness", and they, upon slicing it out and isolating it, hold it up and shout, "You see! Love! Therefore evolved objective morality!" Then, feeling like they've made an argument, move to the next argument and, lost in amnesia, shout, "There is too much evil in the world! Therefore there is no god!"

It's a sort of comedy.

And though we never buy any tickets, they keep playing the movie.